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Abstract 
This thesis examines beliefs regarding spiritual conceptions of evil among South Africans 
and the role that such attitudes may play in outbreaks of public and other forms of violence. 
In examining these illiberal attitudes and consequent violence, the thesis contributes to the 
discourse on democratic consolidation in South Africa. It is argued that illiberal values – such 
as the belief in evil as a literal force which may be countered with violence - present a 
challenge to the country‟s liberal democratic system of governance. 
The thesis is both quantitative and qualitative in nature. It includes a longitudinal analysis of 
the secondary data of the World Values Survey. The latter is used for two purposes: to 
measure the extent of beliefs in evil among South Africans and to find predictors for these 
beliefs. Quantitative analysis revealed that the beliefs in evil is widespread in South Africa 
and that over half the population may believe that violence can be used to rid communities of 
persons deemed evil. However, despite an exhaustive quantitative analysis of independent 
variables – including demographic, socio-economic and attitudinal factors as well as trust and 
tolerance, locus of control and religiosity - no definitive predictors of the attitudes regarding 
evil could be found. It is concluded that the beliefs in question are so universal and 
entrenched in South Africa that they cannot be associated with any particular demographic or 
other group. 
In the absence of quantitative findings, the thesis turns to qualitative analysis to explain the 
widespread nature of illiberal beliefs in South Africa. The thesis examines the country‟s 
serious problems with crime and violence. It also posits that South Africa has experienced a 
decivilisation process in which liberal values have to compete with the absolute individualism 
of an Hobbesian state of nature. 
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Opsomming 
Hierdie tesis ondersoek geloof in spirituele konsepsies van onheil onder Suid-Afrikaners en 
die rol wat sulke oortuigings kan speel in die uitbreek van openbare en ander soort geweld. 
Deur hierdie illiberale houdings en gevolglike geweld te ondersoek, maak die tesis „n bydrae 
tot die diskoers oor demokratiese konsolidasie in Suid-Afrika. Daar word geargumenteer dat 
illiberale waardes – soos die geloof in bose magte as „n letterlike verskynsel wat met geweld 
gekonfronteer mag word – „n uitdaging aan die land se liberale demokratiese regeerstelsel 
bied. 
 
Die tesis is beide kwantitatief en kwalitatief van aard. Dit sluit „n longitudinale analiese van 
die sekondêre data van die “World Values Survey” in. Laasgenoemde is gebruik te bereiking 
van twee doelwitte: om die omvang van die geloof in onheil onder Suid-Afrikaners te bepaal 
en om voorspellende onafhanklike veranderlikes vir hierdie oortuigings te vind. 
Kwantitatiewe analiese het bevind dat die geloof in onheil baie algemeen in Suid-Afrika 
voorkom en dat meer as die helfde van die bevolking glo dat geweld gebruik kan word om 
van sogenaamde bose persone in die gemeenskap ontslae te raak. Ten spyte van „n deeglike 
kwantitatiewe analiese van onafhanklike veranderlikes – insluitende demografiese, sosio-
ekonomiese en houdings- faktore asook vertroue en verdraagsaamheid, “locus of control” en 
godsdienstelikheid – kon geen voorspellende veranderlikes vir die geloof in onheil gevind 
word nie. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die relevante oortuigings so sterk en universiëel voorkom 
in Suid-Afrika, dat dit nie met een spesifieke demografiese of ander soort groep geassosieer 
kan word nie. 
 
In die afwesigheid van kwantitatiewe bevindings, word kwalitatiewe analiese gebruik om te 
verduidelik hoekom illiberale geloofsoortuigings so algemeen in Suid-Afrika voorkom. Die 
tesis ondersoek die land se ernstige probleme met misdaad en geweld en argumenteer dat 
Suid-Afrika „n proses van “decivilisation” ondervind waarin liberale waardes met die 
absolute individualisme van „n Hobbesiaanse “state of nature” moet kompeteer. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Introduction 
“If it took two hundred years of political change from the Age of Revolution to 1970 to generate 
about fifty new democratic states, it has taken only ten years since the mid-1980s to yield the 
same number again” (Caldeira & Holston, 1999:691). 
 
In 1972 electoral democracies comprised 33% of the world‟s 160 states. By 1996 that number 
had almost doubled to 62% or 118 out of 191 states (Caldeira & Holston, 1999:691). The 
rapid democratisation of the late 20
th
 century is in stark contrast to the much slower processes 
that initially occurred in Western countries. Although the democratic newcomers have all the 
institutional requirements of democracy, they often experience violations of citizens‟ civil 
liberties.  
 
In advanced democracies, civil liberties are associated with the ideology of liberalism: 
“Liberals believe that individuals everywhere are fundamentally the same, and are best off 
pursuing self-preservation and material well-being. Freedom is required for these pursuits, and 
peace is required for freedom; coercion and violence are counter-productive. Thus all 
individuals share an interest in peace” (Owen, 1994:89). 
 
Democratisation is often an attempt to achieve this peace, in which the citizenry forge lasting, 
non-exploitative relationships that are free of violence (and the threat thereof) (Rummel, 
1997:85-87). Once peace has been achieved, citizens are free to pursue prosperity. The idea 
that democracy can promote peace is a feature of Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), which has 
its origins in the writings of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant first noticed the tendency of 
republics
1
 to not wage war against each other (1795/1983:112-115). More recently scholars 
like RJ Rummel (1997) have further examined the positive link between liberal democracy 
and domestic peace. 
 
However, democracy as a mechanism for peace is not effective if it is not accompanied by 
liberal ideology. It has been taken for granted that Western democracies are liberal 
democracies and therefore ensure basic freedoms - in the form of a human rights charter - 
through the rule of law. Human rights are a set of rules that promote and protect human 
                                                             
1By republics Kant meant states in which the power of the executive and the legislature were separated. Unlike 
many monarchies of the time, such states usually incorporated a degree of democracy and were therefore 
perceived as “free” (Owen, 1994:94-95). 
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dignity in civil, political, economic, social and cultural spheres (Landman, 2012:332-333). It 
acts as a constraint on the power of a democratic government by legally protecting the rights 
of individuals, even against the interests of the majority and the state. Disputes that arise from 
the competing claims of democracy and human rights are resolved in favour of human rights. 
Liberal values
2
 are therefore a safeguard against the dangers of popular rule and the state‟s 
abuse of power (Donnelly, 2013:224-225).  
 
Liberal values have to be widely accepted in order to consolidate democracy and obtain peace 
and stability. A consolidated democracy is one in which the norms and rules of democracy 
are accepted as “the only game in town” (Schedler, 1998:91). Consolidation occurs when the 
initial commitment to democracy is deepened by making democratic norms a routine, 
unquestioned part of life, not just in the political sphere, but also social spheres (Gordon, 
2001:124; O‟Donnell, 1997:49). Although liberal values and democratic institutions are 
completely intertwined in consolidated democracies, such a union is not a given and it is 
entirely possible to have one without the other (Zakaria, 1997:22-26).  
 
The goal of liberal democracy is made easier if a country‟s liberal values precede and inform 
its democracy: once everyone accepts liberal norms, no one is unduly threatened by 
democratic competition and the occasional loss of power. However, many countries have 
attempted to institutionalise democracy first, in the hopes that liberal culture will follow (Du 
Toit & Kotzé, 2011:17-18). It is a faster yet riskier process as it may not be in everyone‟s 
interests to subscribe to the liberal rules of the democratic game. Certain factors may be 
present that mitigate against the universal acceptance of liberal norms, for example low levels 
of economic development, high levels of income inequality and a divided, heterogeneous 
population (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:21-22). A divided population with diverging interests 
might not trust each other with power and it may not be in every party‟s interests to uphold 
democratic institutions or human rights. In fact, one group may feel that the rights of others 
obstruct their interests. In such a situation a country can be an electoral democracy and still 
lack the stability, security and peace associated with liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 2011:80-
84).  
 
                                                             
2
Values are conceptualised as “appreciative, evaluative, or normative notions, ideas, or conceptions” (Joubert, 
1992:48). 
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A study of South Africa‟s changing and contradictory values is thus of great importance, 
since the extent to which South Africans endorse liberal values is one factor that can 
determine the quality of its democracy (Ariely & Davidov, 2011:271-273). This study 
therefore aims to measure and describe South African values that are not compatible with the 
country‟s liberal democratic institutions, namely the belief in evil as a literal entity and that 
violence may be used to fight it. These values challenge many of the principles of liberal 
democracy and can potentially lead to the violation of human rights and the rule of law. At 
stake is the strength of the liberal democratic system – a system trusted to deliver peace and 
stability to a troubled country.  
 
1.2 Context of the study: South Africa’s transition 
The initiation of South Africa‟s democratic transition in the late 1980s came as an unlikely 
surprise to many inside and outside the country. Despite unrest in the black townships and 
economic stagnation, the Apartheid state had remained stable and there was no immediate 
threat to white domination of the country. It was nevertheless recognised by ruling National 
Party (NP) leaders that its strong position would not last: domestic and international pressure 
would continue to build, further damaging the economy and ultimately making the Apartheid 
system unsustainable. The collapse of communist states - a source of support for the 
liberation movement – further convinced NP leaders that it was a good time to negotiate a 
new dispensation from a position of strength (Giliomee, 1995:83-92). 
 
A key factor for all concerned was the political violence that plagued the country. The armed 
struggle against Apartheid and the government‟s attempts to quash it had led to escalating 
violence in the townships (Marx, 1997:481-483). Neither the Apartheid government nor the 
liberation movement had managed to put an end to the cycle of violence by definitively 
defeating the other. The deadlock presented both parties with a choice: continue a destructive 
conflict or negotiate a settlement. The negotiations that followed – primarily between the NP 
government and the African National Congress (ANC) - were characterised by previously 
unseen levels of political violence as various political actors tried to undermine each other 
(Von Holdt, 2013:592). The need for lasting peace quickly became a central concern. A 
peace deal - and the violence that necessitated it - were therefore at the heart of South 
Africa‟s democratic transition. 
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The transition would deliver all the benefits associated with the liberal democratic system. 
The new constitution established the necessary democratic institutions: a separation of 
powers as well as checks on the legislature and executive by an independent judiciary (Lipton: 
2014:11). Additionally, various extra-parliamentary institutions – for example the Human 
Rights Commission - support liberal democracy (Hamilton, 2011:360). The state has a 
monopoly on the use of violence and is in turn responsible for the safety of citizens (Kucera 
& Mares, 2013:3). 
 
The Bill of Rights, implemented by the judiciary, ensures the protection of citizens‟ rights – 
to life, equality, freedom and dignity – and thus further discourages violence by the state and 
among the citizenry (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:15-20). It also interprets human dignity in a very 
progressive manner, granting socio-economic rights such as housing, health and social 
services as well as education (Lipton, 2014:11). The combination of democratic institutions 
and civil liberties ensures access to peaceful resolutions to any conflicts that may emerge. A 
set of rules was therefore established by which state institutions function – rules that 
encourage peace and make the use of violence difficult and in most cases illegitimate. 
Violence can in fact be interpreted as a failure of liberal democracy (Von Holdt, 2013:590).  
 
The legally enforced human rights that protect citizens‟ civil liberties are rooted in a secular 
paradigm (Freeman, 2004:375-382). The advanced liberal democracies that South Africa 
attempts to emulate tend to be highly secular. They are not only characterised by the official 
separation of church and state, but also an overall decline in religious belief and fervour. In 
such societies religious and spiritual beliefs – where and when they occur – have become a 
private matter that does not shape public life or popular beliefs (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:134).  
 
1.3  Research problem and questions 
Various outbreaks of public violence in the new liberal democratic South Africa against 
forces that were described as evil, motivated researchers Du Toit and Kotzé (2011) to 
question South Africans about their beliefs regarding the matter. Questions addressing the 
issue were incorporated into the South African versions of the 2006 and 2013 World Values 
Survey (WVS). One of the events that motivated the introduction of the new questions were 
the 3 000 reported cases of witchcraft-related violence, including murder, in South Africa‟s 
Limpopo province between 1990 and 1998 (Du Toit& Kotzé, 2011:144). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
5 
 
The belief in witchcraft and the fear and practice thereof continue to play a role in various 
instances of violence, including witch killings, muthi murders
3
 and the use of magic for 
protection by criminals and protesters such as the striking miners at Marikana in 2012 
(Labuschagne, 2004:195; Van der Vlies, 2013:511). There are also numerous examples in 
South Africa of allegedly bewitched school pupils blaming poor academic performance and 
illness on witchcraft. University students have reported their fear of being harmed through 
sorcery by jealous relatives, friends and neighbours (Leistner, 2014:10). Sensationalist stories 
of evil, witchcraft, demons and the like feature frequently in South Africa‟s tabloid 
newspapers like the Daily Sun.
4
 
 
The other relevant outbreak of violence took place in the city of Cape Town when 
community members on the Cape Flats founded People Against Gangsterism And Drugs 
(PAGAD). Members of PAGAD initiated organised and violent action against gangsters and 
drug dealers in their communities. In both cases violence, including murder and public 
execution, was undertaken towards persons perceived to be evil – witches in the former case, 
drug lords in the latter.  These evil persons were perceived as lethal threats to society that had 
to be eliminated (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:143-144). Although PAGAD has since dwindled 
into irrelevance, vigilante violence has not. South Africans continue to target alleged 
criminals and others in acts of reprisal (Jensen & Buur, 2004). 
 
In the WVS waves of 2006 and 2013 South African respondents were – for the first time - 
asked to agree, disagree or remain neutral on the following statements: 
 “Evil is everywhere” 
 “Evil can take possession of some people” 
 “The community must get rid of people possessed by evil even if it means that they have 
to be killed” 
 
Although both religious and secular members of the public can agree with the first statement, 
it is thought that only individuals who believe in a literal, spiritual evil can agree with the 
                                                             
3
Traditional health practitioners and alleged witches make use of muthi (the Zulu word for medicine) to help 
their clients. Muthi can be made from animal, plant or even human material. When it is made from human 
body parts, it has usually been obtained by attacking live victims. When such attacks lead to the deaths of the 
victims, it is known as muthi murder (Labuschagne, 2004:192-193). 
4
This particular tabloid targets mainly the black working class and sells 430 000 copies a day, reaching 4.6 
million readers (Caldwell, 2011:873). 
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second. Support for both statements was very high and equally strong in 2006: over 80% of 
respondents agreed to both (Du Toit& Kotzé, 2011:145-152). It can thus be inferred that 
South Africans not only perceive evil as a pervasive threat, but also have a very literal, 
spiritual conception of evil as a force independent of humans. The 2006 survey results also 
showed that about a third (32%) of respondents supported the third statement, thereby 
endorsing violent action in order to fight evil forces. The beliefs and attitudes in question are 
in stark contrast to liberal ideals of secularism, peaceful conflict resolution and the rule of law. 
This thesis uses the data of the WVS to study the above-mentioned attitudes toward evil and 
public violence as these attitudes may pose a challenge to the legitimacy
5
 of South Africa‟s 
liberal democracy (Ariely & Davidov, 2011:271-273).  
 
Du Toit and Kotzé‟s three statements regarding evil have again been included in the most 
recent South African wave of the WVS. The results were finalised in 2013 and it is therefore 
possible to measure the belief in evil among the South African population from the period 
2006 to 2013. Even more important is the ability to measure support for the ominous third 
statement regarding the elimination of evil persons. This study therefore investigates whether 
the belief in evil and the illiberal support for public violence have increased, decreased or 
remained the same. 
 
The thesis also aims to identify the attributes of the people who subscribe to the said attitudes. 
SPSS
6
 is used to analyse the WVS data in order to establish who the South Africans are who 
agree that radical action may be used against evil persons (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:145-152). 
The South African population is thus analysed according to six categories of independent 
variables: demographic, socio-economic, trust and tolerance, locus of control (LOC),
7
 
attitudinal and religiosity. These variables and their relevance for the study of evil as well as 
illiberal values in general, are discussed thoroughly in later chapters.  
 
In summary, the following questions are to be examined: 
 What are the characteristics of the South Africans who hold beliefs about evil? 
                                                             
5Lipset defines legitimacy as “the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing 
political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society” (Lipset, 1981:4). 
6The IBM Corporation’s computer software programme was formerly known as Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences, but is now officially called only by its acronym SPSS (PASW). 
7See Chapter Three for discussion of LOC. 
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 What relationships can be found between the independent variables and the belief in evil 
(and subsequent actions)? 
 Which predictors, if any, explain the above-mentioned beliefs and actions? What ultimate 
explanation can be found for these beliefs? 
 
1.4  Research methodology 
The study uses the work of Du Toit and Kotzé (2011) as a starting point to further investigate 
the aforementioned values. It is grounded in the context of DPT: the belief that liberal 
democracy fosters peace at home and abroad (Rummel, 1997). Liberal democracy was 
negotiated and established in South Africa with the aims of peace and prosperity in mind. 
That inadvertently positions the country as a case study for those who are interested in how 
democracy and peace relate. The success or failure of South Africa‟s democratic peace 
project can therefore be analysed within the context of DPT. 
 
An analysis of values is merely one potential indicator of the depth and quality of a country‟s 
democracy. Liberal democracy has to be understood as an ideal as well as an ongoing process. 
No democracy will be perfect in all aspects nor is there any guarantee that democracies‟ 
respective strengths and weaknesses will remain so indefinitely. Democracy is not “an all or 
nothing affair” and it is acceptable that “certain features may be better developed than others” 
(Landman, 2011:461). The overall health of a country‟s democracy cannot be based on the 
study of just one feature. An ultimate judgment can only be made when taking all features – 
some of which are touched upon in this study – into consideration.  
 
The thesis is both descriptive and exploratory in nature, providing an accurate, in-depth 
analysis based on factual knowledge. The aforementioned series of research questions are 
thoroughly addressed (Mouton, 1996:102). The study aims to find and observe possible 
relationships between key variables and it seeks to describe values, attitudes and relationships 
as they exist. It is also a longitudinal investigation – observing the same population over a 
long period as opposed to providing a glimpse of socio-political beliefs at one point in time. 
The unit of analysis is the South African citizen. The researcher studies data collected from 
individuals in order to generalise about the collective traits of South Africans. 
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The study makes use of a variety of secondary sources of information, including books and 
journal articles. However, the WVS provides much of the essential data to be studied. The 
WVS is itself a longitudinal study, which is conducted in 97 societies and covers almost 90% 
of the world‟s population (WVS, 2008:2). It has been conducted roughly every five years 
since 1981. On each occasion a different group of respondents is asked the same or similar 
questions in order to establish how values in a society might be changing over time.  
Although the survey consists of the same basic questions in every country, the local 
conductors of the study are free to include questions of their own among the standard 
questions. This study examines the relevant South African questions as inserted by Du Toit 
and Kotzé (2011:145). 
 
The South African edition of the WVS is conducted by the Centre for International and 
Comparative Politics (CICP) at the University of Stellenbosch and the market research 
company IPSOS-Markinor. Face to face interviews were conducted with a representative 
sample of male and female South African residents over the age of 16. The interviews were 
conducted in local languages by specially trained field workers, who were accompanied by 
supervisors, quality control officers and field coordinators (WVS, 2007). 
 
The thesis makes use of triangulation: “the combination of two or more theories, data sources, 
methods or investigators in one study of a single phenomenon” (Yeasmin & Rahman, 
2012:156). In this study quantitative and qualitative methods are used to answer the research 
questions, thus employing methodological triangulation (Hussein, 2009:3-4; Neuman, 
2011:165). The use of two methods enables the researcher to combine the strengths of each 
while possibly overcoming their limitations (Yeasmin & Rahman, 2012:154-156). Although 
triangulation can also be used to validate results, its primary use in this study is to provide a 
deeper understanding of the subject at hand (Hussein, 2009:5-8). Social phenomena are 
notoriously intricate and triangulation can provide a more complete picture of the social 
realities under investigation. 
 
The study therefore consists of an analysis of quantitative data as well as a qualitative 
interpretation of the data. Observations and characteristics of individuals have been translated 
into numbers and studied as such (Antonius, 2013:4). Data from the 5
th
 and 6
th
 South African 
waves of the WVS is analysed and presented using SPSS: computer software technology 
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created for the statistical analysis of survey data. SPSS is commonly used to calculate 
numerical data and uses a representative survey sample to infer about a larger population. It is 
a valuable method of describing data and finding relationships between variables (Walliman, 
2006:110-129). A qualitative interpretation of the numerical results follows the initial 
statistical analysis of the WVS data. The former establishes what the numerical findings 
mean in the context of the study‟s theoretical framework (Antonius, 2013:44). 
 
The WVS provides the researcher with a general idea of how widely held illiberal values are. 
SPSS makes it possible to determine which beliefs and values are held by whom. Their 
combined use enables the researcher to seek relationships between the dependent variable of 
illiberal values and the relevant independent variables. The qualitative analysis sheds further 
light on the findings. 
 
1.5  Limitations and delimitations 
The thesis consists of a secondary analysis of WVS data that has not been obtained by the 
researcher herself. In fact, the researcher does not produce any new data from which to draw 
on. She exerted no control over data collection or the content of the survey questionnaires. If 
any errors occurred during the data collection or capturing processes, it cannot be detected or 
corrected in this study even though it could affect the findings.  
 
The WVS is global in scale and includes a wide variety of questions and variables, most of 
which are not suited or relevant to this study‟s research questions. On the other hand, the 
WVS may not include all variables that could be of use to this study. Some critics have also 
questioned whether differences in culture, technology and language can truly be overcome 
when comparing values across countries the way the WVS does (MacIntosh, 1998:452). It 
may thus be possible that questions are sometimes framed in a way that does not take local 
context into consideration. 
 
However, there are also significant advantages to the use of pre-existing data. Firstly, it is not 
necessary to repeatedly intrude into people‟s lives in order to obtain information (Neuman, 
2011:374-375), which may in any case already have been gathered by others. Refraining 
from such intrusion reduces the risk of affecting or altering what is being studied. It also 
reduces the risk of alienating the respondents (Manheim & Rich, 1981:124-125). Secondary 
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analysis is also extremely cost effective and time efficient. To draw meaningful conclusions 
about a population of almost 53 million South Africans (South African Police Service 
[SAPS], 2014a:1), one needs a large sample size. It would be impossible for most 
independent researchers – especially a master‟s student - to have the means to conduct a 
thorough longitudinal study on a national level.  
 
Furthermore, the WVS is the most extensive database of changing values in South Africa 
(and the world) – covering South African attitudes before and after the political transition 
(Kotzé, 2001:134-135). The longitudinal nature of the survey means that it reflects changes in 
values as well as changes in demographics. It is an essential source of information that makes 
it possible to compare the beliefs of different groups over time. The WVS is a trusted source 
of information that is frequently used by social science scholars, researchers and media 
throughout the world (WVS, 2008:4). The data is generally easy to access and other scholars 
can therefore join the discussion of any research involving the surveys. Easy access can also 
lead to further analysis and replication of results (Silver & Dowley, 2000:518). 
 
A further advantage of secondary analysis of the WVS data is that it is the only survey 
conducted in South Africa that asks respondents what they believe about evil. In fact, these 
pertinent questions were included in the WVS (South Africa) with this study in mind. A 
possible disadvantage to this situation however, is that there is unlikely to be much other 
independent data with which to compare the WVS findings. Also, the three key questions 
regarding evil have only been included in the latest two rounds of the survey. This study 
therefore focuses on the more recent survey results of 2006 and 2013. The study also benefits 
from its timing in that the researcher can make use of fresh findings from 2013 that have not 
yet been made public. 
 
An important issue to consider in the South African context concerns the matter of race. The 
race categories applied to South Africans divide the population into four groups: black 
African, white, coloured (of mixed heritage) and Indian. These categories have their origin in 
Apartheid classifications, but are still widely used and accepted. It is applied by government 
agencies when addressing political, social and economic matters. For example, the ruling 
ANC government has set race-related targets for its land reform and black economic 
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empowerment (BEE) policies (Simkins, 2011:111-117). The four race categories are also 
used by the national census and the WVS. 
 
Even though race is viewed as a social construct, it is nevertheless a powerful one in the 
minds of peoples and governments. It can – and in South Africa does – have real 
manifestations with serious consequences. Race categories may be an important reflection of 
inequality and thus useful in policy matters, but its continued use legitimises the problematic 
construct and all its ambiguities. Various negative consequences may result: from confusion 
and ambivalence among survey respondents (Nobles, 2000:183-184) to a lack of critical 
thinking when researchers analyse South Africans. The present thesis uses the four widely 
accepted South African race categories and acknowledges it as a limitation. 
 
The fact that the present study is a master‟s thesis provides further limitations and 
delimitations: a master‟s thesis does not require the researcher to present completely new 
research. It does, however, limit the study to 50 000 words when much more could be written 
on the subject. Lastly, the researcher is constrained by language: African spiritual beliefs 
comprise an important part of the study, but the researcher lacks knowledge of the relevant 
African languages. 
 
1.6  Rationale and significance 
The topic of democratic consolidation has become popular with scholars (see Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2003; Landman, 2011) and the faults of South Africa‟s democracy have not escaped 
their attention (Lipton, 2014; Gordon, 2001). Some of the studies of democratic consolidation 
in South Africa have focussed on values as it is believed that political culture
8
 – and not just 
institutions - is essential to the health of a democracy (Kotzé, 2001:134). This study aims to 
contribute to the discourse regarding values as an indicator of the quality and legitimacy of 
South Africa‟s democracy. 
 
The values investigated by this study are commonly held beliefs (Du Toit & Kotzé, 
2011:145-152) that clash dramatically with the values of liberal democracy and yet have been 
largely overlooked by scholars, especially with regards to quantitative studies. Attitudes 
                                                             
8
Political culture is defined as all the “attitudes, sentiments, and cognitions” that inform an individual’s 
political decisions and actions (Pye, 1963:78). 
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about evil and violence, especially in the context of spiritual and witchcraft-related beliefs, 
can be a sensitive issue: it touches on matters of culture, religion and tradition which many 
are reluctant to critically engage with (Leistner, 2014:1). It can however not be ignored in 
light of the possible impact on democratic consolidation, peace and stability as well as 
economic development. In addition to the general lack of research on evil and violence in 
South Africa, the specific research questions in this thesis have never been studied before. 
The thesis addresses this gap in scholarly knowledge, attempts to draw attention to the 
problem(s) discussed and encourages others to study it also. 
 
1.7  Chapter outline 
The first of six chapters provides an introduction to the subject under investigation. It 
includes important information regarding the context of the study. It also discusses the 
research aims and methodology. The second chapter reviews the existing literature that 
informs the theories, concepts and context of the thesis. This includes the literature on DPT 
and liberal democracy, human rights, religion and witchcraft. 
 
Chapter Three elaborates on research design and methodology. Important variables will be 
discussed in detail, including their conceptualisation and operationalisation. Chapter Three 
will also elaborate on measurement issues and data analysis. More attention will be given to 
limitations and delimitations. 
 
In Chapter Four the results of the quantitative data analysis are presented in tables and graphs. 
Information is provided on the nature and strength of the relationships between key variables. 
Chapter Five interprets the implications of the quantitative findings through qualitative 
analysis. The sixth and final chapter discusses the ultimate conclusion of the research as well 
as important observations. It also contains recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONTEXTUALISATION 
 
2.1  Introduction 
The following sections provide an overview and contextualisation of the existing literature 
relevant to this study. None of the subjects under review are without a certain degree of 
controversy and a lively academic discourse exists on most of them. A thorough review of the 
relevant discourses will root this study in its wider context. 
 
There is a considerable volume of writing on democracy. Of great relevance is the meaning 
and expected outcomes of liberal democracy and democratic consolidation. This is especially 
true with regards to a recently democratised country whose citizens are largely new to liberal 
democracy and its values and practices. 
 
Lastly, this chapter also examines the literature on religious and spiritual practices in South 
Africa. South Africans‟ engagement with witchcraft-related practices serves as the primary– 
though not only - illustration of the friction between illiberal values and liberal democracy. 
The study of witchcraft has a long and rich history, but its continued existence and 
importance are often neglected. This chapter seeks to remedy this neglect. 
 
2.2  DPT: Why liberal democracy is important 
Immanuel Kant‟s initial observation (17/951983:112-115) has become somewhat of a truism 
to many political scientists: democracies generally do not wage war against each other (Gat, 
2005:73). DPT‟s modern popularity emerged during the Cold War when leaders like United 
States (US) president Ronald Reagan declared that governments that respect individual 
freedom have more peaceful foreign policies (Parmar, 2013:239-240). Scholars began to 
revisit and develop Kant‟s initial ideas and some of them - Michael Doyle (1983), Larry 
Diamond (1991), Francis Fukuyama (1992) - would become influential in US policy circles 
where democracy came to be viewed as a tool for international peace and stability. 
 
Doyle (1983;2005) ascribes the democratic peace to three interconnected factors: 
representative institutions, respect for human rights and economic interdependence. However, 
proponents of DPT have often focused on only two separate explanations for the democratic 
peace: institutions and norms (Owen, 1994:90-91). Democratic institutions, with their checks 
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on power and transparency, can make it difficult for leaders to receive the consensus and 
funds needed for war. It is also difficult to convince a reluctant public to bear the costs of war 
(in terms of both taxes and lives). Unpopular decisions or attempts to abuse power in this 
respect can be punished through elections. Everyone in a democracy is therefore sensitised to 
the costs of war (Layne, 1994:9). 
 
In the domestic arena, democracy is based on compromise and adherence to non-violent rules 
of political competition. Once the rules of democracy become a norm, this “bargaining 
culture” (Sobek et al., 2006:521) is carried over to the international arena. Citizens are 
socialised to expect peaceful relations and rulers therefore prefer to solve international 
disputes with diplomacy rather than violence. Democracies assume that other democracies 
share the same norms and policies. Violence is therefore not considered an appropriate means 
of settling disputes within and between democracies (Owen, 1994:90-91). 
 
However, critics argue that sufficiently bellicose publics, cabinets and legislatures can easily 
encourage war instead of constraining it. If public opinion constrained war, democracies 
would be more peaceful in general, not just toward other democracies, as the cost of war is 
high regardless of the enemy‟s regime type. Rosato (2003:594-595) argues that lives lost 
during war only affects a tiny percentage of the population. Monetary costs on the other hand, 
may seem less important to a public swept up in nationalist sentiment. Furthermore, 
institutional checks on power often fail: Rosato (2003:597) cites examples in which US 
presidents bypassed or simply ignored constitutional processes and unilaterally authorised 
war or military attacks. 
 
The propensity for compromise among democracies is also only relevant if and when 
democracies recognise each other as such – a rather subjective exercise that can be argued in 
self-serving ways (Rosato, 2003:590-593). Realists tend to reject the idea that ideology 
determines democracies‟ national interests and foreign policy. They maintain that power 
politics in an anarchic world remains the key determining factor of international relations 
irrespective of regime type. Domestic political systems may change, but the international 
system remains the same (Parmar, 2013:244; Layne, 1994:10-12). War is in any case such a 
rare occurrence that democratic peace may just be a statistical coincidence. Alternatively, 
democracy may be the result of peace rather than the cause: states that experience external 
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threats will likely make use of authoritarian measures that make the mobilisation of resources 
easy; states that enjoy relative security can afford more liberal institutions (Layne, 1994:39-
45). 
 
Studies of DPT are usually strongly impacted by researchers‟ methodology. Results often 
vary depending on definitions of freedom and war as well as the selection of case studies and 
time periods (Chan, 1984:624-631). Ultimately, the evidence for DPT is therefore a mixed 
bag: Chan (1984) dismisses the notion that democracies are more peaceful in general. He 
does, however, believe that democracies tend not to wage war against each other. The belief 
is shared by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) who argue that democracies are fearful of going 
to war against each other, because they are so exceptionally good at it. Other scholars support 
elements of DPT: Oneal and Russett (1997) agree that democracies do not attack each other, 
but they stress both democracy as well as trade as causal factors;
9
 Sobek et al. (2006) on the 
other hand, found a strong relationship between respect for human rights – mostly but not 
exclusively found in liberal democracies - and peace, irrespective of regime type. 
 
Owen (1994) acknowledges the continued salience of power politics and yet claims that the 
democratic peace is still a real phenomenon. According to him, it is neither liberalism nor 
institutions that produce peace at home and abroad, but rather liberal ideology and 
democratic institutions, functioning in tandem.
10
 Liberal societies are populated by citizens 
freely pursuing their own interests – a situation that necessitates peace. Peace is therefore in 
everyone‟s best interest and citizens can safely trust and tolerate one another. A liberal 
democratic society can also safely assume that other liberal democracies function according 
to the same logic: peace enables freedom; freedom enables the pursuit of material wellbeing 
and happiness, which is in everyone‟s interest; democratic governments represent and protect 
their citizens‟ interests and are therefore unlikely to violently disrupt the status quo. Liberal 
democracies can therefore trust and accommodate each other. Other types of regimes may not 
have the same interests and can not necessarily be trusted (Owen, 1994:89). 
 
Owen insists that the harmony of interests as described above is only possible when a 
democratic society subscribes to liberal ideology. Democratic institutions alone are not 
                                                             
9The idea that trade pacifies nations draws from Montesquieu’s The Spirit Of The Laws (1949:316-330). 
10
Owen’s argument (1994) is therefore reminiscent of Doyle’s (1983; 2005), except that the latter also stresses 
economic interdependence.  
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enough: liberal values are necessary for the pacification of citizens who in turn have the 
power to influence government and hold leaders accountable through democratic institutions. 
The two features mutually reinforce each other and produce peace (Owen, 1994:99-102). 
Without liberalism and consequent pacification, the end result may be an illiberal democracy 
which cannot benefit from the democratic peace.  
 
In conclusion, the democratic peace is a product of the domestic political sphere which 
happens to benefit international politics. Owen (1994:120) does admit that the peace is not 
infallible: it may fail if liberal democracies do not perceive each other as such or if illiberal 
leaders are elected. The latter may obtain enough autonomy over foreign policy to engage in 
a war that would otherwise not occur. However, the main concern in this study is domestic 
peace rather than foreign policy. The virtues of democracy in the domestic sphere – 
protection of rights, the rule of law, accountable government (Patapan, 2012:313) – are of 
key importance to the South African case study, regardless of whether it also leads to greater 
international peace. 
 
2.3  Democratisation: history and preconditions 
2.3.1  Waves of democratisation 
Although various democratic practices can be identified in many places throughout history, 
the origins of democracy as a form of government are usually traced to Ancient Greece, 
particularly fifth-century Athens (Huntington, 1991b:5-13). Early forms of democratic 
participation were restricted to small numbers of citizens and universal suffrage would not be 
an accepted feature of democracy until the 20
th
 century. Athenian democracy nevertheless 
allowed fairly broad participation in government: Athens was not ruled by a small elite, but 
by a larger number of citizens each of whom had equal decision-making power regardless of 
their abilities or importance in society. This restricted form of majority government gave 
Athens its reputation for freedom and equality (Andrews, 2004:539-541). Despite their 
democratic practices however, Athenians were a warrior people who valued conquest and not 
self-preservation. Owen (1994:98) therefore considers them early democrats, but not early 
liberals – an ancient example of an illiberal democracy. 
 
The development of modern democracy is associated with the rise of the nation state in the 
early modern era. Various early liberal and democratic ideas emerged in Western societies 
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from the 17
th
 century onwards. As previously discussed, the work of Kant focussed on human 
dignity (1797) and the relationship between democracy and peace (1795). Other influential 
17
th
 century thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke both emphasised equal 
political rights (Fukuyama, 2011:81-86). In his Two Treatises Of Government (originally 
published in 1689), Locke also wrote on government by consensus (1955:67-68) and property 
rights (14-27). The purpose of government was restricted to ensuring life, liberty and 
property – early liberal sentiments also echoed by Montesquieu and Mill (Fukuyama, 
2012:53-61). The emphasis of these classically liberal authors was thus often on the 
protection of individual political and economic rights against state power. Social inequalities 
garnered little attention and it was taken for granted that the rights discourse largely excluded 
women and slaves (Leary, 1990:17-18). 
 
The revolutionary period that started at the end of the 18
th
 century saw the beginning of the 
modern democratic age and its emphasis on the individual. What followed was the first of 
what Huntington (1991a:15) calls the three “waves of democratisation.” Such a wave 
constitutes a certain period of time in which a significant number of nondemocratic regimes 
transforms into democracies or at least democratise their political systems to a certain extent. 
The waves of democratisation are not without reversals in which countries with democratic 
features or systems regress. Democratisation can also occur outside of the time periods in 
which significant democratisation generally happens. 
 
Huntington dates the first wave to the expansion of suffrage among the US population in the 
1820s (1991a:12). For the first time white men no longer had to own property in order to vote 
(Fukuyama, 2012:53-61). The progress of political equality was neatly captured by Alexis de 
Tocqueville‟s classic Democracy In America in 1840 (2000:12-13), in which he states his 
belief that political equality was a long, unstoppable historical process. 
 
The first wave consisted of a long, slow period of democratisation in the West that lasted 
until 1926 and resulted in 29 democracies. The second wave occurred after the Second World 
War as the victorious allies occupied and transformed the political systems of defeated 
nations. Many colonies also gained their independence and adopted democratic systems. 
South Africa forms part of the third wave: starting in the 1970s and resulting in such large-
scale spread of democracy that Fukuyama (1992) termed it the “end of history.” It briefly 
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appeared that Western democracy would be the final word on which form of government was 
best. Democracy spread far and wide, but civil liberties expanded at a much slower pace. 
 
Each wave of democratisation was followed by some democratic reversals. The democratic 
gains and losses (and further gains) of the third wave have been well-documented. Key 
studies in this respect include: Diamond‟s 1996 investigation of civil liberties in which he 
found many examples where liberal democracy was not being consolidated; Karatnycky‟s 
documentation of democratic gains in many of the same countries in 1999; Diamond‟s 2002 
study was also more positive, finding 73 liberal and 31 electoral democracies; However, in 
the same year Carothers claimed that fewer than 20 of the third wave countries were clearly 
heading towards successful democratisation. The rest were in a “grey zone” (2002:9-10) – 
Carothers‟ term for countries that, in various ways, fall short of true liberal democracy.  
 
The shortcomings of the grey zone are extremely varied and they have been difficult to 
analyse and classify – hence the multitude of scholarly terms for the different faulty 
democracies. Clearly, the road to democracy is neither easy nor linear. Initial success in 
transitioning to democracy is no guarantee of continued democratic consolidation. In fact, 
Carothers (2002:18) believes that so many countries are in the grey zone that it is no longer 
useful to analyse them in terms of their democratic transitioning. Levitsky &Way (2002:51-
52) agree, arguing that regimes should be analysed as what they are instead of being 
measured as partial democracies in a state of transition.  
 
2.3.2  Preconditions of democracy 
In Polyarchy (1971) Robert A. Dahl identified three preconditions that tend to be present in 
countries that begin to liberalise their political systems – a process which can lead to 
democracy. Dahl found that democratic features begin to emerge in countries that are 
ethnically and culturally homogenous;
11
 that experience broad-based socio-economic 
development with little extreme inequality or deprivation; and lastly, that develop liberal 
values prior to democratic institutions. Although most stable democracies took a long time to 
become established, Dahl believed a faster way was possible.
12
 The presence or absence of 
                                                             
11A finding echoed by Lijphart in Democracy In Plural Societies (1977). 
12
Lipset (1959:72) agreed, stating that countries that had prematurely democratised could strengthen their 
systems by encouraging conditions conducive to democracy. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
19 
 
one or more of his preconditions do not predetermine success or failure, but are helpful 
indicators when assessing the strength of a country‟s democracy. 
 
With regards to Dahl‟s first precondition, Karatnycky (1999; 2002) has presented evidence 
that democracy is more successful in mono-ethnic countries. In his analyses of the 1998 and 
2001 Freedom House surveys,
13
 he determines that countries where two thirds of the 
population belong to one ethnic group were twice as likely to achieve freedom. Although he 
is challenged in his assertions by Fish and Brooks (2004), he maintains that democracy is 
significantly more successful in mono-ethnic countries. 
 
There is widespread agreement on Dahl‟s second precondition (1971:62-80) that it is rich 
countries that tend to be democracies.
14
 The notion is not a new one: 
“From Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which 
relatively few citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the 
population could intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint 
necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues” (Lipset, 1959:75). 
 
Lipset (1959:75-88) found that the average levels of wealth, industrialisation, urbanisation 
and education are considerably higher in democracies. Todd Landman‟s work (2002) 
illustrates a strong relationship between economic development and the protection of rights. 
Przeworski et al. (1996:40-41) further prove the point in their study which found that rich 
countries (with an annual income of over $6 000/R60 000 per capita) do not revert to 
authoritarianism after obtaining democracy. Less affluent countries are more vulnerable: the 
lower the per capita income, the less likely democracy is to last in the long-term. If most 
wealthy countries are democratic and most poor countries are not, it stands to reason that 
democratisation occurs in middle income countries. Democratic features often emerge in 
countries that experience comparatively higher economic growth. As Huntington (1991b:60) 
points out, the third wave of democracy followed the global economic growth of the 1950s 
and 1960s.  
 
                                                             
13 Freedom House is a non-profit organisation that measures and compares political and civil rights throughout 
the world. Countries are rated as Free, Partly Free or Not Free depending on the rights citizens enjoy. The 
ratings reflect not only the nature of a country’s government, but also the general reality of citizens’ everyday 
lives (Karatnycky, 1999:114). 
14 See Huntington (1991:59-72), Lipset (1981: 469-476) and Karatnycky (1999:121). 
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Furthermore, Diamond (1994:16) and Fukuyama (2011:80) warn that inequality can impede 
democratisation. If a democratic regime is unable to provide services to the poor, people may 
support populist leaders or political groups that are not committed to liberal democracy, but 
that do take measures to address inequality. On the other hand, if the middle class feels 
threatened by the economic demands of the poor, it may in turn start supporting authoritarian 
rulers who will protect its interests (Fukuyama, 2012:53-61). Ultimately, countries that 
succeed in decreasing inequality have a better chance of democratic survival (Przeworski et 
al., 1996:43).
15
 
 
Once economic scarcity creates social and political tension, possibilities for various types of 
conflict and government repression emerge (Sobek et al., 2006:521). Wilkinson (2005), for 
example, claims a strong relationship between inequality and crime as well as other social ills. 
Messner et al. (2002) found the same relationship between inequality and homicide rates. The 
problem of violent crime may also be exacerbated by ethnic diversity: some studies (see 
Altheimer, 2007; 2008) present a positive link between ethnic diversity and homicide rates. 
Chon (2011) investigated the relationship between ethnic and linguistic diversity and 
homicide rates in 170 countries. He suggests that both income inequality and diversity 
independently affect murder rates (Chon, 2011:741-744). 
 
According to social identity theorists,
16
 the anxiety caused by the humiliation of poverty – 
especially when compared to the material success of other groups in society – can find 
violent expression. Poverty in itself does not cause violence, but the anxiety associated with 
low social status from which people cannot escape, can lead to resentment and outbreaks of 
violence (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:29-30). The violence may not always be directed towards 
wealthy and well-protected groups and may instead target a scapegoat population. Amy 
Chua‟s World On Fire (2004) documents numerous cases of resentment directed towards 
overly successful ethnic minorities. 
 
                                                             
15Przeworski et al. (1996:43) point out that countries with decreasing inequality have a better chance of 
sustaining democracy than countries with increasing inequality. 
16Social Identity Theory posits that people strive for a positive self-image through social identity. A positive 
social identity is obtained by favourable comparisons of one’s own (in-) group with other (out-) groups. If 
comparisons to other groups are undeniably and persistently negative, individuals must find a way to manage 
the resultant blow to their self-esteem. An extreme answer would be to eliminate the group causing the 
unease (Niens et al., 2003:109; Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:29-30) 
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2.3.3  The third precondition: values 
“The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in 
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1947:269).  
 
The Schumpeterian definition of democracy has often dominated the political discourse to the 
exclusion of other approaches (Huntington, 1991b:6-7). Despite its usefulness in defining and 
determining institutional democracy, it has been criticised as a limited way of assessing the 
consolidation of a liberal democracy. 
 
The origin of the problem may lie in the classic conception of the state and civil society as 
separate spheres. Political matters are traditionally associated with the former and social 
issues relegated to the latter. The separation makes the study of democracy easier by avoiding 
confusion over definitions, measurement and ideology (Caldeira & Holston, 1999:720). The 
intricate social conditions in which democracy is expected to thrive, significantly complicate 
its study and are often simply ignored in favour of the study of institutions. 
 
Schedler (1998) voices the concern over the above-mentioned complexity and argues for 
clarity with regards to the definition and study of democratisation. He insists that the concept 
of democratic consolidation should be reserved for discussions on the survival of the 
democratic system and nothing else. To use the concept to describe the completion, 
organisation, quality or deepening of democracy, as opposed to its complete absence in the 
face of authoritarianism, is to strip it of its analytical power (Schedler, 1998:103-104). There 
is however strong opposition to Schedler‟s perspective. 
 
Lipset (1959:71) states that a political system is by necessity characterised by a value system 
and democracy cannot function if its values are not accepted by opposing interest groups. 
Almond and Verba (1963:498) agree that democracy‟s stability and efficiency depend not 
only on its institutions, but also on a supportive political culture. O‟Donnell (1997:45-46) 
suggests that studying democratic institutions makes sense if there is no significant difference 
between the formal rules of democracy and the actual behaviour of citizens. If, however, 
citizens‟ behaviour diverges from the formal rules of the game, the study of institutions will 
no longer be a good predictor of political and social outcomes.  
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Other scholars who argue for a broader approach to the study of democracy, include 
Diamond (1994:5), who stresses democratic citizenship and culture as well as the study of 
civil society.
17
 He rightly notes that civil society and cultural matters have been viewed as 
important features of democracy since Tocqueville‟s Democracy In America (1835-40). 
Diamond maintains that civil society should be studied in order to determine how it may 
support democracy in some ways and cause tension in others. Additionally, Huntington 
(1996:8) claims that socio-economic problems have the power to slowly erode democracy. 
He warns that such slow erosion poses a greater threat to the third wave than the outright 
overthrow of democratic regimes. Caldeira and Holston (1999) also criticise evaluations of 
democratisation that focus solely on the transformation of political systems, arguing that 
social and cultural changes must be taken into account. 
 
Although Schedler (1998:97) acknowledges the arguments of others, he believes that more 
inclusive analyses of democracy are too ambiguous to be helpful. Caldeira and Holston 
(1999:726-727) suggest that viewing democracy as disjunctive - always consisting of 
progressive and regressive features – may neutralise the problem of conceptual ambiguity. 
Drawing attention to regressive features does not condemn a country‟s entire political system 
(in which case there would be no consolidated democracies at all, as all democracies have 
some regressive features), but it merely criticises a weak element of the system. The idea of 
democracy as disjunctive is compatible with Dahl‟s Polyarchy (1971) in which he thinks of 
democracy as an ideal, the realisation of which is always a work in progress. 
 
Broader approaches to the study of democracy are particularly helpful with regards to the 
non-Western countries of the third wave. Their history and development differ substantially 
to that of established democracies in the West. In many cases the behaviour of citizens and 
other actors do not comply with the rules of democracy and an already pacified populace 
cannot be assumed. Evidence suggests that it is partially democratised countries rather than 
authoritarian regimes that are often responsible for the worst cases of repression and rights 
violations (Sobek et al., 2006:521).
18
 Although democracy is associated with peace, the 
                                                             
17Diamond (1994:5) views civil society as an intermediary between the private sphere and the state. He defines 
it as the voluntary, organised, collective action of citizens in order to voice shared interests or pursue goals. 
18
Authoritarian regimes that have already successfully quashed opposition rarely have to engage in further 
repression against a terrified populace. Partially democratic states on the other hand, allow for some degree of 
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process of democratisation is not: partly free states are frequently more prone to civil and 
international war than non-democracies (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995; 2005). The “problematic 
and at times perverse” (Caldeira & Holston, 1999:691) democratisation in Latin America is 
often cited as an indication that social and cultural changes – not just changes in political 
systems – are necessary to establish civil rights and the rule of law: 
“Without both, the realization of democratic citizenship remains disabled. It is increasingly 
evident in the new democracies that without this realization, political democracy loses its 
legitimacy and efficacy. It suffers not only as a means to frame social interaction but also as a 
mode of governance” (Caldeira & Holston, 1999:692). 
 
2.4  The importance of secularism and human rights 
To find the origin of modern universal human rights, scholars often turn – once again - to the 
writings of Kant (1797/1996). Kant was the first to write comprehensively on the inherent 
dignity and worth of all human beings. His ideas had a powerful influence on later 
conceptions of human rights. All human rights derive from the concept of inherent dignity 
and worth: the rights one has simply by virtue of being human (Donnelly, 2013:10). Human 
dignity is therefore the moral source of human rights (Habermas, 2010:464), which ultimately 
stipulate what may or may not be done to any given person (Perry, 1998:12-13). Human 
rights are inherent, equal and universal - not given to people by God – and take precedence 
over religious and other concerns.  
 
According to modern secularist thinking, religion and politics have to be separated in order 
for democracy to thrive. For many secularists, such a separation entails not only the classic 
separation of church and state, but also the separation of religion and politics in civil society 
(Elshtain, 2009:8). In the words of Harkness (1978:11): “Secularism is the organisation of 
life as if God did not exist.” The democracies of Western Europe are good examples of 
secular societies. In these mature democracies, religion has all but disappeared from the 
public sphere and has even faded away in private life (Elshtain, 2009:8). According to this 
perspective, human rights (and modernity in general) represent the triumph of reason over 
religion (Malachuk, 2010:128). It is a triumph that has been predicted by great thinkers since 
the Enlightenment. Secularisation theory – that the importance of religion declines in well-off, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
protest, but it is viewed as threatening and institutions are often too weak to channel it without resorting to 
violence (Sobek et al., 2006:521). 
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secure, industrial societies – has therefore been taken for granted in the social sciences for 
most of the 20
th
 century (Norris & Inglehart, 2004:3-4). 
 
Many of the values protected by the Western human rights doctrine can be protected by other 
means: for example, religious or traditional frameworks. However, Donnelly (1989:109-124) 
argues that such frameworks are less effective as they are not based on the relatively new 
concept of equal and inalienable individual rights: “entitlements of all individuals that may be 
exercised against the state and society” (Donnelly, 2007: 284). The idea that all human beings 
– citizens, foreigners, slaves, men, women, rich and poor – have inherent, equal rights that 
should be institutionalised did not exist in any previous human society: 
“In the ‘pre-modern’ world, both Western and non-Western alike, the duty of rulers to further 
the common good arose not from the rights (entitlements) of all human beings, or even all 
subjects, but from divine commandments, natural law, tradition, or contingent political 
arrangement. The people could legitimately expect to benefit from the obligations of their rulers 
to rule justly. Neither in theory, nor in practice, though, did they have human rights that could 
be exercised against unjust rulers” (Donnelly, 2007:286). 
 
Although religious or traditional procedures of conflict resolution and protection of human 
dignity may work in small, traditional communities, it is unlikely to suffice in modernised 
societies with large, diverse urban populations (Leistner, 2014:7-8). In most contemporary 
societies the human rights doctrine is needed to adequately protect people against violations 
by the economic, social and political institutions of modernity (Donnelly, 2013:86-87). 
Traditional societies and older communal support systems have been greatly changed and in 
many cases destroyed by the impact of capitalist markets and increasingly powerful 
bureaucracies. In developing countries there is thus often to be found, not idealistic 
traditional societies, but rather “a disruptive and incomplete Westernisation, cultural 
confusion, or the enthusiastic embrace of „modern‟ practices and values” (Donnelly, 
1984:411).  
 
Seen in the above light, human rights are thus not so much a Western doctrine to be imposed 
on others, but rather a necessary response to the forces of modernity. Human rights are 
“designed for an effective implementation of the core moral values of an egalitarian 
universalism in terms of coercive law” (Habermas, 2010:464). The majority of the world‟s 
states have signed the numerous human rights declarations that have emerged since 1948 
(Benhabib, 2009:696). There is thus widespread theoretical agreement on the usefulness of 
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human rights and Donnelly (2007:286-291) claims that, in practice, no other framework has 
proven more successful in protecting human dignity. Donnelly (1989: 109-124) also argues 
that the quality of democracy may be undermined if an alternative value system challenges 
the secular human rights doctrine. If societal values are rooted in religious or spiritual beliefs 
as opposed to the secular framework, rights may not be perceived as inherent, unconditional 
or universal. Conflict may thus emerge between groups, individuals and/or the state. In fact, 
social scientists have often identified religion as a cause of such conflict (Sandal, 2012:66). 
 
In response to the perceived anti-religious perspective of secularists, many attempts have 
been made to illustrate the compatibility of religion with human rights. Historically, the 
development of human rights has been closely associated with Christianity (Joppke, 
2013:603-604). The events, challenges and personages that shaped the development of 
human rights in the West are undeniably rooted in religious as well as liberal thinking.
19
 Only 
later did rights become secularised (Freeman, 2004:386; Little, 1990:59-103). In fact, the 
very idea of humans as sacred beings who are inherently valuable, seems inescapably 
religious (Perry, 1998:13). It is therefore not surprising that the constitutions of almost all the 
European democracies contain references to God and Christianity (Joppke, 2013:603).  
 
Scholars have therefore attempted to defend Christianity‟s compatibility with human rights. 
The same is true of Islam, especially in light of the well-known democratic deficit in the 
Muslim world (Elshtain, 2009:8-14).
20
 Joppke (2013) not only argues for the recognition of 
Christianity‟s importance in shaping European culture and politics (including secularism), but 
also states that a Christian identity for the liberal (Western) state might better enable the 
implementation of liberal values such as freedom of religion and expression. In openly 
recognising the religious heritage of the state and the majority of the population (Christianity 
in the case of the West), a liberal state would also have to recognise the religions of 
minorities (such as Islam). Such recognition would not entail the implementation of a state 
religion or religious education, but would acknowledge religion as an historical and cultural 
heritage and thereby allow religious expression in general. 
 
                                                             
19
For example, Locke (1955:4) presupposed that the moral authority for rights sprang from God. 
20For discussion on accommodating human rights in Islamic culture, see Othman (1999) and An-Na’im (1990). 
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By acknowledging all religions instead of banishing it from the public domain, the conflict 
between the secular state and religion may be resolved. According to this argument, the 
conflict is between religion and secularism and not between religion and liberal democracy or 
between religions. This would explain why many Muslims in France attend Catholic schools, 
where all religions may be expressed, and not public schools, where such expression is 
banned (Elshtain, 2009:9). It is estimated that more than 10% of the two million students at 
France‟s 8 847 Catholic schools are in fact Muslim (France only has four Muslim schools). In 
some of the schools Muslim students form the majority of the student body. They are often 
accommodated during Ramadan and female students are sometimes allowed to wear head 
scarves. The Catholic schools teach the national curriculum and participation in religious 
activities are voluntary (Bennhold, 2008:6).  
 
Although the above-mentioned schools are not without conflict – including disagreements on 
politics, history and science - there exists the perception that the Catholic Church is more 
tolerant of Islam than the secular state. The perception is not limited to France: Muslims are 
also increasingly attending Catholic institutions in other countries, including Scotland (The 
Economist, 2006:53) and the US (Pethrez-PeOa, 2012:12). The US has seen an increase in 
foreign Muslims enrolling in Catholic Colleges where they report feeling more comfortable 
and accepted in a Catholic environment – where religious expression and discussion are 
permitted and encouraged – than in secular spaces. Comments from the students in the US – 
“Here, people are more religious, even if they‟re not Muslim” and “I don‟t have to leave my 
faith at home when I come to school” (Pethrez-PeOa, 2012:12) - echo the sentiments of 
religious unity and tolerance in France where Christians and Muslims – “Share the same God” 
(Bennhold, 2008:6).  
 
The shared interests of Christianity and Islam can also be seen with regards to the January 
2015 terror attack on the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in which 12 people were 
killed. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, speculation was rife that it could have been 
carried out by either Muslim or Catholic extremists as both groups oppose unrestrained – and 
at times needlessly offensive – freedom of speech.21 Although the attack by Muslim 
extremists was condemned by Bill Donohue, president of the Catholic League, he also went 
on to attack the secular intolerance of Charlie Hebdo. Donohue stated that Muslims were 
                                                             
21As seen on the live news coverage of Al-Jazeera, 7th January 2015. 
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right to be angry over the “narcissistic” disrespect of their beliefs and that “Muhammed isn‟t 
sacred to me, either, but it would never occur to me to deliberately insult Muslims by trashing 
him” (Hallowell, 2015). 
 
The shared interests and solidarity among Muslims and Christians support the argument that 
a religious cultural identity for the liberal state could lead to further interfaith understanding 
and tolerance. It could also provide better philosophical rationale for human rights and 
resolve some of the contradictions often found in liberal ideology (Malachuk, 2010:128-129). 
In this post-secular perspective, it is “in the constitutional state‟s own interest to treat with 
care all cultural sources upon which the consciousness of norms and the solidarity of citizens 
draw” (Habermas, 2006:258). Indeed, the post-secular perspective may become increasingly 
important in light of the evidence against secularisation theory. The latter includes the 
continued importance of religion in the USA and Muslim countries, the persistence of 
indigenous beliefs around the world, the evangelical revivals in Latin America and Africa, 
the New Age spirituality that has appeared in the West and the ethno-religious conflicts still 
plaguing much of the world (Norris & Inglehart, 2004:4-5). 
 
Despite its religious history and the ongoing relevance of religion in modern societies, human 
rights today are viewed as a “secular religion” (Landman, 2012:333) in terms of its 
conceptualisation and implementation. Religious references are thus deliberately omitted in 
the proposed constitution of the European Union (EU) (Joppke, 2013:603). However, the 
practical implementation of human rights is not uniform. Donnelly (2007) admits that 
variations in its implementation are possible in order to make allowances for cultural 
practices so long as such practices do not fundamentally violate basic human rights such as 
security of person or the right to life. Yet Donnelly (1984:410-414) warns against human 
rights abuses cloaked in culture-based arguments and states that substantive limits apply to 
even well-established cultural practices.  
 
There is nevertheless “a legitimate range of variation” (Benhabib, 2009:698) in how rights 
can be interpreted and implemented. Benhabib (2009:698) argues that such differences are 
not only legitimate but necessary: people must not only be considered subject to the law, but 
the law has to be contextualised to local situations. When human rights are contradicted by 
culture or religion, solutions must come from within society. Scholars like Freeman 
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(2004:377-378-381) and Othman (1999:169-192) think this can be done by reinterpreting 
existing beliefs in order to ground universal human rights in non-Western cultures. Appealing 
to cultural or religious beliefs may be more successful than attempting to invalidate them in 
favour of the secular approach. Only in finding locally relevant solutions, can human rights 
attain democratic legitimacy (Benhabib, 2009:698).  
 
History would seem to argue that religious beliefs can have either a positive or negative 
impact on people‟s wellbeing in general and human rights in particular. In the South African 
context, religious organisations played both a positive and a negative role in the struggle for 
human rights. Although some religious leaders and institutions supported Apartheid, many 
others were actively involved in human rights activism. It has been argued that the role of 
these faith-based organisations was vital in ending Apartheid (Palm, 2014:98-99). As with 
post-secular arguments, it might therefore be possible to view religion as a source from which 
human rights norms can draw (as it has in the past). This may be a risky enterprise, but 
perhaps a solution for societies in which secularism is challenged and human rights are 
disputed (Malachuk, 2010:128-130). 
 
2.5  South Africa in context 
2.5.1  Inequality 
The ideal liberal democracy is homogenous and prosperous. Its wealth is equitably divided. 
Poverty is an assault on human dignity that violates the concept of equality. Stability may 
also be undermined in culturally diverse societies if there is a group that dominates the social, 
economic and political spheres to the exclusion of others. In such divided countries, 
democracy can contribute to conflict if competition for votes is organised along divisive 
ethnic, racial or religious lines. However, it is also possible to accommodate divisions 
peacefully if democracy is supported by strong constitutional liberalism (Zakaria, 1997:35).  
 
In following the fast, risky route to democracy, there is much that works against the success 
of the democratic project, since South Africa lacks the favourable preconditions of 
democracy. Despite socio-economic improvements since democratisation, South Africa still 
experiences very high levels of poverty and income inequality that disproportionately affect 
South Africans by race (Lipton, 2014:12). South Africa has succeeded in growing a black 
elite and middle class and has relieved extreme poverty through social grants. Nevertheless, 
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economic development has remained slow and unequal, with economic growth sometimes 
approaching, but never quite reaching government targets (Tregenna, 2011:2582).
22
 
 
Despite the government‟s efforts to provide housing to the poor, demand has grown much 
faster than supply. The provision of water, electricity and telephone lines has been followed 
by “unprecedented levels of disconnection due to the inability to pay, as the price of services 
soared far above the inflation rate” (Bond & Mottiar, 2013:284). Although a certain amount 
of water and electricity is provided free of charge, rising prices and progressive tariffs (the 
more you use, the more you pay) have translated into higher overall bills. Consequently 
approximately 1.5 million people have their water disconnected every year, while others‟ 
consumption levels have dropped dramatically. A quarter of electricity provider Eskom‟s four 
million customers have stopped (legally) consuming power. 2.1 Million of the 2.6 million 
households that received new telephone lines between 1994-1998 have been disconnected 
due to non-payment (Bond & Mottiar, 2013:284-285). 
 
South Africa‟s white population – about 4.5 million people or roughly 9% of the population – 
still receives 39% of the total household income. The black majority, over 43 million people 
and over 79% of the population (SAIRR, 2013:3-4), has increased its share from 20% in 1970 
to 45% in 2013. About half the country‟s population – more than 25.5 million people - live 
below the poverty line of $1 (approximately R10) a day and about 91% of this group is black. 
Only 3% of the people living in households that fall below the poverty line are white. South 
Africa‟s other race groups – coloured people (9% of the population or over 4.7 million people) 
and Indians/Asians (2.5% of the population or over 1.3 million people) – also only constitute 
a small minority of the poorest of the poor (Simkins, 2011:107-110; SAIRR, 2013:3-4; 
SAIRR, 2014:5). Race-based inequality is a South African reality when it comes to income 
and basic services, as well as education (Lipton, 2014; Chetty, 2014) and health (SAIRR, 
2013:1-84; SAIRR, 2014:561-639).  
 
Income inequality between rich and poor has widened in the democratic era, in general and 
within race groups (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:77-79). The Gini coefficient, which measures the 
degree of inequality within nations, is particularly and consistently high in South Africa: on a 
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The government’s current growth target is 5% (Vollgraaff, 2014), but growth for 2014 has been estimated at 
only about 1.4% (Douglas, 2015). 
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scale of 0 (perfect income equality) to 1 (perfect inequality), South Africa‟s score is 0.63, 
making it one of the most unequal countries in the world (SAIRR, 2013:321). According to 
economist Mike Schüssler (2014), South Africa‟s extreme inequality is due to high 
unemployment. When unemployed South Africans are excluded from the calculations, 
Schüssler estimates that the Gini coefficient could be as low as 0.28 for formal sector workers 
(after taking South Africa‟s progressive taxation and welfare spending into account). 
Inequality in South Africa therefore stems not from an unequal distribution of income and 
services as such, but rather from the income gap between those with jobs and those without – 
highlighting the importance of employment. 
 
Data presented by Garcia-Rivero et al. (2002:169) and Du Toit & Kotzé (2011:52-57) 
illustrate that the South African public has the expectation that democracy should deliver 
socio-economic goods. In both studies South Africans associate democracy with the expected 
delivery of goods such as houses, education and jobs. Political goods such as human rights, 
civil liberties and even regular elections are less strongly associated with democracy and are 
not as highly ranked among priorities and expectations. Garcia-Rivero et al. (2002:170-177) 
conclude that South Africans view democracy as a means of poverty alleviation as opposed to 
a form of government. If democracy does not deliver on expectations, its legitimacy may be 
damaged as South Africans lose faith in their political system.
23
 The possibility exists that 
South Africa could fall victim to populist or extremist leaders and that democratic 
consolidation may be stalled or reversed. 
 
According to Alexander (2010:25-37), South Africans‟ frustration with poverty and 
inequality is evident in the country‟s increasingly frequent and violent social protest action. 
The protests are largely related to service delivery and labour rights, although many also 
include xenophobic violence.
24
 The latter culminated in the countrywide xenophobic attacks 
of May 2008 and the renewed violence of April 2015, primarily directed toward African 
immigrants (Matsinhe, 2011:295-296; Mavundza, 2015:2). The immigrants are commonly 
                                                             
23The best example of such an occurrence is Weimar Germany: despite its liberal constitution, the failure to 
deliver prosperity led to the collapse of the Weimar Republic (Owen, 1994:125). 
24According to the SAIRR (2014:728) there were 1 691 reported outbreaks of public violence in 2013-2014, 
including service delivery protests, industrial action and inter-political conflict. The earliest available data from 
this source is from 2004-2005 when there were 974 such incidents. Burger and Lancaster (2014), taking their  
figures from the SAPS, report 1 907 outbreaks of public violence in 2013-2014, which is an increase of 96% 
from 2010-2011 (971 incidents). 
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perceived as an economic and criminal threat by poor (and other) South Africans. South 
Africa has also become known for its poor labour relations as well as its labour militancy, 
which has been partially responsible for the downgrade of the country‟s bond rating (Bond & 
Mottiar, 2013:299). Ironically, violent protests are often perpetrated in the name of 
democracy and human rights (Bond, 2012: 260-261). 
 
The same is true of community policing and vigilante efforts undertaken to fight crime. South 
Africa has an excessively high crime rate, including 47 homicides (and another 47 attempted 
homicides) per day in the period of 2013-2014 (SAIRR, 2014:707). The high crime rate may 
be viewed in light of the previously discussed literature on equality. Not only is inequality 
linked to crime, but crime is linked to low productivity as well as high levels of stress, illness, 
fear and distrust in unequal and divided societies.
25
 Hamilton (2011:359) asserts that such 
high levels of fear, distrust and anxiety lead to further conflict and violence among citizens.  
 
It is clear that South Africa lacks the benefits of equitable economic development and cultural 
unity. South Africans do not share the same resources, access to opportunities and social 
concerns (SAIRR, 2012:809-811). South Africans also do not share equal access to political 
power, as the ruling ANC – representative of and largely supported by South Africa‟s black 
majority – has been in power since the transition. Smaller opposition parties and racial 
minorities that do not support the ANC have for the most part been excluded from political 
office (Lipton, 2014:13). South Africans‟ diverging interests and concerns do not necessarily 
endanger its democracy, but it may impede the growth of liberal values as groups feel 
frustrated at their exclusion from social, political and economic resources. The same values 
are nevertheless needed as a vital source of stability and cohesion. 
 
2.5.2  Religious and spiritual beliefs 
In light of the concerns discussed above, it is necessary to examine whether South Africa‟s 
liberal values face serious challenges from contradictory beliefs. Of particular concern is the 
belief of South Africans in the concept of evil forces that have the power to do harm and the 
role that such beliefs may play in outbreaks of public violence. Unlike liberal democracies in 
Europe and elsewhere, South Africa has remained very religious. In contrast to the secular 
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Wilkinson (2005:101-143) found that levels of mental illness are 500% higher in very unequal societies – 
among all strata of the population – than among very equal societies. 
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values of the political system, the vast majority of South Africans consider themselves 
religious (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:133-138; also see Chapter Four). Various aspects of 
religiosity measured by the WVS - religious attendance and the importance of God - show 
that the South African public has consistently remained very religious regardless of factors 
such as race and social class (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:133-138; Chapter Four). 
 
In South Africa the belief in evil can be placed in three different contexts: the concept of evil 
found in the monotheistic Abrahamic religions, traditional African spiritual beliefs and the 
secular view. The monotheistic religions in question - Christianity, Islam and Judaism – 
traditionally view the world as a battlefield in which a malevolent spiritual being is in direct 
conflict with God. God is omnipresent and omnipotent and it is considered good to conform 
to his prescriptions (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:139). Satan is his malevolent challenger who 
aims to undermine him by tempting his followers away from his prescriptions. Evil is the 
result of the machinations of this malevolent force and his adherents. 
 
As mentioned in the first chapter, one of the examples of public violence that motivated Du 
Toit and Kotzé‟s work (2011) was the PAGAD movement. PAGAD was responsible for a 
series of terror attacks in Cape Town in the 1990s. The acts of violence included attacks 
against alleged gangsters as well as anyone perceived as a threat to the organisation. PAGAD 
therefore not only attacked supposed criminal elements, but also targeted the state through 
attacks on police stations, courts and judges (Isima, 2007:33). One of the organisation‟s most 
notorious acts of violence was the public execution of alleged gangster Rashaad Staggie who 
was shot and set a light (Pillay, 2002:60-63). Alleged criminals such as Staggie were often 
conceived as evil threats to the community and thus eliminated. 
 
Although PAGAD at times claimed to be a diverse community organisation, its membership 
and leadership were predominately Muslim (as were many of its victims). PAGAD seems to 
have conceptualised “community” not just in the local South African sense, but in terms of 
the ummah - the universal community of Muslim Believers. The neighbourhood watch 
groups out of which the organisation emerged were often organised from mosques. Local 
imams (Muslim religious leaders) often provided leadership and general support. At times 
PAGAD even endorsed Shari‟a law and it was briefly supported by the Muslim Judicial 
Council (MJC), which acts as an interpreter of Islamic law for Muslim South Africans (Pillay, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
33 
 
2002:60-65). It would appear that PAGAD‟s worldview and beliefs about evil were at least 
partly rooted in religious thinking. 
 
Although the example of PAGAD pertains to Islam, Christianity is in fact by far the most 
common of the Abrahamic faiths in South Africa.
26
 European missionaries established the 
Anglican, Dutch Reformed, Methodist and Roman Catholic churches who have an estimated 
following of over 11.1 million. The African Independent Churches (AICs), of which the Zion 
Christian Church is the biggest, broke away from the missionary churches in order to 
preserve traditional cultural practices. The AICs have over 14.5 million members. Pentecostal 
Christians also separated from the mainline churches in the early 1900s in order to celebrate a 
more enthusiastic form of Christianity often influenced by American ideas (Rule, 2007:419-
420).  
 
As in other parts of the developing world, South Africa has seen a new growth in 
conservative and fundamentalist Pentecostal sects (SAIRR 2012:81-83; 2014:68). The new 
Pentecostal and Charismatic establishments have attracted worshippers from the other 
churches as well as non-believers. Jenkins (2002:63) notes that Pentecostal churches tend to 
be especially popular among the poorest sections of society. In total, Pentecostal and similar 
churches have over 6.8 million members. Many of the new churches have been influenced by 
ideologies from Latin America, Nigeria and other parts of Africa, that are characterised by 
spiritual revelations received directly from God (supplementing or replacing instructions 
from the Bible), warfare against evil spirits, miraculous healing and the promise of instant 
God-given wealth (Jenkins, 2002:63; Rule, 2007:420-421; Comaroff & Comaroff, 
2004:528).
27
 
 
Followers of the Pentecostal sects are encouraged to confront evil as a tangible and malignant 
force. It is believed that God intervenes in human affairs and believers therefore rely on his 
direct guidance in their spiritual warfare. Evil can take the form of outright cruelty and 
injustice, but it can also manifest in more subtle and mundane ways. From this perspective 
                                                             
26Islam has about 673 005 followers (2% of the South African population) (SAIRR, 2014:68). 
27Brazil’s Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, which opened chapters in South Africa, has promised the 
public instant material gratification and has also been “rumoured to issue charmed credit cards that register 
no debt” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2004:528). 
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social ills and failed government policy can be interpreted as the work of the devil, which 
must be confronted with the help of divine intervention (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:139).  
 
The existence of a literal evil is also widely accepted in traditional African spiritual beliefs. 
Although there are many anthropological studies that focus on the practice of witchcraft 
within African spiritual life, there are few that examine the implications of witchcraft-related 
violence in contemporary Africa. Among the former type of research, Evans-Pritchard‟s 
study (1937) of the Azande in the Sudan has been one of the most influential works on 
witchcraft in Africa. In the same decade Wilson‟s study (1936/1979) of the Pondo provided 
an in-depth analysis of witchcraft practices in South Africa. Her study would be followed by 
many others.
28
 
 
In more recent times, scholars like Geschiere (1997; 2008) and Comaroff and Comaroff 
(1999; 2004) have researched how witchcraft practices in Africa relate to the political and 
economic forces of modernity. Other works of interest to this study is that of Adam Ashforth 
(2005b; 2011) and Isak Niehaus (2001; 2012) who examine the tension that witchcraft beliefs 
create in South Africa‟s liberal democracy. The work of John Hund (2003) and John Cohan 
(2011) also provide insight into legal aspects of the witchcraft matter.  
 
The use of words like “witch,” “witchdoctor” and “witchcraft” can be considered pejorative 
as they have negative connotations of evil, crime, backwardness and superstition. Many 
Africanist academics therefore refuse to use such terminology. Even with the best of 
intentions, translation can be notoriously distorting (Geschiere, 2008:316). However, the 
terminology is commonly understood and accepted in South Africa (and beyond) and are also 
consistently used by scholars like Ashforth (2005b), Niehaus (2012) and Geschiere (2008) 
who are expert in their field. Geschiere argues that: 
“These Western terms have been generally appropriated by African populations: public debates 
in the media and elsewhere are waged in these terms and so it seems quite futile to refuse to use 
them. Refusing to address the topic as such because it is politically incorrect seems to be not 
very helpful either”(2008:316). 
 
These terms will therefore be used interchangeably with their widely known English and 
Zulu synonyms. 
                                                             
28See for example Hammond-Tooke (1962). 
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According to African traditional belief, there are various benevolent and malevolent actors, 
both human and spiritual in nature, who battle each other and make decisions that affect 
people‟s lives. (Ashforth, 2010:100). The power of unseen spiritual forces and those who 
claim to communicate with them, can be accessed for good – personal protection and the 
solution of problems – or evil. As in Pentecostal Christian belief, evil forces can perpetrate 
any kind of harm including large-scale suffering such as poverty and disease as well as 
everyday misfortunes and seemingly random events including suicide and car accidents 
(Niehaus, 2012:36-37). Evil can also play a role in politics: the Apartheid regime was 
considered evil and violence was used to fight it. In Politics Of Evil (2002) Crais argues that 
violence was used not just as a tool for regime change, but was also seen as a way of 
purifying a disordered world by ridding it of evil. 
 
Evil forces can be used not only to cause undeserved suffering, but also for undeserved gain 
such as self-enrichment and the accumulation of power (Crais, 1998:52). Traditional African 
belief views good fortune or luck as a finite resource of which everyone receives a portion. If 
someone is exceptionally successful – especially when there is no known explanation for it – 
he or she must have obtained more than their fair share of luck. It is assumed that such unfair 
advantage is obtained through devious or supernatural means (Labuschagne, 2004:193). The 
unfair appropriation of limited supplies of good fortune occurs to the detriment of others and 
disturbs the natural order of life. The result is a general fear of individuals who are believed 
capable of using supernatural means to cause harm (witches) as well as the fear of being too 
successful and thereby provoking jealousy and allegations of witchcraft (Leistner, 2014:5-18). 
Witchcraft therefore negatively impacts on the local economy and illustrates how inequality 
can encourage illiberal attitudes.  
 
The concept of ubuntu (from the Zulu saying “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” – “a person is a 
person through other persons”) (Christians, 2004:241) is also an aspect of traditional African 
culture that can contribute to illiberalism. Although often viewed as a form of African 
humanism, the dark side of this idea that “personhood comes as a gift from other persons” 
(Schutte, 2001:12) is that people whose behaviour deviate from that of the community and its 
perceived well-being can become suspect. Although there are inclusive and exclusive 
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conceptualisations of ubuntu,
29
 according to one exclusive interpretation, the community is 
entitled to “reject and repel” (Gade, 2012:498) people who lack ubuntu or humanity. In some 
cases communities have been known to attack and even kill such persons. They may include 
alleged criminals or witches – people who are often described as “anti-social” (Niehaus, 
2012:38). Anti-social behaviour can include the accumulation of wealth or status as well as 
any strange, unpopular, unfriendly, temperamental or miserly behaviour (Cohan, 2011:820-
821). The traditional concept of ubuntu can thus be fairly different from the ideas of Western 
individualism and liberalism. 
 
When the natural order has been disturbed, it must be corrected in the same way it was upset: 
through spiritual intervention. Relations with unseen spiritual entities can and should be 
managed correctly to ensure a good outcome. The believer must find the appropriate 
assistance with which to counter evil powers: one of South Africa‟s 350 000 traditional 
healers (Ashforth, 2005b:8), consulted by up to 85% of African households (Cohan, 
2011:828). African healing largely concerns battling the evil forces held responsible for both 
illness and general misfortune.  
 
Traditional healers – also referred to as witchdoctors or diviners – include: sangomas, who 
communicate with ancestors in order to diagnose diseases and address problems relating to 
personal well-being and spiritual matters (King, 2012:1175); and inyangas who use muthi to 
help clients. In reality these categories often overlap
30
 and among sangomas and inyangas 
there are also believed to be witches who use their power for evil and illegitimate ends 
(Ashforth, 2005a:213-228). In fact, there is a widely recognised conflict of interest regarding 
traditional health practitioners. They depend on the existence of witches for their revenues 
and are thus likely to promote the fear of witchcraft among clients. Clients in turn often 
suspect sangomas of being in league with the witches in order to generate revenue (Cohan, 
2011:823). 
 
                                                             
29In his study, Gade (2012) found that some black South Africans view ubuntu as a moral quality that everyone 
is subject to. Others associate the concept only with black people or only with people who behave according to 
the principles of ubuntu. 
30
Both sangomas and inyangas give clients muthi, which often consists of a purgative substance (Nattrass, 
2005:163). Muthi is believed to prevent harm, heal suffering and counter evil (Semenya & Letsosa, 2013). 
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Traditional healers are recognised by the South African government and often cooperate with 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to promote wellbeing in communities (Gqaleni et 
al, 2012:129). Traditional health practitioners are often accorded respect similar to that of 
biomedical doctors and their services are sometimes covered by medical insurance policies 
(Comaroff & Comaroff, 2004:518). A South African court determined in 2013 that an 
employer may not take disciplinary action against sick employees who take time off work to 
visit healers (Narsee, 2013). The court called for more cultural sensitivity in the case of a chef, 
Johanna Mmoledi, who took time off work to train as a traditional healer. Her decision was 
triggered by visions of ancestors, illness and fear of misfortune and death if she did not 
respond to the calling to become a healer. Mmoledi‟s employer allowed her time off for the 
training, but dismissed her after she took an additional five weeks leave without permission. 
The employer did not acknowledge a certificate from a traditional healer as justification for 
the absence. However, Mmoledi was reinstated through the court‟s decision. 
 
Various studies have focused on analysing individuals who visit traditional healers, mostly 
focusing on health-seeking preferences. Such studies (Case et al., 2005:6; Liverpool et al., 
2004:824) indicate that many people visit both medical doctors and traditional healers. 
However, Case et al. (2005:15) found that better educated persons were less likely to seek out 
traditional healers in the event of short illnesses (though there was no difference with regards 
to prolonged illness). A 2005 survey of 570 people in Khayelitsha – a large black settlement 
in Cape Town – also delivered interesting results. The study found that clients of traditional 
healers were not more likely to have rural backgrounds (Nattrass, 2005:171-173). This is in 
accordance with Ashforth‟s research (2005b; 2011), which has shown that traditional beliefs 
and practices are thriving in urban Soweto (Johannesburg). It was also found that sangoma 
clients in Khayelitsha were less likely to state that they had good English reading and writing 
abilities. They were also more likely to believe that finding a job was a matter of luck 
(Nattrass, 2005:171-173).  
 
Nattrass interpreted these findings as evidence that sangoma clients were more marginalised 
in the modern economy and likely to view their situation as a matter of bad fortune. Nattrass 
(2005:173-175) also found that those who visit traditional healers are more likely to be older, 
less educated, poorer and less trusting of other people. Interestingly, it was also found that 
receiving a disability grant from the government was the best predictor of whether someone 
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was likely to visit a traditional healer. Nattrass suggests that the likelihood of someone 
becoming a sangoma client “is affected by health-related, attitudinal and material factors” 
(2005:179). This study examines most of these variables to see if they also relate to attitudes 
on evil and violence. 
 
Although not all the activities of traditional healers are dangerous, their spiritual beliefs and 
practices can lead to violence. A report issued by the Commission of Inquiry into Witchcraft 
Violence and Ritual Murders in the Northern Province of South Africa recorded 389 
witchcraft-related deaths (including the mass killing of alleged witches) between 1985-1995 
in what is now the Limpopo Province (Ralushai, 1996:191-239). The data only covers the 
former bantustan
31
 areas of the province and Niehaus considers it “a vast underestimate” 
(2001:210). Kohnert agrees (2007:42), stating that the violence has reached “hitherto 
unknown dimensions” and claims that anti-witchcraft movements are responsible for the 
deaths of thousands of supposed witches in the Northern- and Eastern Cape Provinces. 
According to Comaroff & Comaroff (2004:514), the rise in the persecution of supposed 
witches is due to “populist fears of an alarming increase in witchcraft practices, zombie-
conjuring, and the traffic in body parts.” Along with the popular need to punish evildoers in 
general, such fears have led to “hybrid cultural styles of informal justice.” 
 
In pre-colonial times the crime of witchcraft was dealt with by traditional courts who sought 
reconciliation, ordered compensation or sometimes forced migration (Cohan, 2011:826). 
Hund (2003:9-10) states that those who were falsely accused were normally cleared while 
false accusers were fined. He believes that traditional systems of social control kept 
witchcraft accusations and violence to a minimum. Colonial courts, however, usually 
dismissed charges of witchcraft because tangible evidence and direct causation could not be 
established. Today most African countries, including South Africa outlaws the practice of 
witchcraft (Cohan, 2011:823-827).  
 
The twice-amended Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1957 does not acknowledge witchcraft as 
a real phenomenon, but still outlaws all witchcraft-related practices. It is illegal to practice 
witchcraft, to seek to identify witches or make related allegations. South Africa‟s courts treat 
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Bantustans were supposedly independent territories to which black people could be relegated under 
Apartheid (King, 2012:1180; Lipton, 2014:7). 
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the belief in witchcraft as a mitigating factor, but generally expects citizens to be in control of 
their beliefs and actions (Cohan, 2011:849). The Act has largely been ineffective in 
suppressing witchcraft beliefs and practices. By not acknowledging witchcraft as a reality, it 
fails to protect those who fear it as well as those accused of it.
32
 Contrary to the more lenient 
punishments of pre-colonial times, the fear of witchcraft in the modern era can result in 
violent vigilantism. In this situation suspected witches no longer have the protection of 
customary courts and are left vulnerable (Cohan, 2011:823-827). 
 
Scholars of witchcraft generally offer few solutions to the problem. While some believe that 
harmful beliefs must be quashed (Wilson, 1967:135), others suggest the revival of traditional 
courts or the establishment of special courts to deal with witchcraft in a sensitive manner 
(Cohan, 2011:870-871). Hund insists that “traditional structures have all but collapsed” 
(2003:34) and that most Africans no longer respect traditional courts. He does however, 
allow for the possibility of special courts, possibly as “appendages to the formal legal system” 
(Hund, 2003:34-35). Hund also draws attention to the complex nature of such an undertaking: 
it is unclear how the metaphysics of witchcraft would relate to due process or what role 
sangomas would play in legal procedures.  
 
Tebbe (2007:231-233), using Cameroon as an example, highlights all that can go wrong 
when witchcraft is recognised as a reality and criminalised: the arbitrary charges and 
convictions based on little evidence and suspicious testimony pose a threat to the rule of law 
and notions of freedom and equal citizenship. Ultimately, Niehaus (2001:183) may be right 
when he states that consensus regarding witchcraft is not possible. There will always be 
disagreement between those who believe witchcraft is dangerous superstition, those for 
whom such beliefs have cultural value and those trying to find a middle ground (see Ralushai, 
1996).  
 
In addition to traditional healers, troubled South Africans can turn to any number of religious 
leaders who claim to be in contact with God. It is within this context that the growth of 
Pentecostal and other religious sects can be understood, because “the most successful 
religious movements and entrepreneurs in contemporary Africa are those promising 
                                                             
32In Comaroff & Comaroff (2004:529), Inspector Jackson Gopane with the SAPS is quoted as saying “The law is 
no good. The courts don’t believe in witchcraft…They should bring a proven witch into the courtroom. That 
would convince them.” 
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protection from occult assault” (Ashforth, 2011:141). Although the mainline churches tend to 
reject witchcraft related practices as superstition (Leistner, 2014:10-11), many of the new 
churches condemn it as a very real evil and aim to deliver believers from its influence 
through faith in God, prophets and prayer (Jeannerat, 2009:260-264).  
 
The traditional African beliefs and the fundamentalist Christian interpretations of evil are 
thus not mutually exclusive: both belief systems as well as Western scientific knowledge may 
inform the lives of South Africans in contradictory and changing ways (Ashforth, 2005a:216). 
Whereas Western science can explain what happens and how, it can‟t explain why. Spiritual 
paradigms explain why misfortune happens and why it happens to a specific person at a 
specific time. Spiritual and religious beliefs also provide comfort and reassurance in times of 
trouble (Norris & Inglehart, 2004:19). It addresses fundamental and existential questions 
regarding the nature and origin of suffering (Ashforth, 2002:126-127).  
 
According to Jensen (2012:93-95), the above-mentioned interaction between two seemingly 
dichotomous strands of thought is also evident in South Africa‟s political culture: on the one 
hand, formal politics are informed by a liberal, human rights-based political culture; on the 
other hand, occult or traditional elements have always played a role in popular politics.
33
 In 
fact, the violence sometimes generated by this strand of political culture proved quite helpful 
in the struggle against Apartheid. Everyday life and politics in South Africa is thus often 
characterised by the friction of two interacting paradigms: the modern and the traditional, the 
secular and the spiritual. The problem is not restricted to South Africa, as can be surmised 
from the ongoing debates on religion and secularism in Europe and elsewhere (see Norris & 
Inglehart, 2004). However, in South Africa the problem is further complicated by the lack of 
a single, coherent, unchallenged spiritual explanation for everyday suffering.  
 
African and Christian beliefs have been influenced by different ethnic, religious and medical 
traditions from around the region and the world. The only consensus is often that unseen evil 
forces cause very real injury. According to Ashforth (2005b; 2011) the lack of consensus 
from numerous authorities about what to do in the face of spiritual challenges has resulted in 
widespread fear and confusion about whom to turn to for explanation and advice. In this state 
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 One recent example is the use of a sangoma to bless proceedings during an ANC function in Cape Town 
(Steward, 2015). 
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of “spiritual insecurity” (Ashforth, 2011:133) people turn to any number of traditional or 
religious options or a confusing, contradictory mixture of both. In this context it is possible 
for over 80% of African households to visit traditional healers (Cohan, 2011:828) and yet 
only 5% of the South African population identify traditional African beliefs as their primary 
religion (SAIRR, 2014:70). According to King (2012:1176), people often “pray at the church 
in the day and visit the sangomas at night.” 
 
Lastly, the secular view of evil, which is sometimes shared by liberal Christians, is very 
different from the spiritual interpretations. It is not believed that suffering and tragedy are 
caused by spiritual beings. In fact, malicious spiritual entities and literal manifestations of 
evil are often viewed as superstition (Leistner, 2014:1). In a secular context the word “evil” is 
often used simply to describe an exceptionally bad act: one that is worse, more unreasonable, 
more prohibited than standard wrongdoing. “Evil” is thus a condemnation of excessive 
wrongdoing, not necessarily on a large scale, but borne out of a lack of mercy and conscience 
or the deliberate silencing of the conscience. Although the secular concept of evil is still 
disturbing, there is nothing supernatural about it and it is not characterised as an offence 
against God (Garrard, 1998:44-60). 
 
Despite people‟s ability to commit harmful – even evil – acts, in (secular) liberal democracies, 
humanity is believed to be fundamentally good.  Individuals are sometimes flawed or 
misguided, but they are not viewed as inherently malicious or sinful (Glenna, 2002:207). 
When people engage in harmful acts, it is because of ignorance or error. The source of evil is 
perceived as human and it can often be corrected through education (Du Toit & Kotzé, 
2011:140-143).The secular view of wrongdoers as misguided rather than truly malicious 
results in more lenience with regards to correcting their behaviour. Criminals, for example, 
are to be rehabilitated rather than punished and may therefore receive arguably light 
sentences (van der Walt, 2004:104). Their inherent human rights remain protected even if 
they have violated the rights of others. 
 
2.6 Marikana 
The Marikana massacre which occurred in August 2012 in South Africa‟s Northwest 
province illustrates not only the socio-economic frustrations and tensions discussed in this 
chapter, but also the salience of supernatural beliefs. As previously mentioned, South Africa 
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is no stranger to social protests. Strikes in the mining sector are no exception. South Africa 
possesses over 80% of the world‟s platinum resources, which has seen a 350% price increase 
between 2002-2008 (Bond & Mottiar, 2013:294). Mineworkers generally did not share in the 
prosperity of the platinum boom and leading up to August 2012, there were several reports of 
unrest (Van der Vlies, 2013:508). 
 
At Lonmin PLC,
34
 the world‟s third largest platinum producer, rock drill operators earned on 
average $511 (R5 110) a month and a housing allowance of $204 (R2 040). As most of the 
miners in the region are migrants, they often have to maintain two households: their own and 
that of their family (usually in a rural area). In August 2012, 3 000 Lonmin workers (mostly 
rock drill operators) went on strike, demanding $1 420 (R10 420) per month (Bond & Mottiar, 
2013:294). 
 
On August 16
th
 the mineworkers gathered on a hill where they had been striking for several 
days. Over the preceding days the strike had turned violent, resulting in the murder of two 
policemen, two security guards and several miners. There were also attempts to stop mining 
operations (De Villiers, 2013:1; Ledwaba, 2013:17-20). However, on the day, the miners 
were not on Lonmin property. They were nevertheless ordered by police (accompanied by 
national special commando forces) to leave. The miners, carrying machetes, sticks and other 
weapons, were surrounded by barbed wire and fired on with teargas and water cannon. At 
least one miner responded by firing a shot. It is also claimed that the miners charged at the 
police as they left the hill. The police opened fire, resulting in 34 dead and 78 injured miners 
while no police were harmed (Bond & Mottiar, 2013:292-293; Van der Vlies, 2013:508-509). 
 
The massacre at Marikana exposes the fault lines of poverty and lack of socio-economic 
transformation as well as class tensions between workers and elites. The massacre provided 
political capital for extremist politicians such as Julius Malema of the Economic Freedom 
Fighters (EFF), who has gained popularity by exploiting the ruling ANC‟s failures (Van der 
Vlies, 2013:510). Marikana also illustrates the supernatural beliefs common in South Africa. 
Some of the striking miners had visited a traditional healer, from whom they bought muthi. 
                                                             
34
One of the company’s shareholders, the Shanduka Group, is owned by ANC stalwart and South African 
Deputy-President Cyril Ramaphosa (Van Der Vlies, 2013:510-511). 
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The miners relied on the muthi,
35
 traditional rituals and help from ancestors for protection 
against bullets (Starkey, 2012:27). The sangoma had charged about $100 (R1 000) per person 
for the muthi and had also offered the men bee swarms and lightning strikes to defend them 
against the police (Jika, 2013:89). The miners‟ belief in their own supernatural invincibility 
and invisibility has been identified as the reason why they allegedly charged at heavily armed 
police (Bond & Mottiar, 2013:293; Van der Vlies, 2013:511).
36
 
 
Journalist Lucas Ledwaba provides an in-depth description of one of the rituals mentioned 
above: 
“On Saturday night 11 August, striking men gather on the banks of a stream near the koppie. 
Under cover of darkness, they strip naked and undergo a ritual reminiscent of those undertaken 
by warriors over centuries. Supervised by a medicine man, they roast two live sheep, one black, 
one white, over a fire. Incisions are made on their ears, cheeks, backs, thighs, and feet with a 
razor blade, and ashes from the fire, mixed with herbs, are rubbed into the wounds. This, they 
are told, will make them invincible. A firearm is produced and shots are fired [unsuccessfully] at 
a box smeared with the concoction
37[…]The men are now ready for war” (Ledwaba, 2013:17). 
 
Even after the deaths of 34 of the miners, it was still believed that the muthi had been 
effective. It was credited for earlier successes in skirmishes against the security guards and 
police. Many also believed that the weapons of the guards and police had malfunctioned, due 
to the muthi (Jika, 2013:89). Some of the miners believed the reason for the deaths of their 
colleagues was that they had not completed all the necessary rituals. Tholekile Mbhele was 
quoted as saying, “I was right next to Mambush [one of the dead miners] when they fired the 
shots – but look at me, I don‟t have a single scratch on my body, because I had gone through 
all the rituals” (Jika, 2013: 90). Mbhele is reportedly a religious man, who prayed to God 
before having participated in the rituals. After the massacre, he and others sought out a 
different sangoma in order to procure even better protection. 
 
Although the media and authorities have been accused of using the miners‟ beliefs to portray 
them as irrational and violent (Bond & Mottiar, 2013:293), it is nevertheless of great 
significance that spiritual beliefs could play such a central role in South Africa‟s deadliest 
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The muthi reportedly consisted of animal fat and herbal mixtures (Starkey, 2012:27), although the Marikana 
commission of inquiry also found that a tongue had been removed from one of the murdered security guards 
for the purpose of making the muthi (Ledwaba, 2013:19). 
36The sangoma whose sons were involved in the Marikana matter as well as several mine union employees 
were subsequently murdered before they could testify at the commission of inquiry (De Villiers, 2013:3-5). 
37Police have suggested that dummy bullets may have been used to fool the miners (Ledwaba, 2013:17). 
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police action since Apartheid (Van der Vlies, 2013:508). The events at Marikana remind not 
only of the well-known political massacres perpetrated by the Apartheid state,
38
 but also of 
other historical massacres involving supernatural beliefs.  
 
Parallels have been drawn with the 1921 Bulhoek massacre in the Eastern Cape where the 
self-proclaimed prophet Enoch Mgijima and his followers (up to 3 000 people) had gathered 
on private land to await an apocalyptic war. They relied on divine protection against the 800-
strong police force that showed up to disperse them (Anthony, 1990:415-416). More than 200 
believers were killed in the violence that followed, while others, including Mgijima, were 
arrested (Madondo, 2012). Marikana has also reminded some commentators of the notorious 
cattle killings of 1856 (Van der Vlies, 2013:511) in which the visions of a teenaged 
prophetess, Nongqawuse, drove  the Xhosa nation to kill their cattle and destroy their crops. 
The expectation was that dead Xhosa warriors would arise and drive out British colonists. 
Instead a famine resulted that decimated the population and ensured victory for the British 
(Davies, 2007:19-20). 
 
2.7  Conclusion 
It is clear that South Africa‟s democracy faces many challenges with regards to consolidation. 
As a member of the third wave – and taking Dahl‟s preconditions (1971) into account – South 
Africa will have to pay attention to economic development and the problem of inequality as 
well as the state of its political culture. If the country‟s diverse citizens are to enjoy 
democracy‟s promise of peace, they will need to embrace the system‟s liberal values. How 
this is to be accomplished is not a problem unique to South Africa. In fact, many societies are 
grappling with how to reconcile conflicting values. 
 
On the one hand liberalism calls for respect of non-Western cultures, especially in light of a 
long history of Western racism and colonialism. On the other, a liberal system can only 
tolerate what are considered reasonable deviations that do not violate fundamental human 
rights. Attempts to accommodate traditional healing while condemning witchcraft-related 
violence have been criticised as self-defeating as it is not possible to eradicate the violence 
while accommodating the ideologies in which it is rooted (Niehaus, 2001:189). By attempting 
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For example, the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960 in which police fired on political protesters, killing 69 
and injuring more than 180 people (Wagner, 2011:486). 
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to accommodate traditional practices the state also risks becoming entangled in the 
ambiguities that characterise them (Geschiere, 2008:315). 
 
It is also not advisable to simply ignore the issue in the hope that the values and institutions 
of liberal democracy will erode it. Witchcraft-related beliefs are simply too common, too 
much a part (and subtext) of everyday life and too adaptable to new contexts, to simply 
disappear. To ignore the matter is likely to lead to vigilantism as there is no provision made 
for persons who hold suspicions and fears of witchcraft (Jensen & Buur, 2004:198-199). The 
lack of legitimate channels for dealing with witchcraft is evidently part of the problem of 
South Africa‟s spiritual insecurity. However the problem is addressed, it will have to be done 
in a clear and uniform way, leaving no space for alternative authorities or interpretations.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This study seeks to discover, describe and explain the characteristics of South Africans who 
believe in evil and who may choose to act on this belief. The research questions can best be 
answered using methodological triangulation (Hussein, 2009:3-4). Statistical analysis of the 
WVS‟s longitudinal studies in South Africa enable the identification of the potential 
predictors of belief in evil. Six categories of variables will be analysed in an attempt to 
identify the traits of believers in evil: demographic as well as socio-economic variables, trust 
and tolerance factors, LOC variables, attitudinal measures and religiosity. A qualitative 
analysis of the findings will also add value to the interpretation of the data. 
 
The quantitative and qualitative aspects of the thesis both rely on the use of secondary 
sources. The key sources in question are the WVS data of 2006 and 2013 as well as the 
numerous studies mentioned throughout the thesis. This chapter includes a discussion on the 
research designs and methodologies relevant to the present study. Attention is also given to 
the conceptualisation and operationalisation of important variables. 
 
3.2  Survey research 
Survey research is the most common method of data collection in the social sciences 
(Bradburn & Sudman, 1988:61). A relatively large sample of respondents – representative of 
an even larger population – is chosen to answer a set of questions. The answers are 
numerically coded and analysed (Singleton & Straits, 2010:263). This form of research 
provides insight into how often a characteristic may be present in a population. It enables 
researchers to make generalisations about a population by studying a sample of that 
population (Singleton & Straits, 2010:9-10). The survey method can be used in the study of 
most subjects and has the advantage of freeing researchers “to ask the questions they want to 
ask when and where they want to do so” (Brady, 2000:48). 
 
Well-administered surveys are the most effective method of describing a population as they 
can provide a wealth of detailed and accurate information about large groups of people 
(Singleton & Straits, 2010:270). Surveys can be administered in various cost effective, 
indirect ways (over the phone, Internet or through the post) (Fink, 2003:1-30), but face-to-
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face interviews are preferred. Face-to-face interviews are more expensive and time-
consuming, but result in higher response rates and allow for longer and more complex 
questionnaires (Neuman, 2011:339). Personal interviews by well-trained professionals give 
researchers a measure of control over the survey process and help to eliminate a lot of 
confusion and bias that might occur in self-administered surveys. The use of standardised 
questionnaires and procedures also counter any bias that might occur on the part of 
interviewers with regards to how and when they question respondents (Payne & Payne, 
2004:130). 
 
Surveys are often the only way to gather in-depth information on intangible issues such as 
opinions, beliefs or emotions. It is also a very effective way to learn about behaviour (past, 
present or future). However, there is a risk that respondents might tailor their answers to suit 
perceived expectations or social norms. Survey research leaves little room for direct 
observation and is therefore largely dependent on the respondents to be truthful (Singleton & 
Straits, 2010:270-271). Survey data can be compromised when respondents are unwilling to 
cooperate or are unable to remember important information. Although surveys can be used to 
study a wide range of topics, the survey procedure is very structured. Standardised 
procedures and methods result in answers that are easy to quantify and compare, but the 
research process cannot easily be adapted to changing circumstances or new concerns once it 
is underway. Researchers are able to obtain answers to their questions, but not necessarily the 
wider context of those answers (Babbie, 2008:303). 
 
Analysing survey data enables researchers to discover patterns of association between 
variables. It is however more difficult (than in, for example, scientific experiments) to 
establish causation between variables.
39
 In analysing survey data, it is more difficult to 
manipulate variables and exclude rival explanations when trying to determine a causal 
relationship (Singleton & Straits, 2010:271). It is also often the case that statistical analysis 
“provides evidence for average effects rather than evidence that some particular cause results 
in a particular effect” (Crasnow, 2012:658). Scholars may therefore use statistical methods to 
establish that one variable tends to affect another, but when studying specific events or 
situations, qualitative research can still offer a lot of descriptive and explanatory power. This 
                                                             
39Association between variables is defined as “a connection between two social phenomena, demonstrated by 
one tending to vary according to variations in the other.” Causality is “a special case of association” in which 
changes in one variable “systematically result in direct changes in the other” (Payne & Payne, 2004:13-14). 
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study therefore makes use of statistical methods to look for relationships between variables 
and turns to qualitative methods for context. 
 
3.3  Longitudinal research 
Survey research can be either cross-sectional (the data is collected at only one point in time) 
or longitudinal (the same questions are asked at more than one point in time). Longitudinal 
surveys are more expensive than cross-sectional studies, but are also considered more reliable 
because they provide repeated evidence of relationships between variables and are more 
accurate when studying patterns of change in a population over time (Singleton & Straits, 
2010:273). Longitudinal studies can be designed in various ways depending on the research 
aims. Researchers can choose to question the exact same individuals repeatedly over time 
(panel studies) or use different samples to track changes within a group that shares the same 
life experiences at the same time (cohort studies) (Singleton & Straits, 2010:273-276). Data 
can also be collected from different people over time – either regarding a specific subject 
such as opinions on a political candidate (trend studies) (Babbie, 2010:107) or simply in 
general (time series studies) (Neuman, 2011:44-46). 
 
Although the WVS is a time series study that now includes six waves of investigation over 
more than 30 years (WVS, 2008:2), the questions pertaining to evil have only been included 
in the last two waves. Although this provides a vital source of information on the subject, 
there are some limitations in only being able to draw from two waves of study. According to 
Ployhart & Vandenberg (2010:97) one such limitation is that: 
“All change from Time 1 to Time 2 is by default linear […] and it is impossible to determine the 
form of change over time. It is merely an increment of difference between two times, and thus we 
cannot assess whether change was steady or delayed or whether it plateaued and then changed 
again.” 
 
Two waves of inquiry into the belief in evil is thus a limitation in the sense that it does not 
provide a history of this social phenomenon (Payne & Payne, 2004:144). It also makes it 
harder to speculate about possible future trends. However, given the fact that research into the 
matter is at an early stage, this particular limitation is likely to be remedied in the future. 
Future waves of study will no doubt provide more information on the long-term trends of 
these beliefs and might even correct possible mistakes of earlier research. In the absence of 
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knowledge on this topic to begin with, this study lays a groundwork on which others can 
build. 
 
A final concern with regards to longitudinal research is that variables may be conceptualised 
– and measured – in different ways over time (Perry, 2011:156). The relevance of a question 
may also change over time. A question nevertheless has to be asked in the same way each 
time in order for comparisons to be possible. 
 
3.4  Secondary data analysis 
Secondary data analysis refers to the analysis of data that was originally collected by 
someone else (Singleton & Straits, 2010:268). The focus is thus on reinterpreting the data of 
others, often with different research questions in mind. Although primary data analysis – 
where researchers are personally responsible for the entire research process, including the 
collection, analysis and presentation of their data – was the dominant approach to social 
research in the past, secondary data analysis has become very popular.  
 
The 1970s saw the “advent of surveys designed expressly for the purpose of making high 
quality data available to the social science research community” (Singleton & Straits, 
2010:268). The availability of high quality secondary data as well as the reality of financial 
constraints have contributed to the popularity of secondary data analysis. It is thus not 
uncommon today for researchers to use the data of others in their work and “the potential for 
accomplishing original research with precollected data is nonetheless tremendous” (Kiecolt & 
Nathan, 2012:21).  
 
It is nevertheless important to take note of possible differences in research design when using 
data not originally collected for one‟s intended purpose. Different research projects are 
conducted with different aims in mind and with different theoretical bases. This may have an 
impact on the methodology used, the conceptualisation of variables and how they are 
measured. It can even impact the quality of the data and the conclusions of a study (Stewart 
& Kamins, 2012:17-21). It is well-known that the choice of methodology can have a 
significant impact on findings. For example, when studying behaviour, researchers often 
obtain different results with direct observation than they do when they ask people to self-
report on their actions. Differences in conceptualisation and measurement can have similar 
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effects on the end results. It is necessary to carefully asses measurement techniques, units of 
analysis, research samples and response rates to make sure that secondary sources are truly 
usable (Thorne, 1998:6-7). Seemingly relevant and credible studies can still be inappropriate 
for certain research purposes.  
 
Another factor to consider when examining secondary data is time. Researchers naturally 
want to access the latest and most conclusive data, while avoiding data that has become 
obsolete. There is a period of time that passes between data collection and publication. One 
has to keep in mind that freshly published data may not be quite as new as it appears. It is 
also important to consider factors that may affect results at certain times and not others. For 
example, survey respondents may be exceptionally sensitive to an issue if it happens to be a 
highly publicised and debated matter at the time of the interviews. During other times – when 
the subject in question is not really being discussed publically – people may feel less strongly 
about it (Stewart & Kamins, 2012:22-23). The decision of when to measure a phenomenon 
can therefore impact a study and users of secondary data may be unaware of potential 
implications. 
 
An additional challenge of secondary research is that the researcher tends to be “removed 
from the context of the original research” (Thorne, 1998:7-8) and thus runs a bigger risk of 
being accused of misrepresentation or misappropriation of data. The researcher therefore has 
a responsibility to not only use secondary sources in an ethical manner (Brewer et al., 
2012:174), but also to evaluate the implications of varying research designs and to ensure the 
quality and relevance of the information that is used. This is done by studying the original 
data collection process, how information was categorised and summarised, how threats to the 
credibility of the research were managed and how conclusions were ultimately reached 
(Thorne, 1998:4-8).  
 
Stewart and Kamins (2012:17-19) advise a healthy scepticism in the evaluation of secondary 
sources. It is important to know why the research was conducted and by whom. Knowledge 
of the original investigators can inform the researcher of their qualifications and reputation, 
their possible biases and the credibility of their work. It is also necessary to know what data 
was collected as well as when and how. Such information can indicate the relevance and 
quality of the data. One can also compare one‟s secondary data with other sources to see if 
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findings have been replicated elsewhere. It must be ascertained that the secondary data is 
relevant, credible, timely, accurate and affordable (Kolb, 2012:114-115). Even petty errors in 
the original research procedures can affect the end result of a study. Such small errors can be 
magnified when data is used for a purpose other than the original researchers intended 
(Kiecolt and Nathan, 2012:25). 
 
Fortunately, Boslough (2010:1330-1331) notes that the quality of secondary data tends to be 
high and that the methodologies employed by original researchers are usually well-
documented. Stewart and Kamins (2012:19) confirms that it is the norm for “sources of high 
integrity” to provide plentiful information – such as copies of measurement instruments, 
questionnaires and coding forms - regarding the research process. Other researchers can thus 
determine the adequacy of the information for their own work. This is certainly the case with 
regards to the WVS, which provides ample information on the technical aspects of the 
surveys (WVS, 2007). 
 
Although the use of secondary data leaves the researcher without control over important parts 
of the research process (including quality control, the content of questionnaires and research 
design), the benefits of this method, as mentioned in Chapter One, are significant. This is 
particularly true with regards to time, effort and money saved (Brewer et al., 2012:174). 
Finding appropriate datasets for secondary analysis can be difficult, but it takes considerably 
less time and resources than initiating a new investigation. Secondary analysis can be done 
independently, with no need to hire staff or secure funding from organisations (whose 
objectives or demands may have a detrimental effect on the project) (Kiecolt & Nathan, 
2012:23).  
 
It is the researcher‟s assertion that the qualitative and quantitative data used in this study meet 
the requirements and standards discussed above. The fact that the South African edition of 
the WVS was conducted with the present research topic in mind, renders its datasets 
appropriate. The WVS is well-established, respected and covers a wide range of beliefs and 
behaviour, which enables its effective use in a broad range of secondary research projects 
(WVS, 2008). There is no doubt that it qualifies as a source of high integrity and quality. 
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3.5  Description of datasets 
The World Values Survey Association (WVSA) is a non-profit association situated in 
Stockholm, Sweden. It was founded under the auspices of leading social scientist Ronald 
Inglehart. The primary goal of the WVSA is to enable a better understanding of national and 
global changes in people‟s beliefs, values and motivations (WVS, 2008:2-3). The Association 
has therefore established a global network of social scientists who study the aforementioned 
changes by carrying out representative national surveys as well as sharing and studying the 
results. 
 
Each national survey is headed by a member of the WVSA who acts as the principle 
investigator. He or she is responsible for carrying out the survey in his/her country as well as 
for the analysis and interpretation of results. The principal investigator shares the data with 
other social scientists, policy makers and the public. The WVS therefore allows all 
stakeholders and interested parties to assess a society‟s changing values and its possible 
impact on social, political and economic life (WVS, 2008:2-3). 
 
The WVS studies are designed with input from experts around the world. Questionnaires are 
largely similar across countries in order to make cross-national studies possible. However, as 
previously discussed, principle investigators are able to insert their own questions as well. 
The fact that the investigators conduct their work in their own countries, means that they are 
knowledgeable about local circumstances. They can therefore design and implement the 
research process in a manner that suits the society in question. They can also share their 
experiences and research techniques with their fellow social scientists, resulting in the 
worldwide dissemination of data and methodological techniques. (WVS, 2008:2-4). 
 
Although the surveys are designed with the input of WVSA members from around the world, 
all the principal researchers must ensure that the World Values Survey Executive 
Committee‟s (WVSEC) rules and procedures are followed. The rules and procedures include 
(WVS, 2008:2-4; WVS, 2005): 
 Face-to-face interviews carried out by a local research organisation and supervised by 
academic researchers. 
 Interviews conducted in local languages (questionnaires have to be translated). 
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 The use of random probability samples (as far as possible)40 that are also nationally 
representative.
41
 
 A minimum sample size of 1 000 persons. 
 The WVSEC‟s acceptance of the sampling and documentation procedures of each 
national survey before data collection begins. 
 The completion of designated checklists by the responsible research organisation in order 
to report on the fieldwork. 
 Internal consistency checks during the survey process. 
 The WVS data archive‟s extensive data-cleaning measures. 
 The deliverance of complete documentation to the WVSA. 
 
When the procedures above have been adhered to, the national survey is officially included in 
a WVS wave. South Africa has participated in the WVS since its inception and is therefore 
included in all six waves of the study. Researchers studying South Africa can therefore draw 
on WVS datasets from 1982, 1990, 1995, 2001, 2006 and 2013 (WVS, 2013). The 
questionnaires administered in each wave are largely – but not entirely – the same. This 
study‟s key questions were only included in 2006 and 2013. The focus will therefore be on 
the latest two datasets. 
 
3.5.1  The 2006 dataset 
The fifth wave of the WVS in South Africa was conducted in November and December of 
2006 by Ipsos Markinor. The lead investigators were Mari Harris and Professor Hennie Kotzé. 
2 988 South African residents (male and female respondents, 16 years and older) were 
personally interviewed in their homes. The languages employed were Afrikaans, English, 
North Sotho (Pedi), South Sotho, Tswana, Xhosa and Zulu. The respondents were 
representative of the population and chosen by means of random probability sampling (WVS, 
2006b). The survey took place in urban and rural areas of all nine South African provinces. 
The data was also weighted to accurately represent the South African population.  
                                                             
40Once researchers have established a sampling frame (a list or approximation of cases in a population), a 
mathematically random method is used to select the cases to be interviewed. In random probability sampling, 
each sampling element of the population has an equal chance of being selected as part of the sample (Neuman, 
2011:246-249). 
41Data may be weighted to correct for the under-representation of certain groups in the sample. When a 
variable is weighted (multiplied by a certain number), it’s influence in the sample increases to accurately 
reflect the realities of the population in question (Neuman, 2011:223-224; Field, 2013:886). 
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Prior to the start of the interview stage of the survey, all interviewers received training from 
Ipsos Markinor‟s sampling expert. Interviewers were fully briefed and participated in mock 
interview sessions before fieldwork began. Once fieldwork began, interviewers were 
accompanied by supervisors, quality control officers and field coordinators. The quality 
control officers and field coordinators back-checked 30% of the sample and spot-checks were 
also conducted while fieldwork was in progress (WVS, 2006b). 
 
3.5.2 The 2013 dataset 
The sixth wave of the WVS – once again conducted under the auspices of Harris and Kotzé - 
took place between August and October 2013. A nationally representative sample of 3 531 
adults were interviewed in the aforementioned South African languages. The Face To Face 
Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) method was used to execute the survey. 
Interviews were personally conducted and answers entered into the CAPI computer. Paper 
copies of the questionnaire were available for use in instances of electricity failure or absence. 
According to Ipsos (2013), the CAPI methodology provides results that are highly 
representative of the population. Ipsos also estimates that the margin of sampling error
42
 is 
1.65%. Researchers can be 95% confident that the true opinion of South Africans fall within 
a margin of 1.65% of either side of the survey results (Ipsos, 2013:14-26). The data was also 
once again weighted to represent the population. 
 
As was the case with the 2006 survey, the field workers who conducted the sixth wave were 
experienced and well-trained. They completed the Ipsos training course (including training in 
probability sampling and questionnaire administration) and passed competency tests. Field 
workers were thoroughly familiarised with all aspects of the study (including sampling and 
respondent selection) and once again participated in mock interviews before taking to the 
field. Once fieldwork was underway, the 192 fieldworkers reported to 20 supervisors who in 
turn informed the field coordinators of the progress made and challenges encountered. 17.75% 
Of the interviews were back-checked for quality control purposes (Ipsos, 2013:14-29).
43
 
 
 
 
                                                             
42Sampling error reflects how much the sample differs from the real population. The use of random sampling 
enables the researcher to calculate how big the sampling error is (Neuman, 2011:248-249). 
43Excluding further checks made by supervisors to confirm respondents’ details. 
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3.6  Conceptualisation and operationalisation of variables 
The study of values is an attempt to measure the intangible. In order to do so one needs very 
clear, conceptual definitions of the relevant values (conceptualisation) as well as trusted ways 
in which to measure them (operationalisation). Researchers who want to study intangible 
matters that cannot be directly observed and easily measured, have to: 
“Obtain an estimate indirectly by using a surrogate measure that is observable and assumed to 
be related to the more interesting phenomenon. The critical assumption of such indirect 
measurement techniques is that there is a relationship between the observable measure and the 
unobservable event of interest. Even when this assumption is correct, however, the relationship 
may be decidedly less than perfect” (Stewart & Kamins, 2012:20). 
 
Researchers therefore need to have confidence in the validity and reliability of the measures 
they use, thereby ensuring minimal measurement error (Field, 2013:12). Validity refers to 
correctness or truthfulness: whether scientific measurement is an accurate reflection of reality. 
Validity is lacking when the ideas used to analyse a society differ significantly from the lived 
experience in that society. Reliability is broadly defined as the dependability or consistency 
of the results obtained (Neuman, 2011:207-208). If measurement techniques have an undue 
influence on results, the results may be unreliable and unlikely to be consistent with that of 
other studies.  
 
Neuman (2011:208-214) distinguishes between four main types of measurement validity: 
face validity, content validity, criterion validity and construct validity. He also mentions three 
types of reliability: stability reliability, representative reliability and equivalence reliability. 
Face validity occurs when there is consensus in the scientific community regarding which 
indicators measure which constructs. It is quite common for consensus of the definitions and 
measurement of constructs to be lacking (Stewart & Kamins, 2012:20-21). Inconsistent 
results are therefore often due to simple differences in how a concept is defined rather than 
disagreement of the actual nature of the subject under study.  
 
Content validity refers to whether all aspects of a definition are represented in a measure. If a 
construct is defined as consisting of three specific elements, the measure must accurately 
measure all three elements – the entire content of the definition. If only part of the construct 
is measured, the researcher will have low content validity. In such cases, Neuman (2011:212-
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213) suggests that the measure must either be expanded or the definition narrowed in order to 
obtain content-validity.  
 
Criterion validity is when a researcher uses objective criteria to establish that an instrument 
does indeed measure what it claims to measure (Field, 2013:12). Researchers can establish 
that an instrument or indicator is valid by comparing its results with that of a trusted indicator 
(for example, one that has face validity) (Neuman, 2011:213). When researchers record data 
while using both the trusted indicator and the one being tested, they are assessing concurrent 
validity. When data from the new indicator is used to predict future observations, researchers 
are assessing predictive validity (Field, 2013:12). Concurrent and predictive validity are both 
subtypes of criterion validity. 
 
Finally, construct validity refers to measures with multiple indicators. There are two types of 
construct validity: convergent and discriminant. Convergent validity occurs when many 
indicators are associated with each other and tend to converge. If researchers measure a 
construct and find that all the construct‟s indicators converge, there is strong convergent 
validity. Discriminant validity occurs when a construct‟s indicators not only converge, but are 
also negatively associated with an opposing construct. For example, one would expect the 
indicators of political conservatism to converge and to be negatively associated with the 
indicators of liberal political attitudes (Neuman, 2011:213-214). 
 
The three kinds of reliability refer to whether one‟s measures are reliable (deliver the same 
answers) across time (stability reliability), across different subpopulations (representative 
reliability) and when using multiple indicators to measure the same construct (equivalence 
reliability) (Neuman, 2011:208-209). The variables used to measure values in this study are 
reliable across time and across the subpopulations of South Africa. The variables are also 
valid in terms of face validity (their conceptualisation is widely accepted and makes sense) 
and content validity (they measure what is intended). 
 
3.6.1  Evil 
Evil as a belief is conceptualised in two ways in this study, namely the literal and the secular 
definitions as discussed in Chapter Two. The belief in a literal evil is defined as the belief in 
real (if unseen), malignant spiritual forces that can cause real and direct harm in the lives of 
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individuals. Secular evil is conceptualised as an entirely non-spiritual phenomenon 
characterised by wrongdoing on the part of flawed human beings. In the WVS (2006a; 2013) 
respondents are asked to strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or 
strongly disagree with three statements regarding evil: 
 “Evil is everywhere” 
 “Evil can take possession of some people” 
 “The community must get rid of people possessed by evil even if it means that they have 
to be killed” 
 
As explained in Chapter One, all believers in evil can agree with the first statement – it 
therefore measures the belief in evil in general. The other two statements specifically refer to 
evil as a force that can take possession of people. These statements are therefore meant to 
measure only belief in literal evil. Evil is thus included as a categorical variable in this study. 
With regards to the latter two statements, it should be noted that although the statements were 
formulated with the intention that respondents interpret evil literally, one cannot be sure of 
such interpretation. A figurative understanding of “possession” may still have been possible 
on the part of some respondents. However, regardless of literal or figurative interpretation, 
there is no mistaking the serious nature of the third statement. This statement measures 
support for the harsh and violent punishment of evil-doers. It is therefore of relevance as an 
illiberal value regardless of the individual understanding of evil. 
 
3.6.2  Demographic and socio-economic variables 
The first category of variables to be analysed in conjunction with evil is that of demographic 
variables. The demographic variables largely consist of characteristics that individuals 
acquire because of birth or socialisation. Race in the South African context – referred to as 
“ethnic group” by the WVS (2006a;2013) – has four categories relevant to the majority of the 
population: black, white, coloured and Indian. Although “other” is also a response category, 
it is selected so rarely that it has been excluded from analysis. Other demographic variables 
include ethnic community and home language as well as sex, age and province. 
 
The socio-economic variables to be analysed include marital status, level of education, class 
and household income. The 2006 WVS also asked respondents whether they considered 
themselves to be poor or not (self-reported poverty). However, the 2013 survey omitted this 
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particular question and only the 2006 data can therefore be looked at. Lastly, respondents 
were asked – in 2006 and 2013 – whether they receive a government grant. This question is 
included in the analysis.  
 
3.6.3  Trust and tolerance 
Although not considered preconditions of democracy, trust and tolerance are nevertheless 
strongly associated with it. Trust and tolerance have often been studied by scholars of 
democratic consolidation as both constructs are widely recognised as very good indicators of 
political culture (Garcia-Rivero et al., 2002:163). Citizens in a democracy do not rule directly, 
but through representatives and various government and other institutions. Democracy 
therefore requires high levels of trust in institutions and people. Although citizens of a 
democracy are required to be vigilant against abuse of power - and therefore need to be 
suspicious and even distrustful of those in power (Warren, 1998:96) - if people harbour 
extensive distrust of the majority of the actors in the system, democracy begins to weaken. 
For the purposes of this study, only social trust (trust in people rather than institutions) is 
analysed. 
 
Sztompka‟s definition of social trust as a “bet about the future contingent actions of others” 
(1999:2) implies a risk that others‟ actions may be harmful. The definition can therefore be 
extended as the “belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm, if they can 
avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is possible” (Newton, 2004:17). Social trust is 
considered necessary for the effective functioning of civil society. As already discussed in 
Chapter Two, a dynamic civil society is considered a feature of a healthy democracy 
(Steenekamp, 2011:88-89). 
 
The WVS includes a number of questions meant to measure social trust: respondents are 
asked whether most people can be trusted or whether one needs to be careful of others. 
Answers range from 1 (most people can be trusted) to 10 (need to be careful). There is also a 
“don‟t know” category which has been excluded (as missing data) from analysis. Steenekamp 
(2011:93) draws attention to some of the weaknesses of this measure, including the lack of 
social context to the question and the fact that respondents can‟t distinguish between trust in 
family, friends, strangers and so on. The measure is nevertheless recognised as the standard 
indicator of social trust. 
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Additionally, respondents are also asked whether the following people can be trusted 
(completely, somewhat, not much or not at all): family, neighbours, people of other race 
groups, people who are personally known to the respondent, people one meets for the first 
time, people of another religion, foreigners, black people, coloured people, Indians, whites, 
Chinese people, politicians, businesspeople, friends (WVS, 2006a & 2013).  
 
Tolerance is simply defined as “putting up with something that one does not like” (Vogt, 
1997:1). Tolerance requires people to support the rights of those they may not like or approve 
of for whatever reason. It can be an indication of how willing people are to accept different or 
unpopular groups and political opponents. Tolerance is therefore closely linked to the 
acceptance of the rules of a democratic system (Garcia-Rivero et al., 2002:170). Although the 
dislike of others may stem from prejudice, it does not become intolerance until discriminative 
action is taken against the people in question (Steenekamp, 2011:94). Tolerance can therefore 
be seen as an act of “intentional self-restraint in the face of something one dislikes, objects to, 
finds threatening, or otherwise has a negative attitude toward – usually in order to maintain a 
social or political group or to promote harmony in a group” (Vogt, 1997:3). 
 
Vogt (1997:17-20) distinguishes between three types of tolerance: political, moral and social. 
Political tolerance applies to public acts of a political nature such as public speeches, rallies 
and campaigning. Moral tolerance refers to acts in the private sphere, for example, unmarried 
couples living together, homosexuality and abortion. Lastly, social tolerance is tolerance of 
people who are perceived as different due to qualities they are born with (such as skin colour) 
or acquire at an early age (language, for instance). These individuals are sometimes 
discriminated against not necessarily because of the above-mentioned qualities as such, but 
because of the inappropriate behaviour that people may associate with those who have these 
qualities (Steenekamp, 2011:95). 
 
Tolerance is often measured by asking survey respondents to express dislike towards a 
variety of target groups (Garcia-Rivero et al., 2002:171). In the WVS, respondents are 
therefore presented with the following target groups and asked whom they would not want as 
their neighbours: drug addicts, people of another race, people with human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV), immigrants or workers from another country, homosexuals, people who practice 
another religion, heavy drinkers, unmarried couples who live together, people who speak 
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another language, black people, coloured people, Indians, white people (WVS, 2006a & 
2013).  
 
The measures above are indicators of moral and social tolerance. The present study does not 
attempt to analyse political tolerance. The only potential concern with regards to measuring 
tolerance is that there may very well be a difference between a respondent‟s professed 
tolerance and their lived reality. It is nevertheless an accepted and recognised way to measure 
tolerance: it is believed that the measures genuinely reflect tolerance or intolerance where it 
exists, regardless of the fact that the actual behaviour of respondents remains unknown 
(Garcia-Rivero et al., 2002:171; Steenekamp, 2011:97-98). 
 
3.6.4  LOC 
LOC is a psychological construct that was developed to study people‟s perceived levels of 
control over their lives as well as the influence that this perception may have on their 
subsequent behaviour and expectations (Rotter, 1966 & 1975). The LOC variables thus aim 
to measure beliefs regarding how much control people think they have over the outcomes of 
their lives. While some people feel that the outcome of their lives is largely determined by 
their own actions, others believe that external factors determine positive or negative 
outcomes. Broadly speaking, analysing LOC can shed light on possible feelings of insecurity 
or even helplessness among South Africans. It is also a useful concept in light of the 
traditional African view of good fortune as an allotted portion (that others can interfere with) 
rather than the result of individual effort. 
 
Respondents were asked to answer the following questions on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being 
the most negative answer and 10 the most positive: 
“Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they 
try to be fair?” 
“All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” 
“Some people feel they have complete free choice and control over their lives, while other people 
feel that what they do has no real affect on what happens to them. Please use this scale […] to 
indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns 
out.” (WVS, 2006a) 
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The fourth LOC question asked people to rate their overall level of happiness and provided 
several response categories: very happy, rather happy, not very happy, not at all happy and do 
not know (excluded). 
 
3.6.5  Attitudinal factors 
This category of variables measured attitudes and beliefs that could potentially have a bearing 
on the belief in evil. Each of the four questions in this category was answered on a scale of 1 
to 10. Respondents were asked if the death penalty is ever justifiable. They were also asked to 
express their satisfaction with their household financial situation. The last questions in this 
category asked respondents‟ views on hard work (whether hard work brings a better life or 
whether success is a matter of luck and connections) and wealth (whether people can only get 
rich at the expense of others or whether wealth can grow so that there is enough for everyone). 
Details of the recoding of these and other variables are included in Chapter Four. 
 
3.6.6  Religiosity 
Four variables of the WVS‟s questions on religion were chosen to measure how religiosity 
may impact on the belief in evil. Respondents were asked how important God and religion 
were in their lives. They were also asked if they belonged to a church or religious 
organisation. Lastly, respondents were asked about how often they attend a religious 
organisation. 
 
3.7  Conclusion 
This chapter reviews the methodology used in the present study as well as the limitations and 
challenges faced in pursuit of the research aims. The thesis relies on data obtained from the 
WVS‟s well-established longitudinal survey research. It is therefore a secondary analysis of 
the WVS data, but it also offers qualitative explanation. The strengths and weaknesses of the 
chosen methodology have been discussed and the researcher believes that the former 
outweighs the latter.  
 
This chapter also includes detailed descriptions of the relevant datasets as well as information 
on the conceptualisation and operationalisation of key variables. The data used in this study is 
of high quality and from a source of high integrity. The variables can also be considered 
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reliable and valid in all the ways that are applicable. There is thus every reason to have 
confidence in the results of the study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS 
 
4.1  Introduction 
The following chapter presents the statistical analysis of the data from the 2006 and 2013 
waves of the WVS in South Africa. The data analysis consists of univariate (frequencies), 
bivariate (crosstabulations) and multivariate (multiple regression) analysis presented in tables 
and figures as appropriate. The findings are also briefly discussed, although further 
qualitative interpretation is presented in chapters five and six. 
 
As previously mentioned, the dependent variables in this study are the three statements on 
evil. The study attempts to find predictors for these dependent variables. The potential 
predictors have been categorised into six groups or models: demographic, socio-economic, 
trust and tolerance, LOC, attitudinal and religiosity (as discussed in Chapter Three). The most 
significant results from the crosstabulations with each group of variables are presented first. 
The multiple regression analysis conducted on the six models follow in a separate section.
44
 
Comparisons of the 2006 and 2013 findings are also made. 
 
Univariate analysis is the simplest form of quantitative analysis. It describes the distribution 
of attributes that comprises a single variable. Univariate analysis is therefore a count of the 
attributes of a variable (Babbie, 2010:462). For example, gender usually has two attributes – 
male and female. Univariate analysis executes a count of each and shows how frequently 
each attribute occurs – thus how many respondents are male and how many are female. 
Bivariate analysis indicates whether there is a relationship between two variables. This is 
done by examining the pattern or distribution of responses for both variables. Two variables 
are related when:  
“The distribution of values for one variable is associated with the distribution exhibited by 
another variable. In other words, the variation exhibited by one variable is patterned in such a 
way that its variance is not randomly distributed in relation to the other variable” (Bryman & 
Cramer, 2009:199). 
 
This study‟s bivariate analysis consists of crosstabulations, for which Chi-Square tests were 
carried out to indicate whether the results were statistically significant or simply a matter of 
                                                             
44
All figures have been rounded and percentages may not always add to 100 as a result. Where necessary the 
response categories “don’t know” and “refused” have been coded as missing data and excluded. 
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numerical chance. In order for the findings to be significant, the Sig. value of Pearson‟s Chi-
Square has to be .05 or less (Pallant, 2011:219). All the findings below are statistically 
significant unless otherwise stated. The Chi-Square test does not indicate the strength of a 
relationship, but merely whether a finding occurred by chance or not (Bryman & Cramer, 
2009:205-211). To find the strength of relationships – or effect size – the appropriate 
statistical tools were selected depending on table size and type of variable.
45
 An effect size 
of .1 (or thereabouts) indicates a weak relationship, while .3 and .5 respectively indicate 
moderate and strong relationships (Pallant, 2011:220). 
 
Multiple regression analysis (a form of multivariate analysis) is used to find out how well a 
group of (usually continuous) independent variables can predict a continuous dependent 
variable. It provides the researcher with information about the model (or group of variables) 
as a whole as well as the individual contributions of each variable in the model. It gives an 
idea of the predictive power of the model - stating how much of the variance of the dependent 
variable is explained by the independent variables. It also indicates which particular variable 
in the model is the best predictor. Multiple regression analysis can also indicate whether a 
variable is still able to predict a certain outcome when another variable‟s effects are 
controlled for (Pallant, 2011:148-153). Multiple regression analysis includes tests of 
statistical significance and results that are not significant (where the Sig. value is more 
than .05) have been clearly marked in the relevant tables. 
 
4.2  Evil 
A basic univariate analysis was carried out on the three questions in the WVS that measure 
belief in evil. The response categories were collapsed into three options: agree, neutral and 
disagree.
46
 Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below show that the belief in evil has remained stable in South 
Africa from 2006 to 2013. Indeed, the belief that evil is everywhere was affirmed by over 85% 
of respondents in both waves of the WVS. At least 80% of respondents also affirmed the 
belief that evil can take possession of some people.  
 
The most significant finding is the number of people who agreed that the community must 
get rid of evil people even if they have to be killed (Table 4.3). Whereas roughly a third of 
                                                             
45For larger tables, Cramer’s V was selected to test the strength of relationships between nominal variables or 
a nominal and an ordinal variable. Gamma was used when two ordinal variables were analysed.  
46Categories 1 and 2 were recoded as 1 (in other words 1+2=1), category 3=2, categories 4+5=3. 
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South Africans (32%) agreed with the statement in 2006, over half (55%) were in agreement 
in 2013. The general belief in evil has therefore remained very high, while the belief that evil 
persons need to be removed has become more widespread. One could even argue that the 
general belief in evil seems to be entrenched and that South Africans are perhaps hardening 
their attitude toward perceived perpetrators of evil. 
 
Table 4.1 Evil is everywhere 
Evil is everywhere 2006 2013 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Total 
89% 
6% 
6% 
100% 
86% 
9% 
5% 
100% 
 
Table 4.2 Evil can take possession of some people 
Evil can take possession of some people 2006 2013 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Total 
87% 
9% 
4% 
100% 
80% 
15% 
6% 
100% 
 
Table 4.3 The community must get rid of people possessed by evil even if it means that 
they have to be killed 
The community must get rid of evil people 2006 2013 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Total 
32% 
20% 
47% 
100% 
55% 
20% 
25% 
100% 
 
4.3  Demographic factors 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the demographic variables that were analysed as possible 
predictors of the dependent variables were as follows: ethnic group (race), ethnic community, 
home language, sex, province and age.  
 
4.3.1 Race 
Table 4.4 below shows the racial identity of the WVS respondents. The racial demographics 
of the surveys more or less correspond with that of the South African population. 
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Table 4.4 Race 
Race 2006 2013 
Black 
White 
Coloured 
Indian 
Total 
80% 
11% 
7% 
2% 
100% 
77% 
12% 
9% 
3% 
100% 
 
Crosstabulations revealed weak relationships between race and evil.
47
 No particular race 
group is thus significantly more likely to be in agreement with the three statements. A closer 
look at the data does however reveal some points of interest. While all four race groups had 
similar levels of agreement for the first statement in 2006, the situation changed somewhat in 
2013 (see Figure 4.1 below). Most significantly, there was a 10% drop in agreement among 
white respondents and a smaller decrease among coloured people.  
 
Figure 4.1 Evil is everywhere: agreement according to race 
 
 
Although support for the second statement (Figure 4.2) decreased among all race groups, 
white and coloured people once again stood out with significantly decreased support. Support 
among both demographics dropped by more than 10%: 13% among white respondents (to 
75%) and 14% among coloured respondents (to 72%). Support was comparatively higher 
among black (82%) and Indian (81%) people. Although the relationships are weak, it seems 
that support for the first two statements might be decreasing among the white and coloured 
                                                             
47
Cramer’s V for the 2006 crosstabulations were 0.03 (Evil Is Everywhere), 0.04 (Evil Can Take Possession Of 
People) and 0.1 (The Community Must Get Rid Of Evil People). For 2013 it was 0.1 for all the relationships.  
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demographics. It is also possible that their support is decreasing a little sooner and/or faster 
than among the other groups. It remains to be seen whether the pattern persists in the future.  
 
Figure 4.2 Evil can take possession of people: agreement according to race 
 
 
With regards to the third variable (Figure 4.3), all races showed a marked increase in their 
support for getting rid of evil people. Support was strongest among black respondents - 
approximately 58% of whom agreed with the statement. Support among the other race groups 
was roughly 46%. Indians, whose initial support for the statement was weak (12%), showed 
the biggest increase – a rise of approximately 35% to 47%.  
 
Figure 4.3 The community must get rid of evil people: agreement according to race 
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4.3.2 Ethnic community 
Table 4.5 Ethnic community 
Ethnic community 2006 
English 
Afrikaans 
Zulu 
Xhosa 
North Sotho/Pedi 
South Sotho/Sesotho 
Tswana 
Tsonga/Shangaan 
Venda 
Swazi 
Ndebele 
Black 
White/European 
Coloured 
Indian 
South African 
Total 
6% 
8% 
20% 
13% 
9% 
8% 
10% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
1% 
8% 
1% 
5% 
2% 
2% 
100% 
 
It is only in the 2013 WVS that South Africans were asked to identify their ethnic community. 
Response categories consisted mostly of race and ethno-linguistic groups. Most South 
Africans identified with their ethno-linguistic groups. Very few respondents chose to identify 
themselves in terms of race. For example, although black respondents comprised roughly 77% 
of the total number of respondents, only 8% chose to identify as black (Tables 4.4 and 4.5). 
Similarly, although about 12% of the respondents were white, only 1% identified as such. A 
mere 2% of the respondents identified as South African. Whenever possible South Africans 
had a clear preference for identifying themselves in terms of a language group that almost 
always overlapped with ethnicity. 
 
In the first crosstabulation – with “evil is everywhere” (Figure 4.4) – the highest levels of 
agreement was among those who identified as black (approximately 94% agreement), Indian 
(93%) and South Sotho (91%). Those who tended to agree the least were people identifying 
as white or European (66%) and English (75%). There is clearly a considerable difference in 
agreement among the former and latter groups. 
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Figure 4.4 Evil is everywhere: agreement according to ethnic community 
 
 
The highest levels of agreement for the second statement was found among the following 
groups: black (88%) and South African (87%) as well as Tsonga/Shangaan and South Sotho 
(86% for both). The lowest levels of agreement were once again found among those who 
identified as white (64%) and English (68%) as well as coloured (69%). See Figure 4.5 below 
for further reference. 
 
Figure 4.5 Evil can take possession of some people: agreement according to ethnic 
community 
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Analysis of the third statement (Figure 4.6 below) revealed that, yet again, the respondents 
who described themselves as black had the highest level of agreement: about 73%, which is 
well above the 55% agreement for South Africans as a whole (Figure 4.3). The North Sotho 
respondents had the same level of agreement for this particular statement. The lowest level of 
agreement was found among coloured respondents: 35%. This is, relatively speaking, an 
exceptionally low level of agreement. The English respondents once again also had a 
relatively low level of agreement (roughly 43%) and so did the Shangaan (45%). 
 
Figure 4.6 The community must get rid of evil people: agreement according to ethnic 
community 
 
 
Bivariate analysis of evil and ethnic community does seem to reveal a few patterns: the 
comparatively small number of respondents who primarily identify as black – rather than as a 
specific ethno-linguistic group – have the highest level of agreement for every statement. 
Sotho respondents – whether Pedi or Sesotho - also tend to record high levels of agreement. 
On the other hand, English respondents stand out with consistently low levels of agreement.
48
 
 
4.3.3 Language 
Eleven official languages are spoken in South Africa (Table 4.6) with Zulu being the most 
common mother tongue.
49
 Weak relationships were found between home language and the 
                                                             
48
The effect size for the three statements were, respectively, .2, .1 and .2 – thus indicating weak relationships. 
49Also see SAIRR (2014:71). 
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dependent variables. However, some of the relationships were stronger than those between 
the beliefs in evil and race.
50
 
 
Table 4.6 Home languages spoken in South Africa 
Home Language 2006 2013 
English 
Afrikaans 
Zulu 
Xhosa 
North Sotho/Pedi 
South Sotho/Sesotho 
Tswana 
Tsonga/Shangaan 
Venda 
Swazi 
Ndebele 
Total 
10% 
11% 
25% 
18% 
10% 
8% 
9% 
4% 
3% 
2% 
1% 
100% 
11% 
15% 
23% 
15% 
10% 
9% 
9% 
4% 
2% 
2% 
1% 
100% 
 
The belief that evil is everywhere is very strong among all language groups (Figure 4.7). The 
levels of agreement range from 76% for Swazi speakers to 95% for Sesotho speakers (in 
2006). Swazi speakers consistently have the weakest agreement (76%-77%).  
 
Figure 4.7 Evil is everywhere: agreement according to language group 
 
                                                             
50
The effect size for the relationships in this section is .1 (weak). The only exception is the 2006 data for “The 
Community Must Get Rid Of Evil People” and “Home Language,” which has an effect size of .2 (weak). 
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The highest consistent agreement for both data sets come from Zulu and Sesotho speakers 
(over 90% agreement in 2006 and 2013). Tswana speakers show the biggest drop in 
agreement from 91% in 2006 to 78% in 2013 and Ndebele speakers show the biggest increase: 
80% in 2006 to 92% in 2013. 
 
Agreement with the second statement (Figure 4.8) is also generally very high. However, 
many groups registered a significant decrease in support: agreement decreased by 10% or 
more among English (68%), Tswana (74%), Venda (73%) and Swazi (75%) speakers. In fact, 
agreement declined among English and Swazi speakers by as much as 18%, with the former 
group indicating the least enthusiasm for this statement. The groups that did not register a 
decrease, tended to show stable levels of agreement. 
 
Figure 4.8 Evil can take possession of some people: agreement according to language 
group 
 
 
All language groups indicated a significant increase in support for the third statement (Figure 
4.9 above), with the exception of Tswana speakers who were in very strong agreement to 
begin with. As with the previous statement, English speakers were least enthusiastic (42% 
agreement) even though they are twice as supportive in 2013 than they used to be. The 
highest levels of agreement can clearly be found among Sotho (66%-69%), Ndebele (63%) 
and Tswana speakers (62%). 
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Figure 4.9 The community must get rid of evil people: agreement according to language 
group 
 
 
When taking all three crosstabulations into account, Sotho speakers seem to stand out in their 
consistently high agreement to the statements on evil. The relationships are not strong, but 
they do present a persistent pattern. 
 
4.3.4 Province 
As can be seen from Table 4.7, most respondents in the WVS are residents of South Africa‟s 
most populous provinces: KZN and Gauteng. In contrast, only 1%-2% of respondents are 
from the Northern Cape. 
 
Table 4.7 Population according to province 
Province 2006 2013 
Gauteng 
Mpumalanga 
KZN 
Western Cape 
Eastern Cape 
Northern Cape 
Free State 
Limpopo 
Northwest 
Total 
19% 
7% 
21% 
9% 
16% 
1% 
6% 
12% 
9% 
100% 
23% 
7% 
21% 
10% 
13% 
2% 
6% 
11% 
7% 
100% 
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Although many provinces recorded a noticeable increase or decrease of support for the first 
statement, the Northwest registered the most noteworthy result: agreement fell by 15% from a 
high of 90% to 75% - the lowest figure. In addition, KZN shows the greatest support (96%) 
in 2013, but it appears to be the Northern Cape and the Free State that are the most 
consistently supportive across time, with levels of agreement ranging between 91%-96% 
(Figure 4.10). KZN (86%-88%), the Northern Cape (90%-91%) and the Free State (85%-87%) 
also show the greatest consistent support for the second statement (Figure 4.11). In contrast, 
agreement has fallen significantly in the Western Cape (by 26% to 63%), Mpumalanga (by 
17% to 75%) and the North West (by 16% to 72%). 
 
Figure 4.10 Evil is everywhere: agreement according to province 
 
 
Figure 4.11 Evil can take possession of some people: agreement according to province 
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In Figure 4.12 one can see that the belief in getting rid of evil people has grown greatly in 
almost every province. The only exception is the Northern Cape where agreement fell from 
an astonishing 73% in 2006 to 45% in 2013. The province therefore went from having the 
most support for eliminating evil people to having the least. Apart from the Northern Cape, 
the provinces that stand out as showing consistently strong agreement are the North West and 
Limpopo. These two provinces had the strongest support in 2013 (about 69% and 65% 
respectively) and also had strong agreement in 2006 (55% and 40%).
51
 
 
Figure 4.12 The community must get rid of evil people: agreement according to 
province 
 
 
4.3.5 Other demographic variables 
Two other demographic variables were analysed: sex and age.
52
 The crosstabulations for sex 
and beliefs regarding evil revealed no great differences in the attitudes of men and women. 
Similarly, age seems to have no real impact on the beliefs in question (when only taking 
crosstabulations into consideration). 
 
 
 
                                                             
51The relationships between evil and province were weak, although the 2013 data had a bigger effect size (.2 
compared to .1 in 2006) with regards to the first two “evil” statements. For the last statement there was an 
effect size of .2 in 2006 and .1 in 2013. 
52Age was recoded into three categories: 16 to 30 years=1; 31 to 50=2; 51 or older became 3. 
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4.4  Socio-economic variables 
It is often believed that the more formal education people obtain, the less likely they are to 
hold supposedly irrational or superstitious beliefs. Level of education was used to test this 
assertion,
53
 which according to Ashforth (1996:1217-1218) is erroneous. Analysis found that 
South Africans‟ strong belief in evil is not affected by education. The relationships that were 
found were so weak as to be meaningless and often the minor differences in opinion were in 
favour of less educated respondents. This study can therefore confirm that Ashforth is right: 
education does not affect beliefs in evil, at least not in South Africa. 
 
Household income
54
 was also analysed to test whether a rise in income leads to a decrease in 
the belief in evil. This analysis tests the assertion that prosperity leads to a decline in spiritual 
and religious endeavour (Norris & Inglehart, 2004:3-4). However, crosstabulations indicated 
little to no relationship between income and attitudes on evil. As with level of education, 
relationships were very weak and did not show that higher income groups generally 
expressed different opinions than low income groups. Similarly, the analysis of (self-reported) 
class found no differences between the upper, middle and lower classes.
55
 
 
In 2006, respondents were asked whether they considered themselves to be poor, not poor or 
“something in the middle.” Only a relatively small difference in agreement was found with 
regards to the third statement, with those who identified as poor showing somewhat greater 
agreement (37%) than the other two groups (28%-30%). The lack of data from 2013 made 
further bivariate analysis impossible. Analysis of the class and poverty variables can 
therefore not be said to indicate that an increase in material wellbeing affects attitudes on evil.  
 
Analysis with Marital Status produced mixed results across the two data sets. No particular 
group was consistently more likely to agree with any of the statements. There was, however, 
a general decrease in agreement for the first two statements and an increase in agreement for 
the third. The last socio-economic variable that was analysed was whether or not people 
                                                             
53Level of education was recoded into five categories: None; Primary School; High School Or Secondary School; 
Other Qualification; University/Professional. To achieve this the 2006 data was recodes as follows: 1=1; 2+3=2; 
4+5=3; 6+7+11+12+13=4; 8 to 10=5. Response categories for 2013 were different and so was the recoding: 1=1; 
2+3=2; 4 to 7=3; 10=4; 8+9=5. 
54Six income categories were created: R0-R899 (20+21=1); R900-R3999 (15 to 19=2); R4000-R7999 (11 to 14=3); 
R12000-R18999 (4 to 7=4); R20000+ (1 to 3=5). 
55
The original five response categories (excluding “don’t know”) were recoded into three: 1+2=1 (Upper Class); 
3+4=2 (Middle Class); 5=3 (Lower Class). 
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receive a government grant. The question was not included in the 2013 WVS. No noteworthy 
relationships were found with the 2006 data.  
 
4.5 Trust and tolerance 
4.5.1 Generalised trust 
In the WVS respondents were asked whether they think most people can be trusted or 
whether one needs to be careful of others. The respondents have been divided into three 
groups:  those who think most people can be trusted, those who think they need to be careful 
of others and a group that is neither too trusting nor to cautious. It is clear from Table 4.8 that 
most South Africans are not very trusting: only a minority of 4%-6% believe that most people 
can be trusted. In 2006 a majority of almost 60% believed they needed to be careful of others. 
In 2013 this figure decreased to approximately 46%, with a similar number of people opting 
to neither trust too much nor to be overcautious. 
 
Table 4.8 Generalised trust 
Generalised trust 2006 2013 
Most people can be trusted 4% 6% 
Neither too trusting nor too cautious 37% 48% 
Need to be careful 59% 46% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
The analysis of generalised trust with the first statement (Figure 4.13) found a high level of 
agreement among everyone in 2006 (89%-91%). In 2013 the more trusting groups showed a 
small decrease in fervour while the least trustful did not. A similar pattern was detected for 
the second statement in 2013: the most trusting people registered a big decline in support 
(from 93% to 71%). The less trusting the group, the smaller the decrease: the moderate 
group‟s agreement fell by only 7% to 77% and the distrustful group did not really register a 
noteworthy decrease at all. The most distrustful people thus show the strongest agreement 
(85%-88%) – see Figure 4.14 below. The 2013 data indicates that the more trustful South 
Africans may be experiencing a decrease in belief in evil. The pattern may have to be studied 
further in the future. 
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Figure 4.13 Evil is everywhere: agreement according to generalised trust 
 
 
Figure 4.14 Evil can take possession of people: agreement according to generalised trust 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4.15, support for getting rid of evil people was highest among the 
most trusting respondents in 2006 (44%). Their level of support remained stable. In contrast 
the other two groups show a significant increase in agreement of at least 20%. Those who are 
very careful in their dealings with others show the greatest support for the third statement in 
2013: about 59%.  
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Figure 4.15 The community must get rid of evil people: agreement according to 
generalised trust 
 
 
To conclude, by 2013 the least trusting respondents generally show the greatest belief in evil 
(see Figures 4.13-4.15).
56
 There does therefore appear to be a connection between generalised 
trust and evil: distrustful people are somewhat more likely to express a belief in evil and a 
desire to fight it. 
 
4.5.2 Interpersonal trust 
Univariate analysis of the interpersonal trust variable (Figure 4.16) showed that South 
Africans generally trust the people they know and love: family (96%-98%), neighbours 
(73%-75%) and friends (72%-77%). South Africans expressed less trust in people they‟ve 
only recently met (31%-41%). The level of trust in immigrants/foreign workers and Chinese 
people (about 33% for both groups) is also very low.  This is perhaps unsurprising given the 
xenophobic attacks that periodically occur in the country. Trust in people of other 
nationalities is higher (49%). It may be that this category is at least partly associated with 
Western tourists and not only foreign workers from Africa and Asia. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
56Unfortunately the relationships are weak. For Generalised Trust and the first statement the effect size is: .1 
(2006) and -.2 (2013). For the second statement: -.1 (2006) and -.3 (2013) – the latter indicating at best a weak 
to moderate relationship; Finally, .1 (2006) and -.1 (2013) for the third “evil” variable. 
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Figure 4.16 Interpersonal trust 
 
 
Several relationships of weak or moderate strength were found between Interpersonal Trust 
and attitudes regarding evil. All the relationships revealed the opposite of what may be 
expected: the most distrustful people showed the lowest levels of agreement. In the case of 
trust in family, the same pattern was found for all three statements in 2013.
57
 In other words, 
South Africans with high levels of trust in family, also show high levels of belief in evil and 
support for fighting it. Other variables (trust in new people, trust in politicians and trust in 
business people) showed similar patterns, but only with the third statement. 
 
4.5.3 Tolerance 
To measure tolerance respondents were asked which persons they would not like as 
neighbours. Respondents were presented with a number of possibilities that are meant to 
measure moral and social tolerance. South Africans‟ preferences can be viewed in Table 4.9. 
South Africans prove to be most intolerant toward the targets that measure moral tolerance. 
                                                             
57
Effect size for the three relationships are as follows: Statement 1) -.1 and .6 (2006 and 2013 respectively); 
2) .1 and .4; 3) .03 and .1. 
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For example, drug addicts and heavy drinkers do not make popular neighbours, with 
disapproval rates of approximately 86%-91% and 60%-69% respectively. 
 
Table 4.9 Moral and social tolerance 
Whom do you not want as neighbours? 
Do not want as neighbours 
2006 2013 
Drug addicts 
People of a different race 
People with aids 
Immigrants/foreign workers 
Homosexuals 
People of a different religion 
Heavy drinkers 
Unmarried couples 
People who speak a different language 
Black people 
Coloured people 
Indian people 
White people 
91% 
8% 
7% 
25% 
46% 
5% 
69% 
10% 
8% 
1% 
9% 
14% 
9% 
86% 
19% 
18% 
41% 
38% 
16% 
60% 
15% 
15% 
15% 
17% 
20% 
16% 
 
 
Although South Africans are generally more socially tolerant, their acceptance of those who 
are different has declined. There seems to be a general rise in intolerance in this respect, but 
most significantly towards immigrants, people of a different race and people of a different 
religion. In 2006 roughly a quarter of respondents did not want immigrants or foreign 
workers as neighbours. The figure rises to over 40% in 2013. Intolerance toward those of a 
different race also increased by over 10% to about 19%. All race groups in South Africa were 
less accepted by their peers in 2013 than they used to be. However, intolerance rose most 
sharply toward black people: the most accepted group in 2006 was no more tolerated in 2013 
than other groups. People of a different religion are also less tolerated: in the past only 5% of 
South Africans rejected them as neighbours; in 2013 the figure rose to more or less 16%. 
Various relationships were found with crosstabulation, but they were always limited to one or 
other of the datasets and could not be detected a second time. No long-term patterns could 
therefore be established. 
 
4.6 LOC 
Analysis of the LOC variables aimed to find relationships between people‟s sense of control 
(or lack thereof) over their lives and the beliefs and attitudes on evil. It seems plausible that 
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people who feel they have little control over their lives might blame external factors – like 
evil forces - for their troubles. Unfortunately, none of the variables in this category confirmed 
this expectation. In fact, two variables – exploitation and fairness (in which respondents 
indicated whether they think most people will treat them fairly or take advantage of them) 
and satisfaction with life – indicated the opposite. The people most inclined to believe in 
fairness and those who were very satisfied with their lives were more likely to agree that evil 
people must be eliminated. The relationships were weak and in the case of satisfaction with 
life, limited to 2006. Analysis of the other two variables in this category – self-reported 
happiness and choice and control (in which people were asked if they thought they had 
choice and control over their lives) – did not reveal any relationships.58 
 
4.7 Attitudinal variables 
This category includes four variables meant to measure South Africans‟ attitudes toward the 
following: capital punishment, wealth, hard work and the state of their household finances. 
The results are presented below.
59
 
 
4.7.1 The death penalty 
It stands to reason that people who think evil persons must be removed from the community – 
violently if necessary – would also be supportive of the death penalty. South Africans‟ 
general views on capital punishment are presented in Table 4.10. It was found that people 
were about evenly divided over the death penalty in 2006: almost half of South Africans were 
against capital punishment and everyone else thought it was justifiable (either sometimes or 
always). However, by 2013 support for the death penalty seems to have grown by 
                                                             
58As mentioned in Chapter Three, three LOC variables were answered on 10-point scales and thus recoded in 
the same or similar manner as Generalised Trust (see footnote 12). In the case of Exploitation And Fairness (1 
to 3=3; 4 to 7=2; 8 to 10=1), category 1 was labelled as ”People Would Try To Take Advantage Of You,” and 3 
as ”People Would Try To Be Fair.” Satisfaction With Life was recoded in the same manner as Exploitation And 
Fairness, with 1=”Completely Satisfied” and 3=”Completely Dissatisfied.” Choice And Control was recoded 
exactly like Generalised Trust (footnote 12) and the categories labelled as 1=”No Choice” and 3=”A Great Deal 
Of Choice.” Category 2 was in all cases a neutral category. Self-Reported Happiness had four response 
categories and was not recoded. 
59All attitudinal variables were answered on a scale of 1 to 10 and all were recoded like Generalised Trust 
(footnote 12): 1 to 3=1; 4 to 7=2 and 8 to 10=3. The death penalty variable was relabelled as follows: category 
1=”Never,” 2=”Sometimes” and 3=”Always.” Hard Work: 1=”Hard Work Brings A Better Life,” 2=”Combination 
Of Factors” and 3=”It’s A Matter Of Luck And Connections.” Views On Wealth: 1=”People Get Rich At The 
Expense Of Others” and 3=”Wealth Can Grow So There’s Enough For Everyone.” Satisfaction With Household 
Finances: 1=”Completely Dissatisfied” and 3=”Completely Satisfied.” Category 2 was in all cases a neutral 
category. 
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approximately 10%: over 60% of respondents proved in favour while those who thought it 
was never justifiable fell to about 39%. 
 
Table 4.10 Support for the death penalty 
Is the death penalty ever justifiable? 
Year 
2006 2013 
Never 49% 39% 
Sometimes 29% 35% 
Always 22% 26% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
Bivariate analysis– in the form of crosstabulation - could only find a relationship with the 
third statement. Differences in opinion were minimal in 2006 (Figure 4.17), but as agreement 
rose, opinion became more divided.
60
 The data – especially in 2013 - indicates that the 
stronger the sentiment in favour of the death penalty, the stronger the agreement to get rid of 
evil people is likely to be. The greatest supporters of the death penalty show significantly 
more agreement (64%) than those who tend to reject it (49%). Those who are more 
supportive of capital punishment are thus somewhat more likely to believe evil persons must 
be eliminated. 
 
Figure 4.17 The death penalty and evil 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
60This is also reflected by the different strength of the relationships in 2006 and 2013. The effect size for the 
2006 data is -.1 – there is thus a weak relationship between support for the death penalty and support for the 
third statement. The effect size for 2013 is -.2, indicating a stronger (yet still weak) relationship. 
2006 
2013 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
Never 
Sometimes 
Always 
31% 32% 38% 
49% 57% 64% 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
84 
 
4.7.2 Views on hard work 
The hard work variable measured whether South Africans believe success is an eventual 
result of hard work or whether it is due to luck and the right connections. The expectation 
was that those who view the world in terms of good and evil forces, might be inclined to hold 
such forces responsible for success and failure. 
 
Table 4.11 Views on hard work 
Does hard work bring a better life? Year 
2006 2013 
Hard work brings a better life 58% 36% 
Combination of factors 30% 46% 
It’s a matter of luck and connections 12% 18% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
Whereas most South Africans used to think that hard work brings a better life (58% in 2006), 
this belief has declined to 36% in 2013. In 2013 the majority of people (46%) indicated that 
neither just hard work nor luck alone can bring a better life. A minority of 12%-18% thought 
luck and connections necessary to obtain a better life (Table 4.11). 
 
Figure 4.18 Hard work and evil 
 
 
Figure 4.18 presents the results of the crosstabulation between “views on hard work” and “the 
community must get rid of evil people” (the only relationship found). In 2006 there is a clear 
pattern of opinion between people who have faith in hard work, people who do not and those 
of divided opinion. About a quarter of the first group agrees that evil people must be removed; 
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more than a third (37%) of the more neutral group holds this view and over half (56%) of 
people who believe in luck and connections are in agreement. The pattern is still present in 
2013 and each group has experienced a rise in agreement. Among those who believe in hard 
work, agreement has doubled to roughly 50%. The neutral group has also experienced a 
significant increase in agreement (to 56%). Those who think success is due to luck and 
connections had a very high level of agreement to begin with and show a smaller rise in 
agreement of about 7% to 63%. 
 
Despite the fact that the above-mentioned relationships are rather weak,
61
they do indicate a 
pattern. It seems that people who do not believe hard work will bring them a better life are 
more likely to support the third statement on evil. It should however be kept in mind that 
agreement rose to high levels among everyone. 
 
4.7.3 Other attitudinal variables 
Satisfaction with household finances and views on wealth had similar relationships with the 
third “evil” statement. In both cases the most positive group registered the highest degree of 
agreement. The relationships were weak and with regards to the views on wealth, limited to 
2006. 
 
4.8 Religiosity 
Variables analysed in this category include the importance of religion, membership of a 
religious organisation, religious attendance (of a church or other religious organisation), 
importance of God and self-reported religiosity. Only “importance of God” revealed 
relationships with the relevant statements on evil during the crosstabulations. Univariate 
analysis did however provide interesting information on religiosity in general. 
 
At first glance it might appear that religion has declined in importance in South Africa (Table 
4.12). Indeed, the proportion of people who think religion is very important has decreased 
from 70% to 57%. However, the proportion of South Africans for whom religion is important 
in general (either very or rather important) is still extremely high: 85%-90%. The proportion 
of people who think religion is not important (10%-15%) has not increased significantly. It 
                                                             
61Effect size for 2006 is -.3 (thus indicating at best a weak to moderate relationship) and -.2 for 2013 (weak). 
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would therefore seem that for some people religion has become less important, but not at all 
unimportant. 
 
Table 4.12 Importance of religion 
How important is religion in your life? 2006 2013 
Very important 
Rather important 
Not very important 
Not at all important 
Total 
70% 
20% 
7% 
3% 
100% 
57% 
29% 
10% 
5% 
100% 
 
Similar to the importance of religion, it would seem that the importance of God has also 
decreased to a certain degree.
62
 South Africans who think God is very important have 
decreased by about 23%. Those who think God is neither very important nor unimportant 
have more than doubled to 34% in 2013 (Table 4.13). It would seem that God – just like 
religion - has become less important, though not unimportant, to a large number of people.  
Furthermore, the majority of South Africans (over 80%) are members of religious 
organisations (Table 4.14 below). In fact, over half of the population are active members. 
According to the data on religious attendance for the period 2006-2013, roughly 55%-62% of 
South Africans claim to attend a religious organisation at least once a week. 
 
Table 4.13 Importance of God 
How important is god in your life? Year 
2006 2013 
Very important 
Neither very important nor unimportant 
Not important 
87% 
12% 
1% 
64% 
34% 
2% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
Table 4.14 Membership of religious organisation 
Religious membership 2006 2013 
Active member 
Inactive member 
Don’t belong 
Total 
51% 
31% 
18% 
100% 
56% 
25% 
19% 
100% 
 
                                                             
62Importance Of God was originally answered on a ten-point scale and was recoded in the same manner as 
Exploitation And Fairness (see footnote 16). The new response categories were labelled as follows: 1=”Very 
Important” and 3=”Not Important” with category 2 being the neutral category (“Neither Very Important Nor 
Unimportant”). 
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Crosstabulations revealed a relationship between “evil is everywhere” and “importance of 
God.” In both 2006 and 2013, agreement was highest among those to whom God is most 
important (89%-91%) and lowest among those to whom God is not important (70%-77%) – 
see Figure 4.19 below. The same pattern was found with regards to the second statement, but 
only in the 2013 data set (Figure 4.20). Whereas the results from 2006 were mixed, in 2013 
those to whom God is most important were most likely to agree (85%) and the other groups 
were less likely to do so (72%). 
 
Figure 4.19 Evil is everywhere and importance of God 
 
 
Figure 4.20 Evil can possess people and importance of God 
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Agreement to the third statement (Figure 4.21) runs counter to the above-mentioned pattern: 
in 2006 those to whom God is not important were most likely to agree (42%). The people to 
whom God is very important were least likely to do so (32%). In 2013 there was an overall 
55%-61% level of agreement among everyone.
63
 
 
Figure 4.21 The community must get rid of evil people and the importance of God 
 
 
The final variable that was analysed in this category was self-reported religiosity in which 
people were asked if they were religious, not religious or atheist. In both datasets a similar 
number of respondents described themselves as religious (80%), not religious (17%-18%) 
and atheist (1%-2%). Crosstabulation – as seen in Figure 4.22 – indicated that agreement with 
the first statement was similar among everyone in 2006. However, in 2013 the religious 
group‟s agreement remained at a high level (88%) while the atheist group‟s agreement 
dropped (to 73%). The group that is neither religious nor atheist is in the middle with roughly 
80% agreement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
63The relationship between the first statement and Importance of God is very weak in 2006 (with an effect size 
of .03), but moderate in 2013 (.4). For the second statement the effect size is .2 in 2006 and .3 in 2013. Finally, 
the last relationship has an effect size of -.2 in 2006 and -.1 in 2013. 
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Figure 4.22 Evil is everywhere: agreement according to self-reported religiosity 
 
 
Figure 4.23 Evil can take possession of some people: agreement according to self-
reported religiosity 
 
 
The second statement (Figure 4.23 above) revealed the exact same pattern: although 
agreement was the same for everyone in 2006 (87%-89%), in 2013 the level of agreement 
seems to be a reflection of the respondents‟ religiosity. There is an 82% agreement rate 
among the religious and a 72% agreement rate among those who are not religious, but are 
also not atheists. The agreement level of the atheist group is approximately 66%, which is 
relatively low. 
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Figure 4.24 The Community Must Get Rid Of Evil People: Agreement According To 
Self-Reported Religiosity 
 
 
Agreement with the third statement revealed a more curious pattern. In this instance, atheists 
reported more agreement in 2006 than the other respondents did: a high 54% agreement 
compared to the 32%-34% agreement of others. In 2013 agreement once again takes on the 
familiar pattern as discussed above. It is once again highest among the religious (56%). Those 
who are neither religious nor atheist record a similar level of agreement of 53%. Atheists 
again have the lowest agreement (more or less 46%). See Figure 4.24 above.
64
 
 
In conclusion, it would seem that those who are more religious are more likely to believe in 
the general existence and powers of evil. The need to remove evil persons is, however, rather 
more general and less strongly associated with religion. 
 
4.9 Multiple regression 
In the previous part of the chapter potential predictors for evil were sought through 
crosstabulations. Although some variables were shown to be related to the dependent 
variables, many were rather weak in this respect. However, multiple regression analysis 
makes further investigation possible by examining the predictive power of the study‟s models 
as well as the individual variables. 
                                                             
64The effect size for the first statement and Self-Reported Religiosity is .1 (weak) in 2006 and .3 
(weak/moderate) in 2013; For the second statement it is -.015 (extremely weak) in 2006 and .3 
(weak/moderate) in 2013; For the third statement it is -.1 in 2006 (weak) and .3 (weak/moderate) in 2013. 
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Presented in the multiple regression tables are the standardised regression coefficients – or 
beta values – for each relationship in the analysis. These figures describe the relationships 
between the variables by indicating their strength as well as their direction (thus the effect 
size). The bigger the beta value, the stronger the relationship. The bigger values therefore 
indicate which variables make the “strongest unique contribution(s) to explaining the 
dependent variable, when the variance explained by all other variables in the model is 
controlled for” (Pallant, 2011:161).  
 
The beta values range between -1.0 (meaning a perfect negative relationship between the 
variables in question) and 1.0 (a perfect positive relationship). According to Dalton 
(2008:265-266), values under .1 (whether positive or negative) can be considered weak; 
values between .1 and .2 indicate relationships that are moderate in strength and the values 
that are above .2 indicate strong relationships. A value can be negative or positive depending 
on the direction of the relationship of the variables in question. A positive beta value means 
that both variables in the relationship are moving in the same direction: as the value of one 
increases, so does the value of the other. A negative value indicates the opposite: as the value 
of one variable increases, the value of the other decreases. 
 
In addition to the standardised regression coefficients, the regression tables also provide the R 
Square values for each model. A model‟s R Square is an indication of how much of the 
variance of the dependent variable can be explained by the model (Pallant, 2011:160). In 
other words, the R Square value gives an idea of the explanatory power of the model with 
regards to the dependent variable. 
 
The multivariate analysis is presented in two tables: Table 4.15 presents the 2006 data and 
Table 4.16 contains the 2013 data. The results from each data set are discussed separately and 
then compared. 
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4.9.1 Predictors of evil 2006 
Table 4.15 Predictors of evil (2006) 
 Evil is 
everywhere 
Evil can take 
possession of people 
The community must 
get rid of evil people 
Model 1: Demographics 
Ethnic group/Race 
Home language  
Province  
Sex  
Age 
 
R 
R Squared 
Adjusted R Squared 
 
.011* 
.045 
-.061 
.041 
.035 
 
.066 
.004 
.004 
 
-.036 
.024 
-.031 
-.019 
.002* 
 
.046 
.002 
.002 
 
-.021* 
-.004* 
.073 
.009* 
-.034 
 
.175 
.031 
.030 
Model 2: Socio-economic variables 
Marital status 
Level of education 
Household income 
Class 
Self-reported poverty 
Government grant 
 
R 
R Squared 
Adjusted R Squared 
 
-.066 
.000* 
-.095 
.139 
-.096 
-.056 
 
.154 
.024 
.023 
 
-.043 
-.053 
.044 
.113 
-.132 
-.018 
 
.132 
.018 
.017 
 
-.034 
.003* 
.025* 
.019* 
-.139 
.008* 
 
.200 
.040 
.039 
Model 3: Trust and tolerance 
Generalised trust 
Trust in family 
Trust in neighbours 
Trust in other races 
Trust in known people 
Trust in new people 
Trust in people of other religions 
Trust in foreigners 
Trust in black people 
Trust in white people 
Trust in coloured people 
Trust in Indian people 
Trust in politicians 
Trust in business people 
Trust in friends 
Tolerance of drug addicts 
Tolerance of other races 
Tolerance of people with Aids 
Tolerance of immigrants 
Tolerance of homosexuals 
Tolerance of other religions 
Tolerance of heavy drinkers 
Tolerance of unmarried couples 
Tolerance of speakers of other 
languages 
Tolerance of black people 
Tolerance of coloured people 
Tolerance of Indian people 
Tolerance of white people 
 
-.026 
-.006* 
-.022 
-.077 
.012* 
.131 
.036 
-.012* 
-.064 
.101 
-.049 
-.033 
-.001* 
-.025 
.040 
-.009* 
.011* 
-.021 
-.001* 
.011* 
.042 
.023 
-.074 
-.023 
 
.009* 
.010* 
.097 
-.028 
 
-.006* 
-.004* 
.038 
-.044 
.056 
.039 
.053 
.025 
-.011* 
.031 
-.074 
-.025* 
-.022 
-.025 
.025 
.025 
-.037 
.037 
-.043 
-.004* 
.037 
-.004* 
-.024 
-.002* 
 
.014* 
.090 
.055 
-.017* 
 
.016 
.059 
-.014* 
-.050 
-.048 
.147 
.005* 
.000* 
.007* 
.114 
-.122 
-.097 
.055 
.097 
-.045 
.027 
.018 
-.030 
-.041 
.008* 
-.009* 
.046 
-.003* 
-.070 
.016 
 
.031 
.054 
.037 
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R 
R Squared 
Adjusted R Squared 
 
.246 
.060 
.058 
 
.228 
.052 
.050 
 
.349 
.122 
.120 
Model 4: Locus of control 
Advantage versus fairness 
Self-reported happiness 
Satisfaction with life 
Choice and control 
 
R 
R Squared 
Adjusted R Squared 
 
-.029 
.047 
.019* 
-.028 
 
.253 
.064 
.062 
 
-.002* 
.061 
-.074 
.018 
 
.239 
.057 
.055 
 
.048 
-.024 
.049 
-.034 
 
.365 
.133 
.130 
Model 5: Attitudinal variables 
Death penalty 
Satisfaction with household finances 
Views on hard work 
Views on wealth 
 
R 
R Squared 
Adjusted R Squared 
 
.006* 
-.053 
.008* 
.060 
 
.263 
.069 
.067 
 
.016* 
-.018* 
.010* 
.081 
 
.252 
.063 
.061 
 
.069 
.088 
-.154 
.056 
 
.413 
.171 
.168 
Model 6: Religiosity 
Importance of religion 
Membership of a religious organisation 
Religious attendance 
Importance of God 
Self-reported religiosity 
 
.080 
.014* 
.028 
-.018* 
-.099 
 
.077 
.033 
-.012* 
-.024 
-.065 
 
-.020* 
.032 
.001* 
.015* 
-.063 
R .281 .265 .417 
R Squared .079 .070 .174 
Adjusted R Squared .076 .067 .171 
The standardised regression coefficients that are not statistically significant have been clearly marked with an 
asterisk (*). 
 
According to the results from the multiple regression analysis (Table 4.15), the six models 
explain about 7.6% of the variance of “evil is everywhere” (Adjusted R Squared=.076). The 
independent variables included in this study also account for 6.7% of the variance of “evil 
can take possession of some people.” Additionally, the variables explain approximately 17.1% 
of the variance of “the community must get rid of evil people.” The explanatory power of the 
models is thus greatest for the third, more extreme, statement.
65
 
 
The beta values of the first model indicate that province is the best predictor of evil, 
especially for the first and third statements. With regards to the first statement, the 
relationship is negative (-.061). Given the coding of the variable, it seems that people in the 
provinces coded with lower values (Gauteng, Mpumalanga and KZN) are more likely to 
                                                             
65All three statements on evil were recoded so that “Strongly Disagree”=0 and “Strongly Agree”=4. 
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agree with the statement. Province‟s relationship with the third statement is positive (.073), 
meaning that people in the provinces on the opposite side of the scale (Limpopo, the Free 
State and the Northern Cape) are somewhat more likely to agree to this statement.
66
 
 
One of the strongest predictors of evil in the second model is self-reported poverty.
67
 It has a 
weak relationship with “evil is everywhere” (-.096) and a moderate relationship with “evil 
can take possession of some people” (-.132) as well as “the community must get rid of evil 
people” (-.139). In all three cases the relationships are negative. These results indicate that 
people who perceive themselves to be poor are more likely to agree to all three statements. 
 
Class (also self-reported) proved a good predictor of the first two statements: there is a 
moderate relationship between class and the first (.139) as well as the second statement (.113). 
The positive nature of these relationships contradicts the results of self-reported poverty – 
this time those reporting to be in the lower and working classes are less likely than the middle 
and upper classes to show agreement. Unfortunately, the beta value for class and the third 
statement is not statistically significant. 
 
The relationship between household income and the first statement (-.095) seems to support 
the results for self-reported poverty. It indicates that the lower one‟s household income, the 
more likely one is to agree with the first statement. This relationship is not, however, repeated 
with the other statements. 
 
Analysis of the third model,
68
 resulted in moderate relationships between trust in new people 
with the first (.131) and third (.147) statements. Since a complete lack of trust is coded as 0, it 
would seem that the more trusting South Africans are of people they meet for the first time, 
the more likely they are to agree with the relevant statements. 
                                                             
66Recoding for the first model is as follows: Race: Black=0, Indian=1, Coloured=2, White=4; Home Language: 
English=0 and Ndebele=10 (following the same order as Table 4.6); Province: Gauteng=0 and Northwest=8 
(following the same order as in Table 4.7); Sex: Male=0; Age 16=0. 
67The second model’s variables were recoded as follows: Marital Status: Married=0 (recoded in the same order 
as in the WVS); Level Of Education: No Schooling=0, Some Primary School=1, Primary School Completed=2, 
Some High School=3, Completed High School=4, Some University=5, Technical, Secretarial, Artisan and 
Technikon=6, Completed University=7,Professional=8; Household Income: R0-R499=0; Class: Lower Class=0; 
Self-Reported Poverty: Poor=0; Government Grant: No=0. 
68
Recoding of Model 3: A complete lack of trust was in all cases coded as 0. With regards to the tolerance 
variables, intolerance was in all cases coded as 0. 
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The same relationship was found with regards to trust in white people: the more trust in white 
people, the more agreement with the first (.101) and third (.114) statements. Many of the 
other racial trust variables indicated the opposite: the less the respondents trust other races or 
black people, the more likely they are to agree with the first statement (-.077 and -.064 
respectively); the less respondents trust coloured people, the more likely they are to agree 
with the second (-.074) and third (-.122) statements; finally, the less respondents trust Indians, 
the more likely they are to agree with the third statement (-.097). There seems to be a 
connection between trust, race and the attitudes on evil: trust in white people as well as 
distrust of the other race groups seem to be connected to the general belief in evil. It is 
however, not known if it is the same respondents expressing all these beliefs. 
 
The last noteworthy trust beta is trust in business people (.097), which shows a weak 
relationship with the third statement. There is thus a weak tendency for those who trust 
business people to agree that evil people must be removed. 
 
The best predictor among the tolerance variables was tolerance of Indian people, which has a 
positive relationship with the first statement (.097). In other words, contrary to the results 
from the trust variables, increased tolerance of Indian people is weakly linked to strong 
agreement with the first statement. 
 
Only one LOC variable proved to have a mentionable relationship with the beliefs in evil: 
satisfaction with life has a weak, negative relationship with the second statement (-.074). 
Those who are dissatisfied with their lives are therefore more likely to agree with the second 
statement, but not with the other two.
69
 
 
All the attitudinal variables had a relationship with at least one of the “evil” variables.70 
Respondents who indicated support for the death penalty were more likely to indicate 
agreement for the violent third statement (.069). Those who are more satisfied with their 
household financial situation are also more likely to support the third statement (.088). The 
                                                             
69
In Model 4, Advantage Versus Fairness was coded so that “People Would Take Advantage”=0; Self-Reported 
Happiness so that“Not At All Happy”=0; Satisfaction With Life so that “Completely Dissatisfied”=0; and Choice 
And Control saw “No Control At All” as 0. 
70The coding of the variables are as follows: Death Penalty: “Never Justifiable”=0; Satisfaction With Household 
Finances: “Completely Dissatisfied”=0; Views On Hard Work: “It’s A Matter Of Luck And Connections”=0; Views 
On Wealth: “People Get Rich At The Expense Of Others”=0. 
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people who tend not to believe that hard work brings a better life (that it is rather a matter of 
luck and connections) showed the strongest inclination to support the third statement (-.154). 
A last, weak relationship was also found between views on wealth and the second statement: 
it seems that South Africans who think wealth can grow so that there‟s enough for everyone, 
are more likely to support this statement. 
 
Of the religiosity measures,
71
 self-reported religiosity showed weak, negative relationships 
with all three statements. This indicates that atheists – and not religious believers – are more 
likely to support the statements on evil. Lastly, weak, positive relationships were found 
between the importance of religion and the first two statements. People who think religion is 
important are therefore more likely to agree to these statements. However, they are not 
especially likely to agree to the third. These results are clearly very contradictory. 
 
4.9.2 Predictors of evil 2013 
Table 4.16 below presents the results from the multiple regression analysis of the 2013 WVS 
dataset.
72
 In this dataset the six models explain 17.2% of the variance of the first statement. 
This is almost 10% more than in the 2006 data set. The models explain 13.7% of the variance 
of “evil can take possession of some people” – more than double the 6.7% of 2006. Finally, 
the independent variables explain 10.4% of the variance of the third statement, less than in 
2006 (17.1% - see Table 4.16). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
71Model 6’s coding: Importance Of Religion: “Not At All Important”=0; Membership Of A Religious Organisation: 
“Don’t Belong”=0; Religious Attendance: “Never/Almost Never”=0; Importance Of God: “Not At All 
Important”=0; Self-Reported Religiosity: “Atheist”=0. 
72 The recodings of the 2013 data are the same as the 2006 data, with two exceptions: Ethnic Community was 
not included in the 2006 data set and Level Of Education had different response categories in the different 
data sets. Ethnic Community was coded as follows: Ethnic Community (in the 2013 data set): English=0, 
Afrikaans=1, Ndebele=2, Xhosa=3, North Sotho=4, South Sotho=5, Tswana=6, Shangaan=7, Swazi=8, Venda=9, 
Zulu=10, White/European=11, Coloured=12, Indian=13, Black=14 and South African=15. Level Of Education 
(2013) was recoded as follows: “No Formal Education”=0, “Some Primary School”=1, “Completed Primary 
School”=2, Incomplete Secondary Or High School”=3; “Completed Secondary Or High School”=4, “Some 
University”=5, “Completed University”=6. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
97 
 
Table 4.16 Predictors of evil (2013) 
 Evil is 
everywhere 
Evil can take 
possession of people 
The community must 
get rid of evil people 
Model 1: Demographics 
Ethnic group/Race 
Ethnic community 
Home language  
Province  
Sex  
Age 
 
R 
R Squared 
Adjusted R Squared 
 
-.089 
-.011* 
-.071 
.006* 
-.005* 
.021 
 
.132 
.018 
.017 
 
-.076 
.019 
-.013* 
.000* 
-.008* 
.098 
 
.124 
.015 
.015 
 
-.122 
-.092 
.030 
-.023 
-.036 
.075 
 
.173 
.030 
.030 
Model 2: Socio-economic variables 
Marital status 
Level of education 
Household income 
Class 
Government grant 
 
R 
R Squared 
Adjusted R Squared 
 
.011* 
.019 
.011* 
-.004* 
.039 
 
.150 
.023 
.022 
 
.049 
-.014* 
.023 
-.064 
-.064 
 
.144 
.021 
.020 
 
.066 
.068 
.045 
-.040 
.000* 
 
.195 
.038 
.038 
Model 3: Trust and tolerance 
Generalised trust 
Trust in family 
Trust in neighbours 
Trust in other races 
Trust in known people 
Trust in new people 
Trust in people of other religions 
Trust in foreigners 
Trust in black people 
Trust in white people 
Trust in coloured people 
Trust in Indian people 
Trust in immigrants/foreign workers 
Trust in Chinese people 
Trust in politicians 
Trust in business people 
Trust in friends 
Tolerance of drug addicts 
Tolerance of other races 
Tolerance of people with Aids 
Tolerance of immigrants 
Tolerance of homosexuals 
Tolerance of other religions 
Tolerance of heavy drinkers 
Tolerance of unmarried couples 
Tolerance of speakers of other 
languages 
Tolerance of black people 
Tolerance of coloured people 
Tolerance of Indian people 
Tolerance of white people 
 
-.044 
.221 
.022 
-.024 
-.094 
.011* 
-.040 
.064 
-.038 
-.018* 
.108 
-.153 
.061 
.008* 
-.016* 
.041 
-.001* 
-.041 
.060 
-.003* 
.030 
.017 
.003* 
-.090 
.005* 
-.002* 
 
.043 
-.050 
.006* 
.004* 
 
-.097 
.143 
-.015 
.038 
-.095 
.006* 
-.083 
.070 
-.080 
-.031 
.085 
-.102 
.029 
.033 
.018* 
.016* 
-.022 
-.046 
.012* 
.003* 
.016* 
.005* 
-.040 
-.050 
-.044 
.009* 
.033 
 
-.030 
.005* 
.002* 
 
-.128 
-.032 
-.006* 
.011* 
-.011* 
.018* 
-.053 
.028 
.015* 
.015* 
.041 
-.072 
.000* 
-.018* 
.049 
.075 
.003* 
-.091 
.017* 
.020 
-.039 
-.062 
-.028 
.001* 
.005* 
-.042 
.020 
 
-.011* 
.062 
-.039 
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R 
R Squared 
Adjusted R Squared 
 
.379 
.144 
.141 
 
.317 
.101 
.099 
 
.295 
.087 
.085 
Model 4: Locus of control 
Advantage versus fairness 
Self-reported happiness 
Satisfaction with life 
Choice and control 
 
R 
R Squared 
Adjusted R Squared 
 
.055 
-.003* 
.007 
.061 
 
.391 
.153 
.150 
 
.023 
-.029 
.046 
.071 
 
.340 
.115 
.113 
 
.048 
-.038 
-.101 
-.015* 
 
.309 
.096 
.093 
Model 5: Attitudinal variables 
Death penalty 
Satisfaction with household finances 
Views on hard work 
Views on wealth 
 
R 
R Squared 
Adjusted R Squared 
 
-.009* 
-.041 
.049 
-.006* 
 
.397 
.158 
.155 
 
.040 
-.001* 
.085 
-.015* 
 
.353 
.124 
.122 
 
.082 
.066 
.000* 
-.032 
 
.325 
.106 
.103 
Model 6: Religiosity 
Importance of religion 
Membership of a religious organisation 
Religious attendance 
Importance of God 
Self-reported religiosity 
 
.025 
.010 
.009* 
.141 
-.008* 
 
.025 
-.028 
.020 
.112 
.051 
 
-.002* 
.003* 
.034 
-.010* 
.002* 
R .417 .373 .327 
R Squared .174 .139 .107 
Adjusted R Squared .172 .137 .104 
The standardised regression coefficients that are not statistically significant have been clearly marked with an 
asterisk (*). 
 
In 2013, race turned out to be a good predictor of attitudes on evil and has a relationship with 
every statement. The relationships with the first and second statements are weak (-.089 and    
-.076 respectively) while the relationship with the third statement is moderate (-.122). All 
these relationships are negative, meaning that the race group coded as 0 – black respondents – 
are more likely to agree with all three statements on evil. These relationships seem to validate 
the results from the crosstabulations. 
 
Another fairly good predictor of evil among the demographic variables was age. Age has 
weak, positive relationships with the second (.098) and third (.075) statements, which 
indicates that the older the respondent, the more likely he or she is to agree with these 
statements. 
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Ethnic community and home language each had a weak relationship with one of the 
dependent variables. Ethnic community has a relationship with the third statement (-.092) and 
home language with the first statement (-.071). Both of these relationships are negative and in 
both cases this points to English and perhaps Afrikaans respondents who seem to show a 
higher level of agreement with the two statements in question. This is contrary to what was 
found in the bivariate analysis. 
 
Among the socio-economic variables, level of education and marital status revealed weak 
relationships with the third statement (beta values of .068 and .066 respectively). These 
relationships indicate that those with a higher level of education show more agreement. In the 
case of marital status, it is single respondents who exhibited more agreement than the other 
groups. Class and the receipt of a government grant displayed weak relationships with the 
second statement (beta values of -.064 for both). The implication is that the lower class is 
more likely to show agreement. However, in the case of “government grant,” it is those that 
do not receive grants that are more likely to agree. 
 
Many noteworthy relationships were found between the trust variables and attitudes on evil. 
In the 2013 analysis there are relationships between generalised trust and the second (-.097) 
and third (-.128) statements. The former relationship is weak and the latter moderate. Both 
are negative. The less trustful South Africans are, the more agreement they show for the 
second and third statements. This is also true with regards to South Africans‟ trust in people 
known to them. South Africans who do not really trust the people they know, tend to agree 
with the first two statements. These relationships are of a weak nature, with beta weights of   
-.094 and -.095. 
 
The strongest relationship was found between trust in family and “evil is everywhere” – the 
beta value of .221 indicating a strong relationship. Trust in family also had a moderate 
relationship with “evil can take possession of some people” (.143). These relationships are 
positive, meaning that the more a respondent trusts their family, the more likely they are to 
support the two statements. This finding was also present in the crosstabulations (see Table 
4.9). 
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The analysis further revealed that trust in people of other religions had a weak, negative 
relationship (-.083) with the second statement. People who distrust those of another religion 
therefore show a weak tendency to agree more with this statement. However, the relationship 
cannot be found with the other two statements. 
 
Several curious relationships were also found among the race variables. Trust in coloured 
people has a moderate relationship (.108) with the first statement and a weak one with the 
second (.085). Negative relationships also exist between trust in Indian people and all three 
statements as well as between trust in black people and the second statement (-.080). It would 
seem that those who trust coloured people and those who distrust Indian and/or black people 
are more likely to agree with the various statements. It is unknown if – and it seems rather 
unlikely that - these respondents are one and the same people. The last of the noteworthy trust 
variables is trust in business people. For the second time this variable registers a weak 
relationship (0.75) with the third statement: those who trust business people being more likely 
to agree. 
 
Among the tolerance variables, tolerance of drug addicts and tolerance of heavy drinkers – 
both measuring moral tolerance – are the best predictors. Both have weak, negative 
relationships with the beliefs regarding evil: the former with the third statement (-.091) and 
the latter with the first (-.090). The people who are intolerant of drug addicts and heavy 
drinkers are more likely to agree with the third and first statements respectively. 
 
In Model 4, satisfaction with life records a beta value of -.101 (indicating a moderate 
relationship) with regards to the third statement on evil. People who are dissatisfied with their 
lives are more likely to show support for getting rid of evil people. The choice and control 
variable has weak, positive relationships with the first two statements (0.61 and 0.71). This 
would indicate that those respondents who believe they have control over their lives are a 
little more likely to agree than those who do not. Unfortunately, the data for the third 
statement is not statistically significant. 
 
The death penalty once again recorded a weak relationship with the third statement (0.82), 
thus twice meeting the expectation that those in favour of capital punishment are more likely 
to support the removal or elimination of evil people. For the second time the multiple 
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regression analysis finds that those who are more satisfied with their household‟s financial 
situation are also more supportive of the third statement (0.66 indicating a weak 
relationship).The other variable of note in Model 5 is views on hard work. This variable has a 
weak, positive relationship with the second statement. South Africans who think hard work 
brings a better life seem to be more supportive of this statement than those who do not share 
such a belief. 
 
The only good predictor among the last model proved to be “importance of God.” This 
variable‟s moderate, positive relationships with the first (.141) and second (.112) statements 
indicate that the more important God becomes to someone, the more likely they are to agree 
to the first two statements. 
 
4.9.3 Multiple regressions compared 
It has already been mentioned that the predictive power of the six models is different for 2006 
and 2013. The 2013 models explain a lot more variance in the first two statements. However, 
it is the 2006 model that has more predictive power for the third statement. Very seldom does 
a particular variable prove to be a good predictor in both datasets. However, the reason for 
this is often that one dataset contains results that are not statistically significant. It is therefore 
not always possible to know if a variable‟s predictive power has truly diminished or if it is 
just unknown. What follows is an attempt to identify the strongest and/or most consistent 
predictors of each statement on evil. 
 
4.9.3.1 Best predictors of “evil is everywhere” 
Table 4.17 contains only the strongest relationships found for independent variables and the 
belief that evil is everywhere. None of the variables recorded relationships in both datasets. In 
fact, most of the variables had only one statistically significant beta weight and it is therefore 
unknown whether they are good predictors in general. The best predictor is trust in family, 
which has a strong relationship with “evil is everywhere” (the more trustful of family, the 
greater this belief). This is also the strongest single relationship found in all the multiple 
regression analyses. 
 
Other good predictors (showing moderate relationships with the dependent variable) are: trust 
in Indian people (the less trust, the greater the belief), trust in white people as well as trust in 
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coloured people (the more trust, the greater the agreement), trust in new people (the more 
trust, the greater the belief), importance of God (the greater the importance of God, the 
greater the belief in evil) and class, with the middle and upper classes likely to be more 
supportive of the statement. 
 
Table 4.17 Predictors of “evil is everywhere” 
Variable Beta value Dataset 
Race 
Class 
Self-reported poverty 
Household income 
Trust in family 
Trust in known people 
Trust in new people 
Trust in coloured people 
Trust in Indian people 
Trust in white people 
Tolerance of heavy drinkers 
Tolerance of Indian people 
Self-reported religiosity 
Importance of religion 
Importance of God 
-.089 
.139 
-.096 
-.095 
.221 
-.094 
.131 
.108 
-.153 
.101 
-.090 
.097 
-.099 
.080 
.141 
2013* 
2006* 
2006** 
2006* 
2013* 
2013* 
2006* 
2013 
2013 
2006* 
2013 
2006* 
2006* 
2006 
2013* 
Variables that only have one statistically significant beta value are marked with an asterisk (*). 
Variables that were only included in one data set are marked with two asterisks (**). 
 
4.9.3.2 Best predictors of “evil can take possession of some people” 
Many of the same variables that were good predictors for the first statement are also good 
predictors for the second. The strongest predictor is again trust in family (see Tables 4.17 and 
4.18 above). Unfortunately, the 2006 data for this variable is not statistically significant. Self-
reported poverty is once again a good predictor in 2006, but no data is available in 2013. 
Class is noted for a second time, again indicating that the upper class is more likely to agree 
with the statement in 2006, but not at all in 2013.  
 
The importance of God again indicates that religious people are more likely to hold beliefs 
about evil. Importance of religion (2006) indicates the same thing, but is excluded from this 
particular table (for this weaker relationship see Table 4.15). The last relationship of 
moderate strength is trust in Indian people – once again indicating that as trust in Indian 
people decreases, belief in evil rises. 
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Table 4.18 Predictors of “evil can take possession of some people” 
Variable Beta value Dataset 
Age 
Class 
Self-reported poverty 
Generalised trust 
Trust in family 
Trust in known people 
Trust in people of other religions 
Trust in black people 
Trust in coloured people 
Trust in Indian people 
Tolerance of coloured people 
Views on hard work 
Views on wealth 
Importance of God 
.098 
.113 & -.064 
-.132 
-.097 
.143 
-.095 
-.083 
-.080 
-.074 & .085 
-.102 
.090 
.085 
.081 
.112 
2013* 
2006 & 2013 
2006** 
2013* 
2013* 
2013 
2013 
2013* 
2006 & 2013 
2013* 
2006 
2013* 
2006* 
2013* 
Variables that only have one statistically significant beta value are marked with an asterisk (*). 
Variables that were only included in one data set are marked with two asterisks (**). 
 
4.9.3.3 Best predictors of “the community must get rid of evil people even if it means 
that they have to be killed” 
Views on hard work is the best predictor of the third statement (Table 4.19): those who do not 
think that hard work brings a better life, are the most likely to show agreement for this 
statement. The second best predictor is trust in new people: respondents who trust new 
acquaintances faster or more easily are also more likely to support the removal of evil people. 
The opposite is however indicated by generalised trust: the less trusting South Africans are in 
general, the more likely they are to agree. 
 
Race is another moderate predictor of the third statement, with black people being somewhat 
more likely to agree. Respondents that tend to trust white people are also more likely to agree, 
while the opposite is true when it comes to trusting coloured and - to a lesser extend - Indian 
people (the less trust, the more agreement). 
 
For the third time, Self-reported poverty records a moderate, positive relationship with the 
attitudes on evil. It is unfortunate that the 2013 data set excluded this variable, making it 
impossible to know whether the pattern has persisted. All indications in this study seem to 
point to a moderate relationship between South Africans who think themselves poor and the 
belief in evil. 
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Table 4.19 Predictors of “the community must get rid of evil people even if it means that 
they have to be killed” 
Variable Beta value dataset 
Race 
Ethnic community 
Self-reported poverty 
Generalised trust 
Trust in new people 
Trust in white people 
Trust in coloured people 
Trust in Indian people 
Trust in business people 
Tolerance of drug addicts 
Satisfaction with life 
Death penalty 
Satisfaction with household finances 
Views on hard work 
-.122 
-.092 
-.139 
-.128 
.147 
.114 
-.122 
-.097 & .062 
.097 & .075 
-.091 
-.101 
.069 & .082 
.088 & .066 
-.154 
2013* 
2013** 
2006** 
2013 
2006* 
2006* 
2006* 
2006 & 2013 
2006 & 2013 
2013 
2013 
2006 & 2013 
2006 & 2013 
2006* 
Variables that only have one statistically significant beta value are marked with an asterisk (*). 
Variables that were only included in one data set are marked with two asterisks (**). 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the exhaustive quantitative search for predictors of South Africans‟ 
attitudes regarding evil (as expressed by the three statements in the WVS). However, this 
quantitative analysis has largely resulted in mixed findings. Different patterns of response 
were found in the two datasets used. The responses also differed with regards to the three 
statements.  
 
It is not altogether surprising that the most extreme measure of belief in evil often stood out 
from the other two in its relationships with the independent variables. The element of 
violence contained in the third statement distinguishes it from the first two statements. The 
predictors for the third statement therefore tend to be different. There are several scenarios 
that might account for this.  
 
It is possible that the first two statements were not interpreted literally by all the respondents. 
In this case the pattern of responses is different for the third statement because it‟s serious 
nature is more likely to draw agreement from believers in literal evil. Alternatively, the third 
statement might draw agreement from people who hold illiberal beliefs in general – 
regardless of their definition of evil. It is possible to hold a secular view on evil and still be in 
favour of the removal of evil persons.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
105 
 
It is also possible that all the statements were indeed interpreted literally by many 
respondents. This would mean that the general, literal belief in evil is fairly entrenched in the 
country. The rise in agreement for the third statement could therefore be the result of some 
South Africans hardening their attitudes toward those thought responsible for pervasive levels 
of evil. South Africa‟s high levels of religiosity would appear to argue in favour of a scenario 
involving mostly literal interpretations of evil. 
 
It would therefore appear that there aren‟t many definitive predictors of the attitudes South 
Africans hold regarding evil and violence. The reason appears to be that the relevant beliefs 
are so pervasive in South Africa that they can‟t really be associated with any particular group. 
The answer to the question of who holds the stated beliefs on evil seems to be: everyone or 
anyone. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS 
 
5.1  Introduction 
Chapter Four contains the extensive quantitative analysis conducted in order to find 
predictors for attitudes on evil in South Africa. The predictors – grouped into six models – 
were selected in order to test whether some of the theories discussed in Chapter Two had any 
predictive power in the South African context. The mixed results of Chapter Four seem to 
indicate that – pending further research - the beliefs and attitudes regarding evil are pervasive 
in South African society. There does not seem to be a particular variable or group of variables 
that can definitively predict South Africans‟ beliefs in this regard: neither identity, 
background, status, accomplishments, circumstances nor any other beliefs or factors can 
predict the attitudes toward evil that are the focus of this study. The answer for such 
pervasive beliefs must lie elsewhere. 
 
It would therefore appear that there is something else about South Africa that results in the 
above-mentioned beliefs and attitudes. The quantitative analysis leads to the conclusion of 
the pervasive nature of the beliefs and attitudes in question. It is only with the help of 
qualitative analysis that one can speculate beyond this point. To seek an explanation it is 
necessary to return to theory and the uniquely South African context. 
 
5.2  Existential insecurity 
According to secularisation theory – mentioned in Chapter Two – wealthy industrial societies 
experience a decline in religious belief. In their attempt to update secularisation theory and 
explain the variation in religious beliefs still found around the world, Norris and Inglehart 
(2004) identify existential security as a key factor. They claim that rich countries – with 
higher levels of sustainable human development and less socioeconomic inequality – provide 
higher standards of living and reduce their populations‟ vulnerability to existential threats 
(2004:13-14). 
 
Human security can be undermined by a broad range of threats, including various forms of 
violence, disease, natural disasters and environmental problems. Poor societies tend to face 
the biggest number of existential (and other) challenges on a fairly consistent basis. The 
resources of developed countries greatly reduce the impact of existential threats among their 
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people. Although these countries are not immune from threats like terrorist attacks, natural 
disasters and economic collapse, it is primarily poor nations where one finds the greatest 
levels of insecurity (Norris & Inglehart, 2004:13-18). It is also the societies facing these high 
levels of insecurity that tend to be the most religious. 
 
Norris and Inglehart‟s Sacred And Secular (2004:18) proposes that “the experience of 
growing up in less secure societies will heighten the importance of religious values, while 
conversely experience of more secure conditions will lessen it.” People living under 
conditions of greater security do not experience the same need for religious assurance as 
those living with constant existential threat. Where the secular state is powerful enough to 
assure people of protection against threats, citizens tend to become indifferent to religion. 
Where the state cannot fully provide such assurance, religion remains salient. The 
reassurance provided by religious prescriptions and promises of future well-being becomes 
an important safeguard against chaos and danger. Reassurance of protection – from either the 
state or religious leaders - is necessary to relieve stress and enable people to carry on with the 
everyday functions of their lives. According to Norris and Inglehart (2004:19), “without such 
a belief system, extreme stress tends to produce withdrawal reactions.” 
 
South Africa‟s problems with poverty and inequality have been discussed earlier. There is no 
doubt that these challenges produce insecurity among a large number of the population. 
Poverty and inequality do not, however, explain the pervasive illiberal beliefs found in the 
present study (see Chapter Four). It is therefore argued that another factor contributes to 
South Africa‟s existential insecurity and consequent illiberal values. The third factor from 
which there is no escape regardless of race, income or education is violent crime.  
 
Crime and violence do not only pose a physical threat to the country‟s people, but also 
undermine the various economic and social tools with which other causes of insecurity – 
poverty and inequality – are to be addressed. Criminal violence is therefore not an isolated 
problem, but one that affects and is affected by other socio-economic matters. Although this 
chapter mainly analyses violent crime in South Africa, such violence is an extreme 
manifestation of a larger lawlessness in the country. Violent crime is therefore contextualised 
as part of a larger moral decay that will be discussed in due course. 
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According to Møller (2005:311), although different South Africans are sometimes subject to 
different types of crime, all are united by fear and dissatisfaction with personal safety.
73
 
Security is regarded as the very foundation of society and safety is a social good that is 
required by every person (Shearing, 2008:2). Crime is therefore generally acknowledged as a 
source of insecurity (Allen, 2002:53) that negatively affects social order, economic progress 
and quality of life. Individuals do not need to be directly affected by crime in order to feel 
insecure. Fear of crime is typically more widespread than crime itself and affects social life in 
a variety of ways. Fear is a driving factor in: 
“Dividing communities, destabilising social relations, creating insecurity that permeates 
individuals’ lives, and [acts as an] invisible intimidation that induces a constant state of 
surveillance […] Fear can become routinised and normalised, until [people] become de-
sensitised to it” (Allen, 2002:54). 
 
Crime of all kinds are so common in South Africa
74
 that South Africans (including police, 
courts and media) often simply ignore the numerous lesser offences. The mainstream media 
tends to focus on stories of murder, rape and other violent attacks. Indeed, in a country with 
the established reputation of being one of the most dangerous places in the world (George & 
Swart, 2012:202), there is little appreciation for media coverage or police action focused on 
lesser offences (Bezuidenhout, 2011:36). The perception and the reality of pervasive crime – 
violent and otherwise – have created a “climate of fear” (Allen, 2002:54) which has become 
normal and often goes unchallenged (Outwater et al., 2005:135-139). In fact, “ideologies and 
activities that consent to violence are promoted, and become part of everyday life, forcing 
people to manage and negotiate fear and danger as if it were natural” (Allen, 2002:54).75 
 
It should be noted that the fear of violence and its consequent problems and constraints have 
a stronger impact on women than men (Sulemana, 2014). Women experience society 
differently from men and their fear is different in its extent, effects, nature and relation to 
genuine threat. Women are more afraid of every kind of crime and more often take more 
                                                             
73In Møller’s survey of crime and quality of life in the Eastern Cape, 65% of respondents reported that putting 
their faith in God was their preferred method of coping with misfortune (2005:285). This may support Norris 
and Inglehart’s assertion (2004:19) that people under existential stress are more likely to turn to religion for 
reassurance. 
74See SAIRR (2014:701-792) for extensive statistics on all types of crime in South Africa. 
75Powdthavee’s study (2005:540-542) found that although South Africans become distressed when they are 
victims of crime, the distress is lessened if many others in their neighbourhood are also victimised. The higher 
a community’s crime rate, the less bad people feel about their own personal victimisation, because it is so 
normal. 
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precautionary action against it even though they are statistically less likely to be victimised. 
However, the cost of victimisation is higher. The threat of sexual violence in particular – 
which may accompany other forms of crime when the victim is female - is quantitatively and 
qualitatively different for women. Everyday exposure to fear “leads to a continuous state of 
stress that can severely limit their movements, activities and participation in society” (Allen, 
2002:56-57). Given the importance of social and political participation in a democracy, crime 
poses a serious problem when it impedes civil participation and equal citizenship. 
 
South Africans have responded to crime and the fear of crime in ways that have deeply 
affected their society. Behavioural changes are common among fearful South Africans, 
including hyper levels of alertness and caution as well as the decision to limit freedom of 
movement and night time socialising. Most South Africans take measures to improve security 
at home in an effort to escape victimisation. Some also report that they have become more 
suspicious of others and more aggressive in their behaviour (Møller, 2005:278-279). Møller 
concludes that although South Africans seem resilient in the face of crime, compared to 
international standards of behaviour, they “appear to be obsessed and intimidated” 
(2005:305). 
 
One could argue that the “withdrawal reactions” mentioned by Norris and Inglehart (2004:19) 
are present in South Africa, especially with regards to spacial dimensions. In addition to 
limiting social activities and instituting general safety measures, South Africans who can 
afford it – often members of the white population76 - withdraw behind heavily protected 
security complexes with high walls, electric fencing, camera surveillance, guards and armed 
response (Allen, 2002:55-61). However, withdrawal is not only a matter of geographical 
space and private security, but also perhaps a psychological response. Nomali Hadebe was 
tortured for more than three hours before being killed by her male partner. Although 
neighbours heard her screams, no one responded in any way whatsoever (Nöthling-Slabbert, 
2006:7). 
 
5.3  Violent crime in South Africa 
South Africa‟s violent crime and the way that it can undermine society and democracy were 
already briefly discussed in Chapter Two.  In light of the findings from the statistical analysis, 
                                                             
76Modi (2010:57) also draws attention to the isolation and insularity of South Africa’s Indian community. 
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it  is necessary to return to this issue in more depth. South Africa features among the world‟s 
most violent countries. Research has confirmed that the country has extremely high rates of 
violent crime, sexual violence and domestic abuse (Kaminer et al., 2008:1589). Social 
scientists generally identify the country‟s history of political violence (in terms of state 
oppression as well as resistance) and its socio-economic inequality and deprivation as root 
causes (Namoyi, 2000; Pelser & De Kock, 2000). 
 
It is possible that the politics of resistance did much to encourage fearless disrespect for all 
kinds of authority. It has also demonstrated that violence and crime can bring material and 
immaterial gain. Furthermore, due to the illegitimate nature of Apartheid‟s laws and law 
enforcement, incarceration was not always accompanied by stigma or social rejection.  
Historically speaking, it has not been morally unacceptable to break the law or to blame the 
system‟s corruption and illegitimacy when caught breaking the law. In some cases 
imprisonment was an honour and an initiation into manhood (Nomoyi, 2000:67-69). 
 
It is also not unusual for societies that have experienced internal conflict and rapid, large 
scale socio-economic and political transition to experience a rise in crime. The sudden and 
unexpected democratic transition may therefore have played a role in the country‟s social 
instability. Even in Ancient Greece, Plato noted that: 
“Democracy is a stage in which liberty is likely to grow at the expense of order, as people tend 
to do what they like without regarding themselves morally and socially bound to any set of rules” 
(quoted in Nomoyi, 2000:66). 
 
Additionally, some of the human rights introduced by the country‟s secular constitution are 
contested by religious, cultural and social systems. This has led to confusion and possibly 
contributed to cultural, religious and social insecurities (Slater, 2013:11). In other words, 
South Africa has experienced a dramatic change from conservative and confrontational 
politics to liberal democracy. In the process, methods of social control have weakened and 
have not been replaced by legitimate alternatives (Nomoyi, 2000:67), resulting in widespread 
disorganisation and insecurity. Criminals have successfully exploited the situation. 
 
According to the latest figures (2013-2014), 47 people are murdered in South Africa daily 
and another 47 suffer an attempt on their lives (SAIRR, 2014:706-708). South Africa 
therefore experiences 32 murders, as well as 32 attempted murders, per 100 000 people. A 
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more acceptable rate – based on international standards – would be less than 10 murders per 
100 000 people (Du Plessis et al., 2007:532). Although South Africa‟s current homicide rate 
is one of the highest in the world, it has actually declined from the 71 murders and 73 
attempted murders per day of the 1994-1995 period (SAIRR, 2014:706-708). 
 
Although the murder rate has declined in the twenty year period from 1994-2014, the overall 
violent crime rate has not. In 1994 South Africa recorded 1 728 contact crimes per day.  In 
2014 the figure remained 1 700. As one can see from Table 5.1, although murder, attempted 
murder and assault crimes have decreased, sexual offences and robbery-related attacks have 
increased (SAIRR, 2014:707).
77
 
 
Table 5.1 Daily contact crimes in South Africa: 1994/1995 and 2013/2014 
 Number of contact crimes per day 
1994-1995 2013-2014 
Murder 71 47 
Attempted murder 73 47 
Sexual offences 123 172 
Serious assault 591 502 
Common assault 549 458 
Robbery with aggravated circumstances 232 327 
Common robbery 90 148 
Total 1 728 1 700 
Data from the SAIRR (2014:707). 
 
The SAPS labels residential robberies
78
 one of the most feared crimes in the country and a 
serious factor in promoting insecurity. It is a crime– often accompanied by violence - that 
violates victims‟ sense of privacy. Robbery at residential premises has increased by 105.3% 
over the last ten years and is not restricted to wealthy neighbourhoods, sometimes occurring 
even at the most modest dwellings in poor areas (SAPS, 2014:11-37). Ironically, the SAPS 
                                                             
77Serious assault is defined as the unlawful and intentional, direct or indirect use of force in order to cause 
serious bodily harm to another person. Common assault is also defined as the unlawful and intentional, direct 
or indirect use of force to the body, but without the intent to cause grievous harm. However, common assault 
also includes the threat of using personal violence against another in circumstances in which the victim has 
reason to believe the threat. Sexual offences include not only all forms of rape and indecent assault, but also 
many other crimes such as incest, the distribution of child pornography and paying for sex. Robbery with 
aggravated circumstances and common robbery both involve the unlawful, intentional removal and 
appropriation of the property of another. However, the former is committed with a dangerous weapon 
(usually a firearm), while the latter is not (SAIRR, 2014:702). 
78
Break-ins or home invasions that occur while the occupants are at home, as opposed to burglaries, which 
occur when they are not (SAIIRR, 2012:685). 
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believes that improvements in security with regards to theft-prevention has contributed to the 
rise in more serious crimes: as citizens take measures to prevent property theft (which has 
declined), criminals have turned to burglary, robbery and carjacking in order to steal desired 
items. There has been a constant increase in robbery of non-residential premises: over the last 
ten years this crime has grown by about 460.7%. One recent and disturbing trend is the rise in 
armed robberies at shopping malls, which has increased by 142% in the three financial years 
up to 2013/2014 (Burger & Lancaster, 2014). Although there has been a general decrease in 
carjackings over the last ten years (by 19.3%), the 2013-2014 period saw an increase of 
12.3%.  
 
The contact crimes listed above make up about a third (33%) of the total crimes committed in 
the republic.
79
 According to the SAPS the majority of contact crimes – especially the first 
five offences listed in Table 5.1 – occur among people known to each other. These crimes: 
“Result from the phenomenon of existential social interactions. The majority of these crimes are 
caused by feelings of anger, disappointment, frustration and stress that are not channelled by 
self-restraint towards non-destructive outlets, resulting in individuals acting on violent impulse. 
Furthermore, a common denominator of these crimes is the prevalence of alcohol and substance 
abuse, which affect the cognitive control mechanisms required to guide the behaviour of 
individuals.
80
 A considerable proportion of these crimes are either domestic violence cases or 
occur in the vicinity of taverns or shebeens” (SAPS, 2014:10). 
 
South Africa‟s struggle with criminal violence becomes even more striking when looking at 
the entire period of 1994-2014 (Table 5.2). In the democratic era South Africa has 
experienced a total of over 14 million contact crimes, haemorrhaging over 400 000 lives from 
homicide alone. Although South Africa‟s 14 million contact crimes do not imply 14 million 
victims – some people have been repeatedly victimised – the number of lives directly and 
indirectly affected by this scale of violence can only be estimated as a significant proportion 
of the population.  
 
There is also the matter of unreported crimes. Even wealthy countries with efficient 
institutions and record-keeping, experience underreporting (Louw, 1997:140). Some estimate 
that up to 50% of crimes committed in South Africa are not reported (Brown, 2001:270). 
There have been allegations regarding the accuracy of crime statistics, particularly that the 
                                                             
79In contrast to the widespread criminal violence in the country, there were only 13 reported events involving 
political violence in 2013, resulting in 17 deaths (SAIRR, 2014:704-728). 
80 Another key factor is the prevalence of firearms in South African society (Du Plessis et al, 2007:534). 
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SAPS might be accidently (due to incompetence) or deliberately underreporting and 
misreporting crime. The crime statistics are not independently audited (Brodie, 2013). It can 
be safely assumed that at least some of the figures quoted in this chapter are underestimates. 
 
Table 5.2 Total number of contact crimes 1994-2014 
 Total number of contact crimes 
Murder 409 937 
Attempted murder 477 042 
Sexual offences 11 91 987 
Serious assault 4 544 244 
Common assault 4 321 777 
Robbery with aggravated 
circumstances 
2 138 063 
Common robbery 1 334 866 
Total 14 417 916 
Data from the SAIRR (2014:704). 
 
Figure 5.1 Murder, attempted murder and sexual offences 1994-2014 
 
Data from the SAIRR (2014:708). 
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates three of South Africa‟s most serious crimes: murder, attempted murder 
and sexual offences. The murder rate peaked in 1995-1996 with 26 877 murders and has 
fallen to 17 068 in 2013-2014. The rate of attempted murder peaked in 2002-2003 (35 861 
people were almost killed), but is now similar to the murder rate (17 110 attempted homicides 
0 
10000 
20000 
30000 
40000 
50000 
60000 
70000 
80000 
1994/1995 2003/2004 2013/2014 
Murder Attempted Murder Sexual Offences 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
114 
 
in 2013-2014). Although the murder and attempted murder rates have improved since the end 
of Apartheid, they are still extremely high. The general homicide rate includes occult-related 
crimes such as muthi killings, which persist.
81
 The conviction rate for murder in South Africa 
is estimated at only about 10% (Scott, 2013).
82
 
 
It is obvious that South Africa suffers from an epidemic of sex-related crimes. Sexual 
violence – and rape in particular -  is a “a humiliating, degrading and brutal invasion of the 
privacy, the dignity and the person of the victim” (Ndashe, 2004:220). The reported number 
of these crimes has increased in the democratic era from 44 751 in 1994-1995 to 62 649 in 
2013-2014. Although it is mostly men who fall victim to murder and attempted murder 
(approximately 81% of homicide victims and 79% of attempted homicide victims are men), 
the victims of sexual offences are mostly women (47%) and children (35%) (SAIRR, 
2014:708-722). The murder of men tends to involve attacks from strangers, whereas women 
are much more likely to be attacked by male family members or partners (Nöthling-Slabbert, 
2006:5-6). 
 
Sexual offences are notoriously underreported due to fear of intimidation and social stigma as 
well as familial pressure to hide scandals and keep families together (US Department Of State, 
2013:26; Posel, 2005:242). Some of these crimes are reported and then withdrawn as victims 
refuse to take action against family members on whom they are financially and emotionally 
dependent (SAPS, 2014:10). Distrust of and lack of faith in the police and justice system also 
play a role. Police stations and courts are sometimes distant and inaccessible to many South 
Africans. Many police stations – especially in impoverished areas – are understaffed and 
badly managed (Louw, 1997:140-141).  
 
Furthermore, incidents of corruption, misconduct and brutality on the part of the SAPS 
(Singh, 2004:89-91; Møller, 2005:269) means  that many citizens consider it unsafe or 
                                                             
81The US Department Of State’s human rights report  for South Africa (2013:31-40) lists several recent 
examples of alleged witchcraft-related killings: Stanley Modikane from Daveyton (Ekurhuleni) was arrested 
after killing and beheading his wife so that he could use her head for wealth-generating muthi. There was also 
the shooting death of Nocupheni Ngoyana (from Gotyibeni Village in the Eastern Cape) who was accused by 
village members of using witchcraft to kill people. 
82
Research by the South African Law Commission (SALC) found that only 6 out of every 100 violent crimes 
resulted in a conviction after two years (Lancaster, 2012). 
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undesirable to interact with police.
83
 The US Department of State‟s human rights report for 
South Africa (2013:1-4) has drawn attention to the SAPS‟s excessive, often illegal, use of 
force, including torture, beatings and rape. During the 2012-2013 period 706 people died 
while in police custody or due to police action.
84
 During the same period 146 complaints of 
rape were made against on-duty and off-duty police officers. In fact, there were a total of       
6 728 complaints against the police – made to the Independent Police Investigative 
Directorate (IPID). 1 040 Of these cases were considered incidents of misconduct and 
referred back to the police for internal action; 545 complaints were serious enough for 
criminal prosecution; 125 SAPS members were arrested, resulting in 57 convictions and 21 
acquittals (US Department Of State, 2013:9). 
 
Due to underreporting, the real extend of South Africa‟s sexual violence can only be guessed 
at. Rape alone is thought to be seriously underreported: the Medical Research Council has 
estimated that the report rate is only one out of nine (Daily Maverick, 2014). A study 
conducted in Gauteng in 2010 found that only one in 13 women report rape when the 
perpetrator is not a partner and a mere one in 25 report the crime when the guilty party is a 
partner (The Guardian, 2013). According to the South African Law Commission (SALC) 
about 1.69 million rapes occur every year, but only an average of 54 000 rape survivors press 
charges (Britton, 2006:146). South Africa‟s high levels of domestic violence – one of the 
highest in the world – means that rape often occurs within the home.85 
 
It is thought that a quarter of South African women are in abusive relationships, but most do 
not report it (US Department Of State, 2013:27). Studies have shown that between 25%-38% 
of South African men admit to having committed an act of rape and over 50% report that they 
have been physically violent toward their partners (Dworking et al., 2012:98; US Department 
Of State, 2013:25-27). A study of women who visit antenatal clinics also found that 55% of 
the women had at one time or another suffered physical or sexual violence from a male 
partner (Choi & Ting, 2008:838). The conviction rate for sexual offences is 65.8%. However, 
                                                             
83Recent survey results indicate that 83% of South Africans believe the SAPS is corrupt (Brodie, 2013). 
84
The most notorious example of police brutality in recent years is probably the 2013 death of Mozambican 
taxi driver Mido Macia, who was handcuffed to a police vehicle and dragged to a police station where he died 
from his wounds. He was accused of having caused a traffic jam and having resisted arrest. The event was 
filmed by members of the public (US Department Of State, 2013:2). 
85
Additionally, sexual violence in the domestic sphere is thought to be a major contributor to the spread of 
HIV/Aids in South Africa (Outwater et al., 2005:138). 
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given all the cases that are never reported or never referred for prosecution,
86
 some estimate 
that the real conviction rate for a crime like rape is as low as 4.1% (US Department Of State, 
2013:26). Critics claim that judges use the victim‟s behaviour and/or relationship to the 
offender as cause for imposing lighter sentences. Convictions are thus less likely and 
sentences shorter in cases involving domestic violence (Nöthling-Slabbert, 2006:7).
87
 
 
Despite the constitutionally enshrined principle of gender equality and attempts to effect the 
socioeconomic empowerment of women, gender violence is widespread and affects girls and 
women regardless of race, ethnicity, class or geographical location. Slater (2013:1-2) argues 
that South Africa‟s women and girls are failed by a criminal justice system that does not 
adequately examine and punish sexual violence. The result is a culture of impunity among 
offenders and insecurity among victims and potential victims. There is even the possibility 
that the institutional protection and advancement of women‟s rights appear as threatening to 
the many men who continue to experience high unemployment, economic marginalisation 
and the growth of a service economy in which women are very active.
88
 Women are often the 
beneficiaries of the government‟s welfare programmes, which also raises their income and 
status (Dworking et al., 2012:100-103). The economic pressures felt by men are worsened by 
their belief that they bare principle responsibility for raising a family and acting as its head 
and provider. Many South Africans hold patriarchal values in which men are accorded power 
over women and children (often including power over their bodies) (Richter & Dawes, 
2008:85). Now they are confronted by the higher status and greater institutional protection 
granted to these groups. 
 
In the face of the ongoing economic challenges, the increased status of women can be 
perceived as a zero-sum loss of social, economical and political status on the part of men. 
Women‟s empowerment is not only a fact in the public sphere, but also carries over into 
private relationships, which many men are finding increasingly difficult to dominate 
                                                             
86Fewer than half of reported sexual offences are referred for prosecution (US Department Of State, 2013:26). 
87
Convictions and sentencing are also affected by matters of race, class and reputation with black women, drug 
users and sex workers meeting with less sympathy from the justice system and the media than other victims 
(Nöthling-Slabbert, 2006:7). 
88Dworkin et al.’s study documents that there is also frustration over women’s entrance into formerly male-
dominated economic sectors, thus challenging the traditional perception of physical labour being a man’s 
domain (2012:103-104). 
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(Dworking et al., 2012:100-106).
89
 Research has shown that there is indeed a high risk of 
violence in households where women‟s income and/or educational achievements exceed 
those of men. This is especially the case in families where men subscribe to traditional gender 
roles and stereotypes (Choi & Ting, 2008:835-844).
90
 In South Africa, all race groups 
traditionally subscribe to various patriarchal attitudes and values that sometimes contribute to 
victim-blaming or the condoning of violence against women (Van der Hoven, 2001:16-18). 
 
Faced with economic and social pressures, it is interesting that men report feeling not just 
“undermined” but also “unsafe” (Dworking et al., 2012:104). It is also interesting that the 
perceived loss of “respect” (Dworking et al., 2012:109) is often blamed on the human rights 
of women and children – framed as a Western notion being imposed on the country. One 
reported response to the perceived disempowerment and marginalisation is the adoption of a 
hyper masculine identity that emphasises personal status based on all-male contexts, 
engaging in violence and seeking more sexual opportunities (Dworking et al., 2012:100-106). 
The empowerment of women and consequent anxiety and loss of self-esteem among some 
men may also be contributing to South Africa‟s high suicide rate – particularly among men 
(Botha, 2012:543).
91
 
 
Slater (2013:7-10) suggests that gender-based violence (GBV) is (another) example of the 
hold that illiberal values have on South Africans: despite the legal proscription of human and 
women‟s rights, the association of manhood with domination over women and girls is 
entrenched in the country‟s social norms and sometimes legitimated by religious and cultural 
beliefs.
92
 The same may very well be said of violence towards children. Corporal punishment 
of children has been outlawed in public institutions, but not as private punishments. This is 
partly due to the difficulty of policing private homes, but also because of expected resistance 
from various cultural and religious communities. Despite the legal protection of children‟s 
rights, high levels of violence against children still occur in homes, schools and communities. 
                                                             
89Research has shown that violence can easily occur when women challenge the gendered labour customs in 
their domestic circumstances (Krishnan et al., 2010). 
90In fact, any relationship where the principles have unequal status is associated with an increased risk of 
domestic violence. Choi and Ting (2008:845) also found that there was an increased chance of spousal abuse 
and severe wife-beating in polygamous households (a tradition among some African cultures).  
91Suicide is one of the leading causes of unnatural death in South Africa: 7 000 suicides occur every year, 
amounting to 20 deaths per day. Approximately 79% of suicides in South Africa are men (Botha, 2012:526-539). 
92
 It should be noted that men’s perceived right to control and punish errant women is commonly accepted by 
both sexes (Outwater et al., 2005:140). 
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Richter and Dawes (2008:84-85-87) argue that child abuse is rife within this sanctioned 
culture of violence. They also warn that those who experience or witness violence as children 
– especially violence directed toward their mother – are more likely to become violent in 
turn.
93
 
 
South Africa‟s children are, by all accounts, very vulnerable to exposure to violence. Shields 
et al.‟s study (2009:1199) of children from impoverished suburbs of Cape Town found that 
most of the children in question witnessed and/or experienced various forms of violence both 
at school and in their neighbourhoods. Over half the children that were studied reported being 
in fights at school and in their neighbourhoods; over 90% had seen people being hit in both 
places and over 60% had been hit themselves. 40% Of the children in the study had witnessed 
a homicide in their communities.  
 
Other studies report similar findings throughout the country: an incredible 95% of Xhosa-
speaking children in Khayelitsha reported witnessing violence – 56% were victims 
themselves; another Cape Town survey reported that about 63% of grade 10 pupils had 
witnessed violence and almost a third had been mugged or robbed; in yet another Cape Town 
survey, 58% of pupils from 18 high schools said they had seen acts of violence being 
committed in the city; in the Northwest, 52% of pupils from two high schools had witnessed 
a rape in their community –another 56% reported having seen a murder; (Bach & Louw, 
2010:25-26); in the same study, roughly 90%-94% of teenagers had witnessed at least one act 
of violence and 68%-73% had been victims themselves (Bach and Louw, 2010:28-29); a 
national study conducted in 2008 reported that 15.3% of South African children (between 
grade 3 and grade 12) have experienced some type of violence at school. In fact, a third of the 
rapes of young girls are believed to be committed by educators (Le Roux & Mokhele, 
2011:319). Shields et al. (2009:1199-1205) found that the children in their study were likely 
to progress from being witnesses of violence, to victims and finally to perpetrators. None of 
the children were perpetrators only and all the forms of violence produced signs of 
psychological distress in the children. 
 
                                                             
93
According to Abrahams et al. (2013:2) “having witnessed or experienced domestic violence in childhood 
results in more acceptance of violence, lower self-esteem, attachment problems, and personality disorders.” 
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The occurrence of high levels of violence despite a very public rights discourse might be an 
indication that the speed of South Africa‟s transition has contributed to a certain degree of 
confusion, frustration and even fear. It is possible that rapid social, economic and political 
changes have disorientated the population, leading to general uncertainty and insecurity. 
Although the present study does not have gender relations as its focus, it is unavoidable that 
violence is a problem of men: 
“Men form a large proportion of the moral degeneration that we see in our society. There is not 
a single crime – whether rape, robbery or abuse – where a man is not the common denominator. 
Until you address the issue of men, and the violence they perpetrate in our society, you will not 
begin to steer society towards moral regeneration” (quoted in Posel, 2005:249). 
 
South Africa‟s violence is thus often seen as a crisis of manhood (Posel, 2005:249) or at the 
very least a failure of its citizens – including women - to act with responsibility in the private 
sphere. This failure is having a pernicious effect on responsible and equal citizenship in the 
country‟s liberal democracy. 
 
5.4 Anti-crime initiatives 
Another way of illustrating the hold that violent crime has on South Africa is to look at the 
government‟s anti-crime expenditure as well as the private security sector. Table 5.3 shows 
how the South African government has increased spending on police services, the law courts 
and prisons: 
 
Table 5.3 Anti-crime expenditure 1994/1995 and 2013/2014 
 Expenditure 
1994-1995 2013-2014 Change 
Police services 10.2 74.1 626% 
Law courts 1.6 16.5 931% 
Prisons 2.6 18.8 623% 
Total 4.4 Rbn 109.4 Rbn 660% 
Total government expenditure 148.2 Rbn 1149.3 Rbn 676% 
Data from the SAIRR (2014:747). Multiply expenditure by 10 for the US dollar amount. 
 
Government expenditure on the country‟s crime-fighting institutions has increased, in real 
terms and as a percentage of overall expenditure.
94
 There have been many attempts to 
                                                             
94
The increased expenditure on crime-fighting does of course come at the expense of social services (Pelser & 
De Kock, 2000:89). 
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strengthen and modernise police and detective work. Training has been provided to the police 
to enable them to address a variety of crimes including violence against women and children 
as well as occult-related crimes (SAPS, 2014b:60). The SAPS has made a point of initiating 
anti-crime awareness campaigns, especially with regards to crimes against women and 
children. The reinstated Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences (FCS) Units 
have had some success in fighting crime – having convicted 3 718 people, sentenced to a 
total of 51 631 years imprisonment (including 659 life sentences) (SAPS, 2014:10).  
 
Despite the government‟s attempts to address crime, problems persist. According to            
Du Plessis and Louw (2005:435-436), the work load of the justice system has increased 
dramatically, but human resources and performance have not kept pace. Allegations of police 
abuse sited above is not the sole problem. Police have continued to struggle with internal 
corruption and the SAPS has remained short of staff, badly trained and ill equipped 
(criminals are often better armed than police) (US Department Of State, 2013:2-10).  
 
Furthermore, despite access to social workers, mental health professionals and religious 
counselling, police officers are negatively affected by the violence and loss they experience 
on a daily basis. Members of the SAPS also suffer from poor remuneration and the bad 
reputation they have with the public, who often regard them with suspicion and contempt. As 
a consequence police morale is low and many officers – especially specialist investigators – 
leave the service to work in the private sector (Singh, 2004:92-94).  
 
Similar problems plague the other institutions of justice: the work load of South Africa‟s 
understaffed and underfunded courts are such that legal proceedings can continue for years 
without reaching a conclusion (Du Plessis et al., 2007:535). South Africa has a high number 
of pre-trial prisoners (over 48 000 in the 2012-2013 period) and these defendants may face 
prolonged detention while awaiting trails that are frequently delayed. The high rate of pre-
trial detention is attributed to the high number of arbitrary arrests that occur as well as poor 
case preparation and unaffordable bail tariffs (US Department Of State, 2013:11-12). Most 
defendants (approximately 60%) are not convicted. In fact, the overall conviction rate in 
South Africa may be as low as 10.3% due to inadequate evidence collection and investigation 
as well as long and ineffective court proceedings. More than half of the roughly two million 
criminal cases reported in South Africa every year are not resolved. 
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The country‟s prisons are also under pressure: about 28% of correction centres are 
overcrowded, with many prisoners having less than 13 squares of living space.
95
 The 
overcrowding as well as poor ventilation aides the spread of disease. Adequate medical care 
is not always available (US Department Of State, 2013:1-22). There have also been cases of 
prisoners being attacked and even tortured and raped by prison guards. During 2012-2013,     
3 101 hearings were held regarding offences committed by prison staff and 121 employees 
were dismissed. Prison conditions amount to a violation of prisoners‟ basic human rights (to 
which South Africans are largely unsympathetic) (Peté, 2006:429-430).  
 
Policies meant to address crime are therefore not always effectively implemented and do not 
always achieve their goals (Cawthra, 2005:104). According to Posel (2005:247), violent 
crime is interpreted by the public as a failure of political leadership. There is thus an 
occasional defensive reluctance on the part of government to publish information or engage 
with civil society with regards to crime (Cawthra, 2005:100-102). Despite the increased 
spending seen in Table 5.3, the perception remains that the country‟s justice system is under-
resourced and unresponsive and simply not capable of arresting, convicting and incarcerating 
criminals (Louw, 1997:141). Additionally, some argue that South Africa‟s “war against crime” 
(Cawthra, 2005:100) is geared more towards managing crime instead of preventing it. 
 
South Africa‟s large private security industry can perhaps be seen as an indictment on the 
government‟s attempt to cope with violent crime. According to the SAIRR (2014:790) there 
were 4 437 private security companies in 1997, which has increased to 8 144 in 2014. These 
businesses include armed response, cash-in-transit and general guarding services. Figure 5.2 
below illustrates the size and growth of South Africa‟s public and private security forces. In 
1997 the private security sector resembled the SAPS in size: there were 115 331 registered 
guards and 110 177 police. However, while the private sector has grown to over four times its 
earlier size – registering 487 058 guards in 2014 – the SAPS experienced only modest growth: 
there being only 153 116 police officers in 2014 (SAIRR, 2014:790).  
                                                             
95South Africa incarcerates about 4 out of every 1 000 people – one of the highest rates of incarceration in the 
world (Peté, 2006:449). As may be expected given the discourse on masculinity and crime, almost 98% of 
South African prisoners are male. The pressure on South African prisons is periodically relieved with special 
remissions of sentence. For example, 35 506 prisoners were released in March 2012 by special permission of 
the president (SAIRR, 2014:771-775).  
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There is thus more than three times as many private security guards in South Africa than 
police officers: the ratio of police to the population is 1:353
96
 and the ratio of private security 
guards to the population is 1:111. The UN recommends a police-to-population ratio of 1:450 
(SAPS, 2014a:1). South Africa is therefore not far behind the UN standard and yet South 
Africans believe that this is not sufficient. The demand for security appears to be indicative of 
an extremely fearful and insecure society. 
 
Figure 5.2 Public and private security officers 1997-2014 
 
Data from the SAIRR (2014:790). 
 
5.5 Effects of crime and violence on society 
If security is the bedrock of all social activity, crime and violence have the power to permeate 
every sector of society. Satisfaction with one‟s community is a key determinant of life 
satisfaction and it stands to reason that quality of life decreases as crime and violence in the 
community increases. Victims of crime report significantly lower levels of happiness– a trend 
that is also present in South Africa (Powdthavee, 2005). Interestingly, Møller‟s study in the 
Eastern Cape (2005:300-303) found that the fear of crime and fear for personal safety 
decreased life satisfaction even more than actual victimisation.
97
 
 
Crime spreads fear and distrust among people – even more so in unequal societies. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, high levels of fear and distrust can itself lead to violence 
                                                             
96According to the SAPS the ratio of police to population is 1:346 – thus similar to this figure from the SAIRR 
(SAPS, 2014:1).  
97
Unsurprisingly, contact crimes – a physical violation - were found to have a stronger effect on feelings of 
safety and life satisfaction than other crimes (Møller, 2005:303). 
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(Hamilton, 2011:359). PAGAD, for example, was discussed as a vigilante organisation that 
aimed to violently confront both the public and the state (Isima, 2007:33). Although PAGAD 
is an extreme example that has been contained, low level vigilante actions continue.
98
 There 
also exists the aforementioned xenophobic violence, especially against foreign Africans, who 
are blamed for crime, low wages and a loss of jobs and services (foreigners are therefore 
blamed for being a source of insecurity) (US Department Of State, 2013:36).  
 
Additionally, South Africa routinely experiences calls for the return of the death penalty - not 
only for murder, but also for rape and child abuse (Posel, 2005:244-247). Strong support for 
the death penalty – like the beliefs in evil – is a rare example of South African opinions 
converging (Møller, 2005:268; Chapter Four). This could possibly constitute a desire to use 
violence to purge South Africa of evil – in the same way that violently removing Apartheid 
was seen as purifying a disordered world (Crais, 2002). The perpetrators of popularly 
justified violence – vigilante crimes, xenophobic attacks and political- or protest-related 
violence – are rarely prosecuted, resulting in a sense of impunity and perhaps an air of 
legitimacy (York, 2015). 
 
Crime has an effect on the mental and general health of the population (Wilkinson, 2005:101-
143; Sulemana, 2014). The fear of victimisation causes people to spend less time out of doors 
and to socialise less often, which can negatively affect health and well-being. The extreme 
measures and lifestyle changes that South Africans take to try and ensure their own safety can 
be seen as symptomatic of trauma (Møller,2005:306). The practice of hiding violence – often 
the case with regards to sexual crimes – can lead to worsening trauma as problems are denied 
and suppressed (Posel, 2005:242-243). Conversely, the experience of reporting crimes to a 
distrusted and at times unsympathetic justice system also increases anxiety. All the 
psychological effects associated with crime and violence – depression, anxiety, feelings of 
aggression and personal violation as well as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) – 
negatively affect health, well-being and quality of life (Powdthavee, 2005:532). 
Kaminer et al.‟s study (2008) confirms that the high levels of violence experienced and 
witnessed by South Africans heighten the risk of PTSD. The disorder is also associated with 
life in squalid urban surroundings where there is a higher than average chance of being 
                                                             
98
For example, the 2012 stoning of Boikie Molefe by mob in a village near Mafikeng, which took place while 
police drove by. Molefe was suspected of killing his girlfriend (US Department Of State, 2013:10). 
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exposed to violence. Those suffering from PTSD are likely to experience feelings of 
powerlessness, a lack of confidence, anxiety and depression. Previous studies have shown 
that survivors of violence who develop PTSD are more likely to suffer from ill health (over 
longer periods) and to die sooner than their peers. They are also more likely to abuse alcohol 
and drugs and to have less successful work lives (typically characterised by many periods of 
sick leave) (Hirschowitz & Orkin, 1997:169-172). 
 
Children who experience or witness violence can also be affected by depression, anxiety, 
PTSD or worse (Bach & Louw, 2010:26). Indeed, this was often found to be the case in the 
studies of violence among the youth that were mentioned earlier in this chapter (Bach & 
Louw, 2010:28-29; Shields, 2009:1199-1205). Violent communities are associated with 
PTSD in children and proximal violence is associated with developmental problems, 
including speech and feeding problems as well as aggressive behaviour (Shields et al., 
2009:1192-1195). In violent neighbourhoods children are more likely to be both witness, 
victim and perpetrator of violence and to experience mental anguish because of it.  
 
In 2005 Powdthavee attempted to quantify the psychological costs of crime. He claims that 
crime has by far the biggest psychological burden when compared to other socio-economic 
challenges. If the psychological cost of crime could be expressed in numbers, a household 
spending R1 187 per month would require an extra R97 424 per month to compensate for an 
experience of crime. The South African average household would therefore “require a 
financial package worth 82 times of their current spending to make them feel indifferent 
about their experiences of crime” (Powdthavee, 2005:538). On the other hand, the estimated 
psychological costs of unemployment and lack of formal education are on average R4 300 
and R7 370 respectively. 
 
Kaminer et al. (2008:1594) warn that developing countries like South Africa do not have the 
well-resourced mental healthcare system needed to address PTSD and other psychological 
problems. Furthermore, the problem of violent crime undermines any attempt at improving 
South Africa‟s healthcare sector. Any progress that is made and money that is spent will have 
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a limited affect if people are not safe. This is as much true of the health sector as it is of other 
social sectors or the economy.
99
 
 
Crime is known to affect the economy in numerous ways: it results in a loss of earnings for 
households and increased state expenditure on the justice system (Powdthavee, 2005:532); it 
affects international economic relations and has been associated with low levels of 
productivity. While economic investment and job creation are needed to address the socio-
economic roots of crime, economic activity - formal and informal - requires security. Both 
local and international investors are scared off by crime and instability (Pelser & De Kock, 
2000:89).  
 
The small business sector is particularly vulnerable to crime, but it is hard to operate a 
successful business of any kind when neither businesspeople nor customers nor merchandise 
are safe (Shearing, 2008:1-2). Even non-violent offences such as cable theft harm business as 
the resultant power failures reduce productivity. Cable theft alone has been estimated to cause 
an annual loss to the economy of between R5 billion and R10 billion (Burger & Lancaster, 
2014). Meanwhile, commercial crimes – fraud, forgery and embezzlement – have increased 
by 70% over the last decade. 
 
The assertion that crime is bad for business is confirmed by the quantitative study of Roxas et 
al. (2012) that found that companies identify crime as one of the most urgent constraints to 
doing business in South Africa. During the first six months of 2014, 65% of respondents in a 
survey of the business community reported that they, their staff members or family had 
experienced some form of serious crime (Burger & Lancaster, 2014). A majority of business 
executives (74%) identified security costs as their biggest burden. 37% Of respondents also 
noted that crime led to decreased productivity and motivation. A further 20% indicated that 
crime resulted in a loss of personnel.
100
 Burger and Lancaster (2014) conclude that: 
“Business is finding it increasingly difficult to absorb the direct and indirect effects of crime. The 
business sector is the main contributor of disposable household income and the country’s 
                                                             
99
For example, education expenditure goes to waste if schools are plagued by violence (Shearing, 2008:2). 
Violence in schools typically lead to poor academic results, absenteeism and a high dropout rate (Le Roux & 
Mokhele, 2011:325). 
100These figures from 2014 were higher than in 2011 when 45% of respondents said security expenditure was 
their biggest burden; 16% said crime led to less motivation; 15% reported that crime led to less productivity, 
and 9% claimed it resulted in a loss of staff (Burger & Lancaster, 2014). 
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revenue base through taxes and levies. The increase in the cost of crime means that less income 
is available to pay for wages and for contributing to the state coffers.” 
 
Crime therefore has a double impact on security: violence poses a direct threat to physical 
security, but all forms of crime also impede economic growth on which people rely for 
material security. Democratic South Africa‟s ability to deliver on much desired material 
security – as discussed in Chapter Two – is thus seriously threatened by crime.  
 
An industry such as travel and tourism, which has the potential to lift many people out of 
poverty, is a good illustration of the impact that crime can have on growth. South Africa has 
been Africa‟s top destination for travellers, attracting one out of four visitors to the continent  
(Ferreira & Harmse, 2000:80). However, widely publicised crimes committed against foreign 
visitors, which has an immediate effect on the industry, means South Africa has the 
reputation of being a high risk destination.  
 
Crime was reportedly a key factor in Cape Town‟s failure to win the 2004 Olympic bid 
(Ferreira & Harmse, 2000:80-84). It once again emerged as a concern with regards to the 
country‟s ability to successfully host the Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA) World Cup tournament in 2010 (George & Swart, 2012:201-203). The South African 
government spent R1.3 billion on safety and security during the tournament, deploying an 
extra 44 000 police officers around the country at key locations. The country‟s transport 
infrastructure was also upgraded and policed. Special courts were created to address any 
World Cup-related crimes. These extraordinary measures may be why there were few crime-
related problems during the event.
101
 In fact, robbery in general decreased by almost 12% 
during 2010 although this success has not been sustained (Daily Maverick, 2014). 
 
The hosting of sporting and other events signals South Africa‟s attempt to develop an event-
driven economy that will display the country‟s economic, social and political strengths to an 
international audience. In turn such events may lead to an increase in tourism, employment, 
economic activity and publicity. Despite the growth in South African tourism, crime and 
violence have the potential to adversely affect this industry, thus also affecting the livelihoods 
                                                             
101Survey data has shown that most World Cup tourists to Cape Town (79%) felt safe during their stay, 
compared to 50% of respondents in a 2003 study (George & Swarz, 2012:214). Several surveys also reported 
that 92% of World Cup visitors would recommend South Africa as a travel destination. Most were also willing 
to return to the country in the future. 
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of thousands of people. For example, the positive impression of World Cup visitors was 
marred by the highly publicised murder of Swedish tourist Anni Dewani, which occurred 
shortly after the World Cup when most soccer fans – and presumably most of the extra 
security forces – had left (George & Swart, 2012:203). 
 
It has been estimated that the murder of one tourist results in 200 potential visitors deciding 
on a different destination (Ferreira & Harmse, 2000:84). Those who persist in visiting South 
Africa despite its bad reputation often report crime as a key concern and tend to avoid the 
areas – such as central Johannesburg - with the worst reputations. South Africa has to 
compete with over 200 other emerging markets in the travel and tourism sector, some of 
whom can spend far more on marketing their brand. 
 
Crime is also identified as one of the primary reasons for South Africa‟s brain drain: the 
exodus of thousands of skilled people to more peaceful and prosperous societies (Petzer, 
2014). Estimating the number of South African emigrants has been rather difficult – it is hard 
to know who really leaves the country permanently - and figures differ wildly. Minimum 
estimates range from 232 000 to one million (Mattes & Mniki, 2007:26). A recent survey 
found that close to 11% of recent graduates either have left or want to leave the country 
(MacGregor, 2013). Mattes and Mniki (2007:32-38) found that there is only a moderate 
desire among potential emigrants to settle permanently in other countries, but that students 
are motivated by financial and safety concerns.  
 
The loss of human resources is sure to affect the country‟s economic growth, especially if 
emigrants do not return. Their emigration deprives the country of the investments made in 
their education and training and the economy also loses potential consumers (Mattes & Mniki, 
2007:25). Thus despite the reported return of approximately 400 000 South Africans who had 
previously left the country, there still remains a skills shortage amounting to 830 000 
vacancies (especially in engineering, finance, medicine and management) (Petzer, 2014). 
 
5.6 The “sick society” 
It is perhaps appropriate that crime and violence have been incorporated in a larger discourse 
on moral decay in South Africa. South Africa does not just have a violent crime problem, but 
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a problem of general lawlessness and entitlement that manifests in a variety of ways. There is 
a: 
 “Lack of respect for the sanctity of life, for the next person, private property, disregard for the 
law of the land, lack of parental control over children, and the general blurring of the lines 
between right and wrong [that] are continuing to plague our communities” (Jacob Zuma, quoted 
in Posel, 2005:247). 
 
In this “sick society” (Jacob Zuma, quoted in Posel, 2005:247) moral threat is not perceived 
as a problem outside of mainstream society, but rather as a sickness at the heart of it, 
affecting everybody in one way or another. Violence may simply be the most extreme 
expression of the problem. Outwater et al. (2005:135-139) states that violence has become 
normative in South Africa: an accepted expression of masculinity and method of conflict 
resolution. It has become the default strategy for resolving disputes and winning arguments. 
Violence is the method by which criminals brutalise their victims, who in turn want to use 
violence to remedy violence. In the process the lines between right and wrong and perpetrator 
and victim are blurred. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two and confirmed by the data in Chapter Four, the perception 
exists that human rights are an impediment to justice and safety – that the constitution 
extends more protection to criminals than to victims. There is thus great support for the return 
of capital punishment as well as severe sentencing practices and the use of force against 
suspects. The pressure on the police to address crime is so great, that they have increasingly 
turned to the use of militaristic tactics against criminal elements. Violent crime and the 
perception of violent crime are therefore “bad news” (Du Plessis & Louw, 2005:438) for the 
credibility and survival of democracy and human rights. South Africans are unlikely to fully 
embrace human rights norms in the face of extreme levels of everyday violence. In chapters 
one and two it was noted that the widespread attitudes regarding evil and violence may 
damage democratic consolidation by undermining the political system‟s human rights culture. 
This fear is borne out by the results from Chapter Four and the context presently provided. 
 
Liberal democratic rules of behaviour – or norms – seem to be weak in South Africa. There is 
thus a need for a more thorough understanding of human rights (and responsibilities) as well 
as a process of entrenching such rights as norms. Although South Africans acknowledge that 
there is a crime problem, they do not acknowledge the possibility of personal responsibility 
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for creating a disorderly environment in which crime thrives. Despite fear of, and outrage 
over crime, the average South African is often guilty of lesser or so-called victimless offences, 
such as littering or traffic violations.
102
 South Africans are more likely to be critical rather 
than supportive of attempts to address minor offences (Bezuidenhout, 2011:36). Everybody 
wants a solution to violence, but nobody wants resources to be wasted on petty crimes which 
they themselves may indulge in.
103
 
 
According to the well-known “broken windows” theory (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), an 
unwillingness to address small criminal infractions signals an unwillingness or inability to 
address larger infractions. A lax attitude regarding lesser offences either encourages the 
growth of crime or attracts criminals to dilapidated areas. Conversely, the strict application of 
the law with regards to minor offences, indicates a seriousness in dealing with all crimes, thus 
discouraging it. Once a small group of people start committing lesser offences with impunity, 
others tend to follow their lead and the situation can escalate to more serious problems. An 
orderly environment on the other hand, signals a social norm: “This is the kind of place 
where people obey the rules” (Pinker, 2011:124). Policing lesser crimes seems to discourage 
petty rule-breaking by otherwise law-abiding citizens. It also leads to the arrest of serious 
offenders as they often tend to be responsible for both serious and minor crimes (Fulda, 
2010:101-102).  
 
The issue of traffic violations is a good example of the above-mentioned dynamic. The 
London Department of Transport found a connection between traffic violations and more 
serious crimes (Bezuidenhout, 2011:36). They determined that those who commit traffic 
offences were often characterised by (at least) one of the following: a history of traffic 
                                                             
102South African roads suffer from poor law enforcement and reckless disregard for traffic rules (Bezuidenhout, 
2011:34). According to South Africans Against Drunk Driving (SADD), traffic accidents is the second biggest 
killer of males in South Africa after homicide (the order is reversed for females). The road traffic fatality rate is 
39.7 per 100 000 persons, mostly caused by drunken driving (31.9 deaths per 100 000) (SADD, 2015). Road 
accidents cost the country about R307 billion a year (Steyn, 2013). 
103This is also illustrated by the South African president himself: his speech quoted in this chapter – made 
when he was deputy-president - was in reference to the phenomenon of baby rape(Posel, 2005:247). However, 
in response to the numerous allegations of corruption against him (Du Plessis & Du Plessis, 2014; Smith, 2013), 
he called it (corruption) a crime that only exists in a “Western paradigm” (Du Plessis & Du Plessis, 2014) and 
even if it were a crime, there were no victims. 
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violations; a criminal record; involvement in other illegal activities.
104
 Table 5.4 illustrates 
this connection between traffic offences and other violations. 
 
Table 5.4 The connection between traffic violations and other offences 
Description of offence Illegally parked 
vehicles 
Legally parked 
vehicles 
Of immediate interest to police (stolen car, owner 
wanted by police, false registration) 
21% 2% 
Criminal record 33% 3% 
History of traffic violations 49% 11% 
Past use in crime 18% 0% 
Current illegality 11% 1% 
Table from London Department of Transport Research Report, quoted in Bezuidenhout (2011:36). 
 
The connection above was confirmed by the Albuquerque Police Department in the US, 
which noticed that the parts of the city with the highest incidents of car accidents and road 
rage were also the parts with the highest general crime rates. Their increased policing of 
traffic violations – which declined by 12% - also coincided with a 9.5% decrease in crimes 
against persons and a 3% decrease in property crimes.
105
 The preventing of traffic accidents 
alone saved $34 million in damages, while the traffic fines generated $4 million for New 
Mexico‟s education fund (Bezuidenhout, 2011:34-35).  
 
It would appear that the restoration of basic law and order (the enforcement of norms) does 
play a role in reducing crime in general (even though it may not be the only factor). It is not a 
substitute for addressing other causes of violence, but it may be part of a larger strategy in 
addressing the culture of crime and disorder. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
The reality of pervasive crime and violence in South Africa as well as the problems of 
poverty and inequality mean that the country is confronted with many sources of existential 
insecurity. Existential insecurity makes the adoption of liberal values and peaceful conflict 
                                                             
104Similarly, when police in plain clothes started arresting turnstile jumpers in New York’s subway stations in 
1990, many offenders turned out to be wanted by police and/or carrying illegal weapons. As the arrests 
continued, all types of subway crimes declined. The strategy of targeting misdemeanours was implemented in 
New York in general and despite a lack of empirical evidence, has been credited as a major reason for the city’s 
reduction in all kinds of crime (Miller & Wilson, 2001).  
105
Including a 29% decrease in murder, 17% decrease in kidnapping, 10% decrease in assault, 36% decrease in 
arson, 10% decrease in fraud and a 9% decrease in robbery and burglary (Bezuidenhoud, 2011:34-35). 
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resolution difficult. People are unlikely to seek peaceful resolutions when living with the 
stress of violent existential threat. Instead, they are likely to turn to other strategies: 
withdrawal from a disorderly and unsafe environment, the use of violent or aggressive tactics 
when having to deal with the outside world and the reliance on religious and spiritual 
guidance as a source of comfort. The beliefs and attitudes regarding evil and violence that are 
illustrated in Chapter Four are indicative of the problem of disorder and the consequent need 
for spiritual reassurance. While existential insecurity remains, it is doubtful that the liberal 
values discussed in Chapter Two can make significant headway with the population. Crime 
and violence weaken liberal values and norms, which then contribute to the disorder in which 
criminals thrive. 
 
The socio-economic causes of insecurity doubtless need to be addressed, but this cannot be 
done easily or quickly. In the meantime an effort must be made to signal a change in culture. 
South Africa may require a concerted effort to entrench human rights and responsibilities 
(such as civil participation) as norms in the country. It may be possible to use sources of local 
and traditional culture (the concept of ubuntu for example) as well as religion to frame such a 
discourse. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
6.1  Introduction 
The larger goal of this study has been to examine South Africa‟s illiberal values and 
behaviour – the belief in evil and consequent violence – within the context of democratic 
consolidation. The quantitative and qualitative data presented in the thesis point to the 
conclusion that these beliefs and actions are widespread and entrenched among South 
Africans of all backgrounds. Crime and violence appear to be fuelling existential insecurity, 
which reinforces illiberal beliefs. The end result is a society characterised by moral decay or 
normlessness
106
 and a struggle with opposing values (cognitive dissonance).
107
 This chapter 
briefly examines the forces that can counter a state of normlessness and how they are 
currently failing to do so in South Africa. This part of the study also makes suggestions for 
future research. 
 
6.2  The decline of violence 
In Leviathan (1651), Thomas Hobbes outlines three principal causes of violence: competition, 
diffidence and reputation (Hobbes, 1957:185). Violence may occur when people compete 
over resources. It also occurs when people(s) attack one another out of fear. In this case, the 
fear that one might be attacked by an enemy leads to a pre-emptive strike out of self-defence. 
Lastly, people become violent to protect their reputations or honour: if the enemy is 
sufficiently convinced that one will react to punish any disrespect, they may refrain from 
initiating any such disrespect (Pinker, 2011:33-34). 
 
According to Hobbes (1651/1957), the presence of a Leviathan – a strong central authority – 
reduces the anarchy (what he calls the state of nature) in which the above-mentioned forms of 
violence occur. The Leviathan intervenes in conflicts in order to reduce their negative social, 
economic and political impact. It does so through the use of the legal system. In the process it 
                                                             
106A state of normlessness occurs when the social norms that regulate behaviour become so weak that they 
are no longer effective rules of conduct (O’Donnell et al., 2006:217).  
107 Cognitive dissonance theory posits that someone who is confronted with two conflicting cognitions will 
experience psychological discomfort, which the person will try to reduce. This can be accomplished in various 
ways, for example: conflicting information can be changed or denied outright; It can also be accepted and thus 
induce a change in behaviour; alternatively, people may try to justify or rationalise the dissonance (Festinger, 
1957). 
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monopolises the use of violence and becomes the sole legitimate punisher of aggressors 
(Pinker, 2011:35). 
 
In addition to the pacifying influence of a strong state, another factor in the reduction of 
violence in modern times has been the “civilising process” (Pinker, 2011:59). In response to 
the emergence of the Leviathan in early modern Europe, European elites became more 
restrained. Impulse control was necessary if elites were to curry favour at the court of the 
king – the wellspring of most opportunity for advancement. It would no longer be the 
strongest warlord that automatically gained relative wealth and status – instead, positions, 
titles and land were often allocated to the most agreeable, responsible and refined. Those who 
were too aggressive, ambitious or impulsive could lose all in punishment. European elites 
adapted to the new situation and the bourgeoisie, seeking similar success, started to imitate 
them. Eventually the lower classes followed suit and the entire culture changed: 
“Europeans increasingly inhibited their impulses, anticipated the long-term consequences of 
their actions, and took other people’s thoughts and feelings into consideration. A culture of 
honour – the readiness to take revenge – gave way to a culture of dignity – the readiness to 
control one’s emotions. These ideals originated in explicit instructions that cultural arbiters 
gave to aristocrats and noblemen, allowing them to differentiate themselves from the villains and 
boors. But they [the new norms] were then absorbed into the socialisation of younger and 
younger children until they became second nature. The standards also trickled down from the 
upper classes to the bourgeoisie that strove to emulate them, and from them to the lower classes, 
eventually becoming a part of the culture as a whole” (Pinker, 2011:72). 
 
Three forces are therefore responsible for the modern decline in violence: the power of the 
state, the civilisation process spearheaded by elites and economic interdependence (already 
discussed in Chapter Two with regards to the democratic peace). However, Pinker (2011:106-
116) also notes the occurrence of a decivilisation process. Whereas the civilising process was 
a flow of norms from elites downward, it is also possible to experience the obverse. 
According to Pinker, as the Western world became more democratic, “hierarchies of taste and 
manners were levelled” (2011:110). Everyday life – including dress, language and manners - 
therefore became more casual and overly formal behaviour was ridiculed. Additionally, 
Western elites suffered a crisis of moral legitimacy as political scandals came to light from 
the 1960s onwards.
108
 A more democratic and informal world in which upper class behaviour 
                                                             
108
Pinker (2011:110) mentions the mistreatment of minorities and women as well as questionable military 
attacks as examples of the criticism directed at ruling elites in the West. 
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is rigorously criticised has tarnished some of the prestige traditionally associated with middle 
and upper class lifestyles, values and ambitions.  
 
A counterculture therefore emerged in the 1960s which challenged notions of 
interdependence, self-discipline and propriety and instead stressed individualism, self-
expression and the indulgence of impulses. At this time various forms of unconventional, 
dissolute and authority-flouting behaviour became permissible and even admirable. 
Sometimes this resulted in a tolerance for and romanticisation of violent behaviour as often 
expressed in popular entertainment. According to Pinker, “the glorification of dissoluteness 
shaded into an indulgence of violence and then into violence itself” (2011:112). Although 
there is no direct causal connection between violence in popular culture and actual violence, 
Pinker claims that the rejection of the values of the civilising process probably caused an 
increase in violence in the West as well as the increased celebration of violence in popular 
culture.
109
 One can expect general beliefs and popular culture to reinforce one another and 
“where susceptible individuals and subcultures can be buffeted one way or another, there are 
plausible causal arrows from the decivilising mindset to the facilitation of actual violence” 
(2011:113-114). 
 
6.3  Decivilisation in South Africa 
Once again one finds that the forces responsible for the West‟s decline in violence are not 
particularly strong in South Africa. In fact, Pinker (2011:89) mentions South Africa and 
Russia as examples of countries that may be experiencing a decivilisation process. As 
discussed in Chapter Two as well as Chapter Five, South Africa‟s economy faces many 
challenges and has not grown as fast as necessary to increase material security. Additionally, 
South Africa‟s transition from a strong, oppressive state to the freedoms of liberal democracy 
has loosened methods of social control (Nomoyi, 2000:67). Democratic South Africa‟s 
institutions are struggling to cope with social problems that were previously kept in check 
through the coercive methods of the Apartheid state. In South Africa, the Leviathan has 
weakened. Furthermore, the illegitimate nature and wrongdoings of the Apartheid state 
discredited the old ruling elite. Unfortunately, when the new ruling elite is compared to the 
old, it is often found wanting too.  
                                                             
109Despite the lack of a direct causal relationship between popular culture and violence, many studies have 
found various effects between violent media and aggressive behaviour – see Anderson et al., 2003 and Gunter, 
2008). 
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Despite some successes, South Africa‟s new rulers have not delivered the desired levels of 
economic growth and prosperity. Policies such as BEE have been labelled as reversed 
discrimination or tools for the enrichment of a corrupt few (Lipton, 2014:14). Such policies 
have certainly maintained and reinforced the racialised worldview and tensions of the 
Apartheid era. The same may be said for the comments of high ranking politicians, including 
the president, in which Westerners – and thus by extension the white minority – are blamed 
for South Africa‟s problems and failings (see Steward, 2015). The controversial removal of 
symbols and names reflecting the white minority‟s history and leaders continues even twenty 
years after the end of Apartheid.
110
 Whatever the possible merits to these practices may be, 
the end result is certainly not the non-racial society promised in 1994. 
 
It can also be argued that South Africa‟s new ruling elite has not proven capable of moral 
leadership. Allegations of fraud and corruption against high ranking officials are not 
uncommon in South Africa. Examples include the former chairperson of the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Ellen Tshabalala, who lied about her qualifications 
(Presence, 2014), former police chief and former president of Interpol, Jackie Selebi, who 
was convicted of corruption in 2010 (Cohen, 2015) and the president himself. Corruption 
allegations against President Zuma include money-laundering and racketeering charges that 
originate from a 1999 arms deal; the 2005 conviction of businessman Schabir Shaik who 
made payments to the then deputy-president in return for his assistance in business matters 
(Mail & Guardian, 2005); and the more recent scandal of R246 million that was improperly 
spent on upgrading Zuma‟s private residence at Nkandla (Du Plessis, 2014). Although Zuma 
has not been convicted of any wrongdoing, the persistent allegations of corruption and 
interference with the country‟s independent institutions have tarnished the reputation and 
credibility of the president and the ANC government.  
 
The president has also been accused of immorality, sexism and homophobia. Zuma – who 
was acquitted of rape in 2006 – has admitted to infidelity, fathering children out of 
                                                             
110The recent removal of the statue of Cecil John Rhodes at the University of Cape Town (UCT) (Felix, 2015:2) 
triggered numerous vandalous attacks on statues throughout the country. Examples include the burning of a 
Port Elizabeth statue commemorating the Anglo-Boer War (Schoeman, 2015:2), attacks on statues of General 
Louis Botha and Queen Victoria  in Cape Town (Die Burger, 2015 & Scheun, 2015:2) as well as Paul Kruger in 
Pretoria (Mailovich, 2015:2). 
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wedlock
111
 and having unprotected sex with an HIV positive woman (thus acting in 
contradiction of the government‟s attempts to promote condom use and fidelity in order to 
counter the spread of the virus) (BBC News, 2014). Zuma has also sparked outrage with 
various offensive comments and claims, including that the accuser at his rape trial had 
provoked their sexual encounter by wearing provocative clothing (BBC News, 2006); that it 
is wrong for women to remain single – that they should marry and have children (Pillay, 
2012); and his boast that, as a youth, he would have beaten a gay person who dared approach 
him (Daniels, 2006). 
 
According to Hunter (2011:1108-1121), the rise to power of Jacob Zuma – a populist leader 
with little formal schooling – is partly illustrative of poor South Africans‟ sense of betrayal at 
the failures of the government to deliver prosperity. While the previous president, Thabo 
Mbeki, is viewed as an aloof, intellectual neoliberal, Jacob Zuma started his career with a 
reputation for being down-to-earth and pro-poor. His lack of formal education and patriarchal 
values resonate with many South Africans. Many women, while acknowledging Zuma‟s 
sexism, also admire him as a “traditional respectable man” (Hunter, 2011:1107) who at least 
marries and provides for his girlfriends and children as opposed to discarding them as other 
men do.  
 
As class divides have deepened in post-Apartheid South Africa, those of the poor who have 
not been a part of the country‟s new black middle class success, have become derisive of the 
so-called “amamodelC” South Africans (Hunter, 2011:1108): the well-educated, prosperous 
black middle and upper middle classes whose success have left the poor feeling dispossessed 
and demoralised (Coplan, 2011:383). Their leadership – as epitomised by the elitist 
“intellectual king” (BBC News, 2014) Thabo Mbeki – has left the poor disaffected (Hunter, 
2011:1108).  
 
Zuma‟s early promise as the “peoples‟ president” (BBC News, 2014) has however also 
soured due to the corruption allegations against him. At former president Nelson Mandela‟s 
memorial service in 2013, Zuma was heckled and booed in front of world leaders by ruling 
party supporters. “He is eating when we are hungry” remarked one member of the public 
(BBC News, 2014). The sentiment that the government still does not care about the South 
                                                             
111Zuma is a polygamist who has married six times and currently has four wives (BBC News, 2014). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
137 
 
African poor also found expression in the aforementioned attacks on foreigners. Those held 
responsible for such xenophobic attacks report feeling like foreigners in their own country 
who are marginalised and even actively disliked by the authorities (Coplan, 2009:377-378). 
 
Post-Apartheid rulers and elites have thus proved disappointing. Their perceived avarice and 
neglect of the poor have sometimes led to negative comparisons with Apartheid elites. The 
massacre of the miners at Marikana – so reminiscent of Apartheid era bloodbaths – serves as 
another case in point (see Chapter Two). Discredited elites make the downward flow of 
civilising norms as described by Pinker (2011:72) quite difficult.  
 
A final important factor in the civilising process is the role of marginalised young men in 
violent societies (Pinker, 2011:166). When a large number of young men fail to integrate into 
society – when they fail to find steady employment and start families – an increase in 
violence is often experienced. According to Brooks (2013), men have traditionally strove the 
hardest for status and respect from their peers in order to improve their chances of finding a 
mate. Young men are accordingly most sensitive about their status in society and when 
suffering from low status, they are more likely to engage in dangerous behaviour in an 
attempt to remedy the situation: 
“Young men discount their futures and take ridiculous risks in order to improve their prospects. 
They also become more violent, rising more readily to perceived slights and insults, and starting 
more fights – often over trivial issues. These are the triggers for most man-on-man assaults and 
homicides” (Brooks, 2013). 
 
Hudson and Den Boer (2002:15) warn that single young men with low status are bound to 
socialise together, compete with each other and legitimise each other‟s risky choices. When 
grouped together they are likely to take bigger risks and become more violent than they 
would as individuals. Brooks (2013) and Pinker (2011:166) point to the lawlessness of the 
American frontier or “Wild West” as an example of the kind of violence that occurs when too 
many men have too little chance of a stable family life. Marriage and a settled family life 
appears to temper risky behaviour in men (literally decreasing their levels of testosterone). In 
fact, unmarried men (aged 24 to 35) are three times more likely to commit a murder and also 
more likely to commit other crimes such as robbery and rape (Hudson & Den Boer, 2002:12-
14).  
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Although South Africa does not have the serious imbalance of sex ratios of countries like 
China and India (Hudson & Den Boer, 2002), it does have a large population of impoverished, 
unemployed and unemployable young people. Young men from this demographic are likely 
to be keenly aware of their low social status and inability to support a family (Brooks, 2013). 
As discussed in Chapter Five (see also Dworkin et al., 2012), this lack of esteem may be 
responsible for the risky and violent behaviour of young South African men.  
 
Men‟s lack of social status may also be responsible for the breakdown of family life in South 
Africa as documented by the SAIRR. According to the SAIRR (2014:65), 47.2% of South 
Africa‟s children are growing up without their fathers even though the fathers in question are 
still alive. Only 34.8% of children in the country are being raised by both their parents. The 
majority of children are lacking at least one parent – usually their father. The lack of 
willingness or ability on the part of South African men to support their children may be 
indicative of their lack of social integration as discussed above. This lack of social integration 
– in such high numbers – increases the likelihood of risky behaviour among this demographic.  
 
South Africa‟s decivilising process therefore appears to be characterised by a number of 
factors: the history of political violence, the weakening of authority, the lack of moral 
leadership and finally, the large number of economically and socially marginalised young 
men. If this is indeed the case, one may expect to find the violence that plagues the country 
reflected in its popular culture. Two examples of the glorification of violence in South Africa 
have already been mentioned: the heroism of violent political struggle in which breaking the 
law was honourable (Chapter Five) and the sensationalist stories of evil and violence in the 
media (Chapter One).  
 
The history of violent struggle has remained a relevant part of popular politics. The symbolic 
politics of name changes and statue removals mentioned above is one example of the 
continued importance and reinforcement of historical divides and conflicts. Another is the 
continued use by political leaders and supporters of violent struggle songs like “Bring Me My 
Machine Gun” and “Shoot The Boer” (even though the latter has been ruled hate speech by 
South Africa‟s Equality Court) (Davids, 2014; IOL News, 2011). 
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As mentioned at the beginning of the thesis, South Africa‟s tabloid newspapers frequently 
feature sensationalist stories with violent and supernatural themes. The Daily Sun, which 
reaches 4.6 million readers, mostly from the black working class (Caldwell, 2011:873), is one 
of the most relevant examples. Examples of the kind of stories commonly featured include: 
 Buried Without His Head! Tears For Madala After Muthi Murder 
 The Head In The Fridge! Sangoma Bust Over Horror Find! 
 Credo Warns: Evil Is Upon Us!112 
 Dead Talk To Sangoma On Sun TV! 
 My Hair Talks To Ancestors! 
 Village Of Zombie Kids! 
 Satanists Did It! Dying Girl Tells Her Mum Of Bloody Attack! 
 SMS From The Devil! Family‟s Terror After Two Kids Die! 
 
In January 2014, the Daily Sun even reported that President Zuma used to practice witchcraft 
in order to defeat his Apartheid enemies (City Press, 2014).
113
 Daily Sun editors have freely 
admitted that – much like other newspapers – it tends to take the perspective that will be 
popular with its readers (Coplan, 2009:368). In other words, it is not informing its public of 
matters unknown to them, but rather catering to and reinforcing their existing beliefs, 
attitudes and interests. It is in fact common for newspaper coverage to be, not an objective 
reporting of the facts, but rather subjective descriptions of events with ready-made 
interpretations provided by journalists. Journalists and editors “select events that are atypical, 
present them in a stereotypical fashion and contrast them against a backdrop of normality 
which is overtypical” (De Wet, 2009:46).  
 
Although tabloids tend to be the most sensationalist in their content and reporting, other 
(print and broadcast) media also frequently report – in sensitive and insensitive ways - on 
South Africa‟s extreme violence (see De Wet, 2009). Coverage of high profile cases like that 
of accused murderers Oscar Pistorius (convicted of culpable homicide) and Shrien Dewani 
(case dismissed) as well as the mystery of the Stellenbosch axe murders have been highly 
                                                             
112
Credo Mutwa is one of South Africa’s best known traditional healers (Labuschagne, 2004:192). 
113An allegation that was denied by the president (City Press, 2014). 
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speculative and emotional.
114
 The long-term and sensationalist nature of the coverage give 
the impression that crime and violence can become entertainment. In fact, during his murder 
trial, Pistorius and his legal team were approached for autographs (Daily News, 2014). 
 
In addition to the news media, South Africans are exposed to the same forms of violent 
entertainment found in Western countries and documented by Pinker (2011:112-114). These 
forms of entertainment include movies, music and games with violent protagonists, scenes, 
lyrics and themes. While a form of escapism to some, such entertainment may have a more 
pernicious effect on others. Olivier and Cunningham (2004:99) have noted that the youth‟s 
first exposure to gang culture is often through music, television and movies. For those living 
in economically marginalised communities plagued by gang activities, the media glorification 
of violence (for example, Martin Scorsese and Quentin Tarantino films, television shows like 
The Sopranos or the gangsta-rap music genre)  can give the impression that crime provides 
excitement and status in an otherwise poverty-stricken and mundane existence.  
 
The media does not only romanticise violent criminals – often turning them into darkly 
alluring protagonists - but also glorifies the violence of the heroes. The heroes of Western 
action movies are usually extremely violent and anti-social characters who embark on 
widespread destruction in pursuit of an ideal of justice that often has more in common with 
the revenge killings of honour-bound societies rather than the legal proceedings of the 
Leviathan. In these films the focus is very much on the protagonist and/or the villain and not 
on the fate of helpless bystanders, shown as “nameless, faceless, shouting, hysterical people, 
slightly blurred, often out of focus” (Pillay, 2002:50). It is not very difficult to identify the 
parallels between the movie narrative and real violence such as gang warfare, daring mall 
robberies or police chases. Films – and other forms of media like gangsta-rap and hip-hop - 
articulate “the values of absolute individualism which are posited as oppositional to collective 
and social responsibility, that speaks more to a Hobbesian state of nature where life is „nasty, 
brutish and short‟” (Pillay, 2002:52). 
 
It is therefore not a coincidence that communities suffering from high levels of violence also 
tend to relate to and consume more violent entertainment. As Pillay (2002:50) points out, 
                                                             
114Some headlines include: “Corrections: No ‘Royal’ Treatment For Oscar” (News24b, 2015) and “Anni’s Sister: 
This Will Haunt Us For The Rest Of Our Lives (News24, 2014). See also News24a (2015) and Eggington (2015) 
for speculation about the murders in Stellenbosch. 
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cinemas located in Cape Town‟s working class neighbourhoods are more likely to be 
dominated by violent action movies. By contrast, “art house cinemas” for the “discerning 
film goer” (Pillay, 2002:50) are exclusively located in wealthy areas. Violence sells cultural 
products and those living closer to Hobbes‟s state of nature often prove especially good 
consumers. This is not because violent entertainment causes violence, but because the fiction 
reflects and reinforces aspects of reality and vice versa.  
 
The South African situation is thus one where the values of the liberal democratic state are 
competing with the absolute individualism of the Hobbesian state of nature. Values become 
weak because there is a “high expectancy that socially unapproved behaviours are required to 
achieve given goals” (Schoultz, 1978:82) and that “departures from prescribed behaviour are 
common” (83). The result is that liberal values are not always able to inhibit transgressive 
actions. The consequent disorder is further evidence of an aggressive and unpredictable world 
in which the individual must survive. It is in these circumstances that cognitive dissonance – 
psychological discomfort arising from conflicting beliefs and actions (Festinger, 1957) - 
becomes possible. Hinton (1996:819) illustrates cognitive dissonance with the example of 
smoking: 
“Upon hearing a report that cigarette smoking is bad for their health, for example, many 
smokers will likely be motivated to reduce the resulting psychological discomfort/dissonance by 
changing cognitions to make them more compatible (e.g., dismissing the research out of hand); 
circumspectly adding new cognitions that bridge the gap between the cognitive elements (e.g., 
finding information that indicates smoking is less dangerous than driving a car); or changing 
her or his behaviour (e.g., stopping smoking).” 
 
South Africans may not deny that breaking the law is wrong, instead it is justified in a variety 
of ways: larger crimes are not entirely the individual‟s fault, but due to bad circumstances or 
injustice – in fact, the offender is often the hero, using violence defensively to fight evil and 
obtain rights; smaller offenses, on the other hand, are not really as bad as real crime and can 
thus be overlooked. These kinds of “cognitive schemata” (Hinton, 1996:819) can become 
culturally shared, which seems to be the case in South Africa. 
 
6.4  Future research 
As pointed out previously (Chapter Three and Chapter Four), the conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of evil is rather problematic. Although researchers have conceptualised 
evil, it remains uncertain exactly how individual respondents interpret the concept. The WVS 
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presents respondents with questions on evil, but it neither clarifies these concepts to 
respondents, nor does it ask them about their personal interpretations. It can therefore not be 
definitively known what respondents mean when they register support for the statements on 
evil. The first statement certainly captures all possible definitions of evil, but the second and 
third statements can be interpreted literally or figuratively. In fact, it is possible for 
definitions of evil to converge, as may be the case when people refer to the evils or demons 
of poverty, drugs and disease (Jenkins, 2002:78). In this case the evil is literal in its effects 
and yet spiritual in its origin.  
 
Future research on evil will therefore in all likelihood have to take the problems of 
conceptualisation and operationalisation into account. It may be necessary to develop various 
definitions for survey respondents to choose from and to design studies around such 
definitions. This could clarify what South Africans mean when they refer to evil. Studies on 
the local level – in communities and neighbourhoods – could also provide insight on how 
different demographics might differ in their definitions, beliefs and behaviour. Despite these 
problems of definition, it will nevertheless be important to study future patterns of response 
to the WVS questions. This includes the three statements on evil and the many inconclusive 
relationships found in Chapter Four. 
 
Future research could also perhaps be linked to the study of normlessness in South Africa. 
Attempts to measure normlessless have been made in countries like the USA (see Kapsis, 
1979) and it may be productive to attempt the same in South Africa. It might be useful to 
study possible relationships between normlessness and attitudes regarding evil and violence 
as well as trust and tolerance. Research of the connections between norms and values on the 
one hand, and violence on the other, could produce potential solutions for illiberal attitudes 
and actions that threaten South Africa‟s democracy.  
 
Possible solutions may include the reinterpretation of religious or traditional values and 
customs like ubuntu in order to promote a liberal democratic culture, which would in turn 
strengthen – and be strengthened by – institutions. These solutions for South Africa may be 
quite similar to attempts to reinterpret religious and traditional values and practices in other 
parts of the world (see Chapter Two). In South Africa‟s case, attention must also be given on 
how reinvented values can be disseminated as norms. If elites prove to be ineffective 
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disseminators, there may be a need for grassroots or community-based organisations to take 
the lead. Additionally, policing of minor offences – as in Wilson and Kellings‟ “Broken 
Windows” (1982) approach, which is also discussed by Pinker (2011:123) - might help to 
signal a change in culture. The enforcement of lesser rules and laws need not necessary be a 
long-term practice in order to be successful (also see Chapter Five). 
 
6.5  Conclusion 
This study embarked on an exhaustive search for predictors of the beliefs in evil and support 
for consequent forms of violence among South Africans. This was done in the belief that 
illiberal values and actions hold implications for democratic consolidation. Quantitative 
analysis confirmed the strong presence of the said illiberal beliefs and attitudes. However, it 
was found that these beliefs and attitudes cannot be identified with any specific demographic 
or other group. Although relationships were found to exist between various groups and the 
statements on evil, these relationships were usually weak in nature and often contradictory. It 
was therefore concluded that the attitudes regarding evil are so widespread that minor 
differences between groups are less important than the overall strength and universality of the 
attitudes. 
 
Although further research is no doubt necessary to shed light on the subject, this study‟s 
qualitative analysis indicates that answers may be found in South Africa‟s high levels of 
violent crime and general disorder – produced by a weakened state, ineffective leadership and 
norm setting by elites, as well as challenging economic conditions. The situation has given 
rise to widespread insecurity, normlessness and cognitive dissonance as people perceive 
themselves to be in a disorderly environment where aggression is often the best strategy for 
safety and success. The study therefore urges the continued research of illiberal values in 
South Africa – particularly those surrounding beliefs and attitudes regarding evil and violence 
– so that more knowledge may lead to solutions.  
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